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ABSTRACT 
 
 The post-secular event within which we live is occasioned as the limit of the secular 
project.  The secular project meets its limit in attempting to separate a religious private sphere 
from a public sphere while at the same time repeating as a demand a religious subjectivation of 
the public sphere: demanding conformity to a simple subjectivity, producing a world of simple 
subjects through a theologically determined metaphysics of conversion.  In this latter demand 
secularism enforces a simplicity of its subjects and its world.  Yet this simplicity cannot be taken 
up into or as life.  To genuinely live and think the post-secular requires, then, not simply a 
resistance to the secular but a resistance to simplicity, developing ways of becoming otherwise 
than simply and of producing a world other than that which conforms to a metaphysics of 
conversion. 
 This dissertation proposes to meet the requirements of the post-secular event by 
developing a post-secular political ontology drawn from the work of Judith Butler and Alfred 
North Whitehead.  Read through and out of these two philosophers of becoming is a post-secular 
political ontology that is embedded within a metaphysics of creativity, a metaphysic that is itself 
already infected by the political.  At the intersection of the work of Butler and Whitehead a 
metaphysic arises that is a systematic discourse of the political.                
 From this metaphysic a political ontology is developed.  This political ontology begins 
with a suspicion of grammar as a suspicion of a subject-predicate form of thought that grounds 
ontologies of substance.  With this suspicion, being is allowed to unfold as its becoming, 
particularly as a becoming material, so that actuality is a becoming materiality.  This is also a 
relational becoming of feeling, becoming as a process of intensive feeling that can never be 
finalized for itself, always suffering its own continual downfall.  Finally, but without finality, 
actuality is a becoming of creativity, opened by a divine violence that ruptures history by the 
possible, leading to a post-secular political ontology of the future.   
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“These practices of instituting new modes 
of reality take place in part through the 
scene of embodiment, where the body is not 
understood as a static and accomplished 
fact, but as an aging process, a mode of 
becoming that, in becoming otherwise, 
exceeds the norm, reworks the norm, and 
makes us see how realities to which we 
thought we were confined are not written in 
stone.” 
 
Judith Butler 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.  On the need for a Post-secular political ontology 
 
More than a century before its recognition, Karl Marx diagnosed the failure of the secular 
project.  When he begins his analysis of Capital, a doubled conversion appears, a series of 
metaphysical operations marked by ―theological niceties,‖1 through which the commodity 
becomes:  individual labor is represented as general labor, while use value is transformed and 
transferred into relative (exchange) value.  We should resist, here, any temptation to an economic 
reductionism of this analysis: in addition to Marx‘s own observation that the commodity is 
produced through theological as well as metaphysical powers, we should not forget that this is 
also, famously, presented as an analysis of the fetishism of economics, and so is already 
presented as an analysis tainted by the religious discourse of his day.  It is, in other words, an 
analysis of the effect of the religious in the production of being.     
Within this already religious analysis, Marx argues that the value of the commodity is 
created by a series of conversions, which is also a certain transformation and movement.  The 
commodity is the representation of a transformation and movement, a logic of production that 
produces equality of kind out of difference.  Following through on an analysis that takes as its 
central commodities linen and coats, Marx argues that ―the linen acquires a value-form different 
from its physical form.  The fact that it is value is made manifest by its equality with the coat, 
just as the sheep‘s nature of a Christian is shown in his resemblance to the Lamb of God.‖2  As 
Marx points out, it is common to see in linens and coats a difference, and just as common for this 
difference to be erased by way of the representation of exchangeability.  It is the accomplishment 
of the first volume of Capital to rupture this movement – from difference to exchangeability – 
                                                 
1
Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 163.   
2
 Ibid. 143. 
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and to display this movement precisely as a movement whereby difference is converted into 
exchangeable value.  
 Analyzed in the first section of Capital is the peculiar mechanism of capitalism – the 
logic of capitalism – whereby value is created.  On one reading, this logic is simply the operation 
whereby human labor is converted into abstract general labor, such that ―labor time, the 
substance and measure of commodities, inscribes time as the matter and measure of 
equivalences.‖3  But things are not so simple.  Through the series of conversions whereby value 
as the measure of exchangeability is created, the object of exchange is moved away from itself, 
to become represented under the sign of value.  As Marx argues:  ―The existence of things qua 
commodities, and the value-relation between the products of labour which stamps them as 
commodities, have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and with the material 
relations arising therefrom.  There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in 
their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things.‖4  Within and as a social relation, 
value is always represented outside of the object itself – outside its materiality – in another, 
which determines its equivalence.  This externalization whereby value is attributed to an object is 
made by moving through the social in a serious of abstractions.  In a circular movement, this 
abstraction is productive of both social relations that are productive of value which function 
themselves through the abstractive production of value, such that the capitalist machine that 
creates valued commodities out of objects is also the production of social relations, of relations 
between laborers.   
Here, at the base of capitalism, in its baseness, works labor, being worked over into 
abstract labor, represented as value as timed.  Just as an object is converted into a commodity, so 
                                                 
3
Éric Alliez, Capital Times: Tales from the Conquest of Time, trans. by Georges Van Den Abbeele, Theory Out of 
Bounds, vol. 6 (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996),  xvi.    
4
 Marx, Capital, 165. 
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too labor is converted into wage labor, the measure of abstract labor.  Hidden within capitalism, 
a series of conversions – the production of an abstract labor, of a measuring time, of an 
equalizing value; each leading to a series of representations.  As Eric Alliez argues, within 
Marx‘s analysis, among these representations a certain ―metaphysical figure of capitalism‖ 
begins to appear.
5
  On Alliez‘s reading of Marx, this figure is itself a figure of time: a time 
unhinged from itself, free to be capitalized on, which runs throughout the history of Western 
metaphysics.  Today, at the end of this history, ―[t]he most aberrant movement has become the 
everyday itself, the daily mastery of money.  Here is found the old curse: money is time.‖6  For 
Alliez, capitalism arises within a time of avarice, where time, and all that occurs in time, can be 
conquered.  And so a conquest of time, which is also a time of conquest:  the conquest of 
Western metaphysics through and by the representation of time.    
To speak of a metaphysical figure of capitalism will always already be to speak of and in 
abstractions.  The proper task of philosophic analysis, as Alfred North Whitehead argues, is not 
to search for the truth of our figured abstractions, either in the unraveling of the surface of the 
figure or by peering behind the abstracted appearance as if there were a deeper reality waiting in 
hiding to be discovered.  Rather, the proper philosophical task is to take our figured abstractions 
seriously as abstractions.
7
  This is to understand our abstractions at work:  the work that they do 
in themselves, as well as the work that is done in fixing them as abstractions.  Understanding 
abstractions – metaphysical figures – in this manner, it becomes necessary to follow both Marx 
and Whitehead and direct our analysis towards the movements that have produced these 
                                                 
5
 Alliez, Capital Times, 2. 
6
 Ibid., xvi. 
7
As Whitehead argues in Science and the Modern World: ―You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is 
of the utmost importance to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction.  It is here that philosophy 
finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society.  It is the critic of abstractions.‖  Science and the 
Modern World (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 59. 
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abstractions.  It becomes necessary, in other words, to risk a fuller abstraction, one which can 
understand not only the production of commodities, but production itself.  And here we begin to 
depart from a strict reading of Marx, realizing that the machine of capitalism is itself built 
following plans made long before its own arising.  The logic of conversion that is the beating 
heart of the metaphysics of capitalism is not simply that through which the commodity is 
produced, but is more fundamentally a logic of production that runs through the history of 
Western metaphysics.  Rather than speak of a metaphysical figure of capitalism, it is better to 
draw on another phrase from Alliez, which he introduces through Augustine, and direct analysis 
towards a ―metaphysics of conversion.‖8  This is to designate as metaphysical, as a metaphysical 
logic, the machination that is conversion, a machine that can produce a world.                          
 In one sense, of course, Marx already recognizes that the metaphysical logic through 
which commodities are produced is not simply a logic for the production of objects.  Conversion 
as a metaphysical logic is also a certain subjectivation: a logic in which and through which 
subjects, in general, are determined.  This is the recognition from which Louis Althusser‘s 
intervention into Marxism begins.  In recognizing the logic of capitalism as an ideology that 
operates through the production of subjects, Althusser argues that ideology is a production 
whereby a ―concrete individual,‖ by ―a mere one-hundred-and-eighty-degree physical conversion 
. . . becomes a subject.‖9  ―Just as Christians are valued as sheep,‖ as Marx phrases it.  
Conversion, in this sense, becomes a metaphysical designation of the logic of interpellation, the 
                                                 
8
 Alliez, Capital Times, 80.  This designation needs to be distinguished from the same phrase as used by Etienne 
Gilson, in his discussion of St. Augustine.  Gilson argues that, concerning Augustine, ―[h]is doctrine is the 
metaphysics of his own conversion and remains pre-eminently the metaphysics of conversion‖ The Christian 
Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L.E.M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960), 240.  As used by Gilson, 
this phrase marks a crude psychologism that does not account for the extent to which the metaphysical nature of 
conversion for Augustine implicated in a series of authorizations and power relations that eventuate in God‘s 
creation of the world.     
9
Louis Althusser, ―Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),‖ in Lenin and 
Philosophy, and Other Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 174. 
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mechanism by which subjects are produced precisely as subjects.  And so the metaphysics of 
conversion comes to operate as and through the production of subjects, so that to be is to be 
converted.   
 At this point, it would seem that we are still at a distance from the secular.  On the one 
hand, rather than diagnosing the demise of the secular project, in arguing that capitalism arises 
out of a theological logic, filled with theological niceties, Marx seems to be laying the 
groundwork for secularism.  He is, in other words, inaugurating a critical secularizing of 
capitalism, completing, as he himself will argue, the unfulfilled liberation begun by Ludwig 
Feuerbach.   On the other hand, the analysis has only moved from commodities to subjects, even 
if these subjects are ideologically produced.  Secularism, it often seems, is a sociological 
determination of institutional separation: the separation of the private and the public as the 
justification for, although possibly also the accomplishment of, the separation of the religious 
from the secular spheres of public life.
10
  To arrive only at conversion as a productive logic of 
subjects is to not yet arrive at this institutional secular project.     
Here it becomes necessary to turn to the work of Talal Asad who argues that secularism 
is ―an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and 
transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, 
gender, and religion.‖11  The secular project is not simply or fundamentally a reorganization of 
social space, but is also a production of subjects.  Now, of course, as Asad continues, this 
production itself can only occur within a certain social space, one which is itself secularized, yet 
it remains the case that the power of this construction flows through and as the production of 
                                                 
10
 Judith Butler, ―Is Judaism Zionism?‖ in The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere, Judith Butler, et. al., ed. with 
intro. By Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathon Van Antwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 71. 
11
 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 5. 
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subjects.
12
  Further, as Asad clearly indicates, the productivity that the secular enforces is a 
production by way of conversion, conversion now understood as the logic of transcending 
difference in the service of a simple political representation.  In its secular instantiation, 
conversion becomes the demand to a simple political subjectivity determined as citizen, a 
demand that is enticed by a promise of self-possession through political representation.
13
  As a 
movement to political representation, conversion becomes a means for overcoming difference, 
the differences of particularity and the differentiating of particularities.  But again, as Asad 
argues, this demand to be converted does not itself arise ex nihilo; it is, rather a demand that is 
achieved within a conversion of time and space: the production of a time and space of 
conversion.
14
  The secular project is then a project for the determination of time, space and 
subjectivity, a determination that is itself an enacting of a logic of conversion.  The secular 
project, then, is ground in and comes to be grounded by, a series of theological niceties, and in 
the name of overcoming a religious demand is itself enacting its own religious command to be 
converted.    
 In order to make this connection – from conversion as the production of the commodity 
to conversion as the demand of the secular – a certain metaphysical abstraction must be made, 
one which reverses our earlier abstraction.  To connect the secular project with capitalism it is 
necessary to abstract from both a logic of conversion that they both take up and are taken up into.  
This metaphysical abstraction presents its own dangers, for in the heights of abstraction it is 
always possible to perform our own aeronautic acrobatics, enacting a theoretical conversion by 
                                                 
12
 This is, as Asad himself argues, to follow through on an understanding of the movements of power and 
productivity first articulated by Michel Foucault.  Ibid., 16. 
13
 Judith Butler, ―The Sensibility of Critique: Response to Asad and Mahmood,‖  in Is Critique Secular?: 
Blasphemy, Injury and Free Speech, Asad, Talal, Judith Butler, Saba Mahmood, and Wendy Brown  (The Townsend 
Papers in the Humanities, Doreen B. Townsend Center for the Humanities, UC Berkeley, 2009), 120. 
14
 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 5.   
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projecting a similarity onto that which is itself differentiated.  To speak of a singular 
metaphysical logic that capitalism and secularism both take up risks conflating two very different 
historical movements that are themselves internally differentiated.  It is important to be clear, 
then, that the metaphysical logic of conversion is always itself a logic of production that is 
enacted in and through the differences that it seeks to overcome.  Again, it is a logic for the 
production of similarity out of difference, and so a logic for overcoming difference that is itself 
always differentiated. 
 Yet the risk of abstraction also carries its own reward.  In proposing that the secular 
project takes up a logic that is also taken up by capitalism, we are able to understand one aspect 
of why the failure of the secular project is often also bound up with a failure capitalism.  Without 
subscribing to a deterministic dialectical theory of history, it is necessary to recognize that the 
failure of the secular project, just as the failure of capitalism, is a product of both internal 
contradiction and external resistance.  The secular project, just as capitalism, is failing because it 
harbors within itself a demand for conversion and from being actively and forcibly resisted for 
demanding a conversion.  This is not to dismiss the reality that the resistances to the secular 
project and to capitalism are also both often bound up with a resistance to a Western imperialism 
that goes under the name of the modern.  Rather, at issue in the demand of a metaphysics of 
conversion is the micro-power of the logic of this imperialism: a demand to be converted 
precisely in order to be, and to be simply.
15
  Whether this is the demand by which objects must 
already be commodities or political subjects must be citizens alone, the logic through which this 
demand is enacted is a logic of conversion.  So the resistances to this demand for conversion are 
always and in diverse ways attempts to become otherwise.    
                                                 
15
 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 81. 
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 With this it becomes possible to see the failure of fundamentalist resistances to both the 
secular project and capitalism.  As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue, contemporary 
fundamentalist resistances to capitalism (and, we can add, the secular project) are marked not 
primarily by their theological conservatism but by their subjective demand.  Fundamentalism is, 
in this sense, the demand for a simple subjectivity, one that exists as and within the static being 
of alienation, frozen against its own productive differentiating power, through which the subject 
itself disappears both as an individual and as a body.
16
  The theological and political projects of 
fundamentalism are only possible on the condition of this subjectivation.  As we will see in what 
follows, the subjectivity of fundamentalism is the subjectivity that is produced by a logic of 
conversion: a simple subjectivity, static and frozen, disappearing in its own being, so that 
fundamentalism is not, in the end, a resistance to that which it opposes.           
Even with this failure of fundamentalism, the end of the metaphysics of conversion is 
dawning in what is now designated as a post-secular event.
17
  Fundamentalisms have most 
vocally taken up the mantel of living this event, even though they unknowingly repeat the very 
demand of the secular.  Yet fundamentalism is only one of the many resistances to the secular 
project and capitalism.  It has now become clear that the secular project has reached its limit.  
What follows, under the heading of a post-secular political ontology, is an attempt to take 
seriously the possibility presented as the post-secular event.  This is, quite simply, the possibility 
of becoming otherwise, of becoming other than that which is demanded by conversion.  But in 
order to be faithful to this event, it becomes necessary to fully articulate the metaphysics of 
                                                 
16
 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 
2009), 32-35. 
17
 Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler, ―What is Continental Philosophy of Religion Now?‖ in After the 
Postsecular and the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, eds. Anthony Paul Smith and 
Daniel Whistler (Newcastle on Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 13.   
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conversion that is coming to an end.  And for that, we must turn to the beginning of conversion 
by returning to Augustine.  
2.  The Metaphysics of Conversion   
To begin with Augustine. 
Yet Augustine is not an absolute beginning, the first appearance of the absolutely new 
and unprecedented.  To make this claim is to already decide on the extent of a certain Platonic 
and Neo-Platonic influence, on a certain Roman or African Augustine, and finally a certain 
(orthodox) Christian Augustine.
18
  What is unique about Augustine is what is unique about each 
moment:  namely, that in Augustine an entire history is brought together to create a new moment 
in the world, a new way of being in the world.   
In this objectification of Augustine, it seems necessary, if we are looking for that moment 
when a certain metaphysics of conversion appears, to turn to the Confessions, Augustine‘s own 
autobiographical and narrative creation.  Augustine‘s Confessions begins with a cry for help:  
―How shall I call upon my God, my God and Lord?‖ (I, 1).19  Although much can, and has, been 
made of this existential cry from which flows both confession and autobiography, for Augustine, 
this cry unfolds with a certain cosmological weight as it moves immediately from confession to 
creation.  Through a reading of Genesis 1:1, Augustine‘s initial questioning cry is multiplied:  
―Who then are you, my God?‖, ―What, I ask, but God who is Lord?‖, ―Who will enable me to 
find rest in you?‖, ―Who are you to me?‖ (I, 4-5).   Appearing in these opening sections of the 
Confessions, through a tightly woven rhetorical play of confession, prayer, questioning, and 
                                                 
18See especially Peter Brown‘s biography Augustine of Hippo (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).  
Although this work has, in some respects, been advanced upon in recent scholarship, it is still the definitive 
biography of the complexity of Augustine‘s life.  
19
 Saint Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, Oxford World Classics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).  All further references will be designated in text by book and chapter. 
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scriptural quotation, is a logic whereby salvation, as the possibility of conversion, is read through 
creation. 
Within this multiplying rhetoric the Confessions presents three conversions, each 
mimicking the other.  As Eugene Vance argues, the ―narrative discourse must be seen as 
belonging to a configuration of multiple discourses [that correspond] to a structure of reality that 
is not manifested in any instance of a specific discourse.‖20  So there is, first, Augustine 
recollecting himself out of the depths of his life, a recollection that culminates in his own 
conversion (Books I – IX); second, a discourse on memory, as a theoretical doubling of his 
autobiographical recollection (Book X); and third, an exegesis of Genesis 1, which is itself God‘s 
conversion of the creation (Books XI – XIII).  Within this division of the Confessions, the final 
section retrospectively explains and, more importantly, authorizes,
21
 the first two sections: as 
God brings creation into order, so Augustine brings his own life into order through recollection 
and conversion, and recollection is established as the means to becoming and knowing this 
converted being through memory.
22
  In these conversions, Augustine reads himself into the 
narrative of God‘s creation where he is finally able to recognize himself as God‘s creation.  This 
point of recognition is, as Jill Robbins argues ―the narrative‘s point of maximum closure, its 
                                                 
20
Eugene Vance, ―The Functions and Limits of Autobiography in Augustine‘s ‗Confessions,‘‖ Poetics Today 5, no.2 
(1984): 400. 
21
In a discussion of recent anthropological theory, Asad rightly insists on the distance, and connection, between the 
two authors of biography:  ―The sense of author is ambiguous as between the person who produces a narrative and 
the person who authorizes particular powers, including the right to produce certain kinds of narrative.  The two are 
clearly connected, but there is an obvious sense in which the author of a biography is different from the author of the 
life that is its object.‖  Genealogies of Religion; Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 4.   
22
As John Freccero has argued, ―It is as if the historical Augustine had been refined away by his conversion and had 
become commentator on the very structure that retrospectively seemed to be the principle of his own life‘s 
organization.  In other words, the conversion marks the transformation of autobiography into allegory.‖  
―Autobiography and Narrative‖ in Reconstructing Individualism; Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western 
Thought, ed. by Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1986), 28.   
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dogmatic foundation, its circular establishing of origin.‖23  This is also the point where 
autobiography becomes metaphysics, a metaphysic of absolute adequacy for being and knowing 
the world.       
Before this closure can be achieved, within a narrative already in progress, Book VII 
begins with a note of remorse, of regret:  ―The older I became,‖ Augustine laments, ―the more 
shameful it was that I retained so much vanity as to be unable to think any substance possible 
other than that which the eyes normally perceive‖ (VII, 1).  At this point in the narrative, 
Augustine has successfully, and beneficially, he thinks, already given up a certain immersion in 
the desires of this world, desires for worldly fame and glory; he has also given up, beneficially, 
he thinks, the search for Truth and Wisdom in the crude materialism of the Manichaeans.  Yet 
Augustine is still unable to think God beyond the material, which is, for him, a desperate 
situation.   
For the newly bishoped narrator of the Confessions, to think God as materiality is to think 
a heresy.  Augustine goes to great lengths – repeating the dogma of God‘s immateriality 
excessively – to distance himself from his previous Manichaean self.24  Yet his argument, in 
Book VIII, only lightly can be called an argument.  It is much closer to the forceful assertion of 
dogma than anything else.  Although it is also difficult to call this assertiveness faith, it is clear 
that both reason and faith, for Augustine, trouble this thought of God as an extended, immutable 
                                                 
23
Jill Robbins, ―Circumcising Confession:  Derrida, Autobiography, Judaism,‖  Diacritics 25, no.4 (Winter 1995): 
26.   
24
As Roland J. Teske, S.J. argues, given that Augustine was one of the first Christians in the West to articulate a 
concept of God as incorporeal, his insistence on the orthodoxy of this position ought to be seen not only as a certain 
rhetorical distancing from the Manichaean‘s, but also the rhetorical insistence on the Orthodoxy of his own Milan 
inspired Neo-Platonist Christianity.  ―The Heaven of Heaven and the Unity of St. Augustine‘s Confessions,‖ 
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 74, no.1 (2000): 39. 
12 
 
materiality, and so Augustine himself is troubled by his inability to think otherwise than 
materially.
25
 
More importantly, for Augustine, moral difficulties arise when trying to think God as 
both an infinite body and as incorruptible and unchanging.  If it were possible to imagine God as 
an infinite physicality,
26
 this would then imply that all things are in God, just as God would be in 
all things.  To preserve God‘s absolute goodness, then, two options would seem available: either 
God is good but finite, and there is another substance equal to God which is Evil, thus affirming 
the Manichaean heresy, or God is both evil and good, and therefore liable to change and ruptured 
by an internal difference.   
The liability to change and internal difference that this latter option opens is registered, 
for Augustine, as the possibility of a conflict of will in God.  For God to be incorruptible means 
that ―no act of will, no necessity, no unforeseen chance‖ can corrupt God, for God ―is God and 
what he wills for himself is good, and he is that same good‖ (VII, 6, emphasis added.).  Not only 
is God‘s incorruptibility registered as a unity of will, this will is further unlimited in its efficacy:  
―For the will and power of God is God‘s very nature‖ (VII, 6).  God is God as incorruptible and 
unchangeable as unity – as One:  a One that is unlimited and good will.  Not that this will can be 
predicated of God, nor that this unlimited power can be predicated of God, nor that goodness can 
be predicated of God.  Rather, God is this very will, power and goodness, as One, in essence.
27
  
Yet this unity is, although necessary, nearly impossible for Augustine to think.   
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Just at this moment, a pedagogical miracle occurs: God brings to Augustine‘s attention 
―some books of the Platonists‖ (VII, 13).28  As if to prove that God‘s providence is, if nothing 
else, ironic, the one who brings these Platonic books to Augustine‘s attention is ―a man puffed up 
with monstrous pride,‖ embodying that which the Platonic books lack: namely, humility, the 
humility of Christ made flesh.
29
  Yet, even with this deficiency, it is in these books – most likely 
of Plotinus and Porphyry –  that Augustine finds not only a hint of the Gospel (―not of course in 
these words, but with entirely the same sense and supported by numerous and varied reasons‖ 
[VII, 13]), but also a way to think God beyond materiality and multiplicity.  Augustine finds in 
these books of the Platonists the way around his intellectual block to thinking God as simple 
non-material being.
30
 
The path to this knowledge, as advocated in the Platonic books, begins with a turn 
inward, and with his ―soul‘s eye‖ Augustine is able to see ―above that same eye of my soul the 
immutable light higher than my mind.‖  This light transcends his own thought, establishing a 
valued relation:  the light, Augustine argues, is ―superior because it made me, and I was inferior 
because I was made by it‖ (VII, 16).  This turn inward and upward is registered as both a turn to 
the self, the inner workings of the self as an intellection, as well as a turn from the immanent to 
the transcendent: from sensibilia to intelligiblia: from bodies and places, to vision and light.  
                                                                                                                                                             
greater than God.  So he is great with a greatness by which he is himself this same greatness….  The same must be 
said about goodness and eternity and omnipotence and about absolutely all the predications that can be stated of 
God, because it is all said with reference to himself, and not metaphorically either or in simile but properly – if 
anything, that is, can be said properly about him by a human tongue.‖  The Trinity, ed. by John E. Rotelle, O.S.A.,  
trans. by Edmund Hill, O.P. (New York: New City Press, 1991), V, 11.     
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With the illumination of this light, Augustine is able to think God as immaterial, and to do so in 
such a way as to save God‘s simple goodness.31  For on the one hand, Augustine argues, just as 
the source of light is itself not visible, neither is God visible as the source of light.  God‘s nature 
is invisible, and in a quick movement, Augustine can now argue that God is also immaterial.  As 
light and the source of light, God is that which makes the sensibilia possible, while remaining 
other than that which is witnessed as and through the sensibilia.  Further, Augustine is able to 
now understand God as Being as light and source of light.  Since everything that is is because of 
this light, and yet is not this light, difference from God is understood as a lack, as distance.  And 
since God is good, all that comes from this light is also good, and its goodness is measured by its 
distance from the Good, from the source of light, which is also its difference from God.   
With these Platonic books, and God as his guide, Augustine is able to begin the journey 
to illumination:  
In the course of this inquiry … I was making, I found the unchangeable and authentic eternity of 
truth to transcend my mutable mind.  And so step by step I ascended from bodies to the soul 
which perceives through the body, and from there to its inward force, to which bodily senses 
report external sensations, this being as high as beasts go.  From there again I ascended to the 
power of reasoning to which is to be attributed the power of judging the deliverances of the 
bodily senses.  This power, which in myself I found to be mutable, raised itself to the level of its 
own intelligence, and led my thinking out of the ruts of habit.  It withdrew itself from the 
contradictory swarms of imaginative fantasies, so as to discover the light by which it was 
flooded….  So in the flash of a trembling glance it attained to that which is.  At that moment I 
saw your ‗invisible nature understood through the things which are made‘ (VII, 23).   
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By passing through a series of judgments on judgment, a series of measurements, Augustine is 
able to travel this path inward and upward, guided by divine illumination, to catch a glimpse of 
the source of light – a glimpse of God.  
 But this is only a glimpse, a passing glance.  Although Augustine is able to know God, he 
is unable to sustain this vision.  Augustine finds himself ―caught up to you [God] by your beauty 
and quickly torn away from you by my weight. With a groan I crashed into inferior things.‖ (VII, 
23).  The Christianized Platonic path of judgment and measurement provides the intellectual 
means for understanding God, but it gives no indication of how to sustain that vision. Through it 
Augustine is unable to sustain his vision of God.  Illumination, as an epistemological matter, is 
literally a letdown.  It is with this thud, this let-down, that we hear the limits of Platonism for 
Augustine, and so find inaugurated the movement from Book VII to Book VIII of the 
Confessions, which is also the move from the gospel of the Platonists to the books of Paul, and 
grace, which is also, for Augustine, the move from epistemology to ontology.  Although the 
knowledge of God is necessary for seeing God, it is not sufficient.  An ontological conversion is 
also necessary.  To be sustained in the Light, it is necessary for Augustine to become weightless.  
With this, ―the final outcome of [Augustine‘s] search for wisdom‖ is found ―not in the 
descriptions of the vision of God in Book VII, but in his account of his decision to accept 
Christian discipline in Book VIII.‖32  
 Book VIII begins, then, with a new desire:  ―My desire was not to be more certain 
of you but to be more stable in you‖ (VIII, 1).  More than knowledge, what is needed is a way of 
being, a certain stability.  The desire to sustain the vision of God is now transposed into the 
desire for one will – for a will of/for God.  With this as a background, the narration of 
Augustine‘s conversion – which will be the attainment of a new will – comes quick.  Following a 
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series of readings, which will become a series of citations of conversion, Augustine finds himself 
tormented in the garden of his own beginning.  In the midst of this torment, a voice:  ―Pick up 
and read, pick up and read.‖  Quickly surmising that this is not the simple chant of a schoolyard 
game, and so must be a divinely originated utterance, if not an utterance from the divine, 
Augustine retrieves the book of St. Paul he had earlier been reading:   
I seized it, opened it and in silence read the first passage on which my eyes lit: ‗Not in riots and 
drunken parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord 
Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts.‘  I neither wished nor needed to read 
further.  At once, with the last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from all anxiety 
flooded into my heart.  All the shadows of doubt were dispelled (VIII, 29).   
And so, for the moment, it is over.  Augustine is changed.  With a flood of light, he is made light.  
Just as quickly as his conversion comes in the narrative, the narrative itself passes.  One 
more chapter on his last days as a rhetorician, the death of Monica, strangely compressed, and 
the narrative is over.  A flooding of light is all we are told of.  For those who wish to find the 
culmination of the Confessions in Augustine‘s conversion, Book VIII is quite troubling: as a 
climax this is amazingly flat, providing no explanation of the means of Augustine‘s conversion: 
everything is left as a question.  If we wish to know more about this conversion, we will need to 
look elsewhere than in Book VIII.  In the narrative recollection of this moment, Augustine can 
only have recourse to a strangely transmitted voice of God and a citational history.  The narrative 
itself cannot tell anymore of this conversion.  As James Wetzel argues the moment of conversion 
cannot itself be narrated because it is the basis of the narrative.
33
  To be the ground of its own 
being it must, it seem, remain hidden as a pure occasion.  To discuss conversion itself, there is a 
need to start again on a new plane of discourse, in a different mode of thought and writing.  It 
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becomes necessary to move from autobiography to creation, from self-writing to God‘s creation 
as spoken creation, a certain speech that creates the world.   
In Book XI of the Confessions, an account of creation begins as an extended exegesis of 
Genesis 1, an exegesis that will structure the remainder of the Confessions.  In exploring God‘s 
creation, Augustine is initially tempted to begin where his own life might begin, with an 
investigation of his own pre-conversion life read now as mirroring the invisible and unorganized 
earth of Gen. 1:2.  Like his own life prior to its post-conversion recollection, this earth was a 
chaotic sea, ―a deep abyss over which there was no light because it had no form‖ (XII, 3).  A 
chaotic mess.  But without form or light, would this abyss not then more properly be nothing?  
Yet out of this deep abyss flows the earth, which is, quite clearly, not without form, and is 
something; it is overflowing with bodies that have form.  The mark of these bodies is not their 
absence of form, but the very fact that they change form, ―they cease to be what they were and 
begin to be what they are not‖ (XII, 6).  From formless to formed, and back to formless.  From 
one form to another form.  This is the movement of change, which is also the mark of all that is 
created.  Yet this seems, for Augustine, logically quite impossible.  If being is form, a Platonic 
doctrine Augustine hesitantly accepts, then the formless will also be being-less.  But if being-
less, then nothing.  What is there, then, to take on form?  So Augustine proposes a certain 
―nothing something,‖ [nihil aliquid] ―a being which is non-being‖ [est non est] (XII, 6). God‘s 
creation is not a simple matter of the movement from nothing to something; there is first this 
intermediary ―nothing something.‖  This deep abyss, chaotic sea, ―nothing something,‖ is now 
the site of Augustine‘s attention, and will become the distinguishing mark of his exegesis.  It will 
also be the site from which the world is born.
34
    
                                                 
34
 Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003), 74-75. 
18 
 
Augustine is tempted by the sight of this ―nothing something,‖ tempted to see it as the 
formless matter out of which God created.  The text of Genesis 1, as Augustine reads it, 
continually wants to equivocate between this ―nothing something,‖ and a creation which ―made 
something and made it out of nothing.‖  If this ―nothing‖ is to take form, must it then be the 
―nothing something‖?  A ―nothing something‖ spoken of as ―nothing‖ for those of us with 
―slower minds‖ for us to have ―some notion of the meaning where no word is available except 
that of familiar usage‖?  But this would then mean that this ―nothing something‖ is co-eternal 
with God, not created, but that out of which God created.  This challenge to God‘s preeminence 
cannot be allowed.
35
  For Augustine, only God is eternal, and it is the very mark of eternity that it 
is only God who is changeless eternity:  ―‘You alone have immortality,‘ for you are changed by 
no form or movement‖ Augustine pleads with himself as confession (XII, 11).  So even this 
―next-to-nothing,‖ the ―nothing something,‖ was itself created out of nothing (XII, 8).  God 
created this chaotic, formless abyss out of nothing, and from this ―nothing something‖ all else 
will be created.  
So to preserve God as ultimate Creator, through the creatio ex nihilo, Augustine doubles 
the creation of the ―heaven and earth‖ spoken of in Gen. 1:1.  Prior to the creation of this earth 
and this heaven, Augustine argues, there was a prior creation of a first heaven and a first earth.  
The original ―nothing something,‖ the deep abyss, is split into ―two entities, one close to [God], 
the other close to being nothing; the one to which only [God is] superior, the other to which what 
is inferior is nothingness‖ ( XII, 7).  The first entity, heaven, will become the ―heaven of 
heaven,‖ while the second entity, earth, will become the ―heaven and earth‖ of this world.  Out 
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of the chaotic abyss, the ―nothing something,‖ is drawn two worlds, the ―heaven of heaven‖ and 
the ―heaven and earth.‖  Chaos is converted from formless matter into two entities.  The first 
entity ―has become converted to that which cannot change either for the better or for the worse,‖ 
while the second entity ―remains . . . to be converted to [God] by whom it was made‖ (XIII, 4 & 
5). 
Again, Augustine is here drawn into the difficult position of positing that the ―heaven of 
heaven‖ is itself immutable.  For God to possess the ―heaven of heaven‖– for the ―heaven of 
heaven‖ to ―belong‖ to God – would require, Augustine seems to believe, that the ―heaven of 
heaven‖ in some way be like God, at least in regards to change; not equivalent to God, but in 
some way like God.  Possession, apparently, as the only possible mode of being with God, is 
registered as necessarily the possession of that which is similar. If this were the case, though, 
then the ―heaven of heaven‖ would be free from change and time, and therefore eternal, co-
eternal with God.  The Augustinian dogmatism of God‘s preeminence will not allow this.  For 
God is the one transcendent Creator.  The mutability of the ―heaven of heaven‖ must remain in 
principle, even if in practice this mutability is checked.   
To achieve this similarity, in a moment, in the blink of an eye, ―without any lapse to 
which its createdness makes it liable, by cleaving to [God], [the heaven of heaven] finds power 
to check its mutability‖ (XII, 9).  The fluidity of the abyss is frozen out of time.  By the grace of 
God, a portion of the deep abyss is snatched from perdition into the static contemplation of God.  
Literally, by the grace of God, for the ―heaven of heaven‖ would have been ―dissimilar to [God] 
unless by [God‘s] Word it had been converted to the same Word by whom it was made, so that, 
illuminated by Him, it became light and, though not in an equal measure, became conformed to a 
form equal to [God]‖ (XIII, 3).  Drawn back to its source of creation, a circular movement of 
20 
 
being establishes the ―heaven of heaven‖ in God‘s possession.  By the work of the Word, by the 
work of Christ, the ―heaven of heaven‖ is drawn to God, and its ―delight is exclusively in [God].  
In an unfailing purity it satiates its thirst in [God].  It never at any point betrays its mutability‖ 
(XII, 12).  Cleaving to God, the ―heaven of heaven‖ remains pure, which is the denial of its own 
fluidity.  By the work of the Word, the ―heaven of heaven‖ is in practice what it is not, and 
cannot be, in principle.  
In the frozen confinement of its own fluidity, the ―heaven of heaven‖ is now also the 
House of God (XII, 12).
36
  And it is this House that will become Augustine‘s desired abode, a 
House free from the teeming multiplicity of the other earth, the earth that has not yet been 
snatched up into its own being.  But life is lived in this other teeming earth, an earth dominated 
by its yet unfrozen ―salty sea-water,‖ filled with a humanity ―deeply inquisitive, like a sea in a 
stormy swell, restlessly unstable‖ (XIII, 28).  Created beings, Augustine argues, do not yet have 
their existence in the ―heaven of heaven,‖ but rather live in the non-converted ―heaven and 
earth.‖  They both live in a world marked by change and are themselves subject to change.  This 
changeability, then, is also the mark of their lack of true being, for true being, as God, is being 
not subject to change.  It is to this being, this changeless and timeless being, Augustine insists, 
that all creation is called. 
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If the relation between the material, created world to its creator God is explainable for 
Augustine as a relation of form giving, so that the created world is marked by its ability to 
change form, which is also the ability to take on form, the relation between the temporality of 
this created world and God‘s eternity is much more complex.  God did not, in creating out of 
nothing, merely create this material world.  God also, Augustine insists, created time in creating 
the world.  Just as there was no place before creation, there was also no time (XI, 15).  
Specifically, this second ―heaven and earth‖ was created not only from the ―nothing something,‖ 
but also created with time,
37
 and so from then on, form and change, on the one hand, and time, 
on the other, will always appear together.  As Augustine argues, ―Out of this [nothing something] 
were made a second heaven and a visible and ordered earth and beautiful waters and everything 
else mentioned in the creation narrative after days had come into existence.  These things are 
such that they are subject to ordered changes of movement and form, and so are subject to the 
successiveness of time‖ (Conf., XII, 15).  Time, then, is the mark of the created world, as the 
measure of change, as the measure of all that exists as created. 
Yet it is not simply a question of time, as if the times are singular.  Rather, in Augustine‘s 
historical re-creation of a Biblical narrative, two times appear: a time of creation, and a time of 
the Fall.  ―With sin, time becomes the number of a ‗violent‘ motion, one that is forced and no 
longer natural, the movement of a will that moves away from God – and everything is as if 
carried away by the fleeting moment, and things flow like the rush of a torrent.‖38   With the Fall, 
time, which is the measure of change, becomes a time of rot, hurtling towards incoherence.  It is 
within this time that Augustine, and all humanity, until the end of time, lives.  ―I,‖ he writes, ―am 
scattered in times whose order I do not understand.  The storms of incoherent events tear to 
                                                 
37
 Saint Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, trans. by Henry Bettenson, intro. by John 
O‘Meara  (New York: Penguin Books, 1984) XI, 6. 
38
Alliez, Capital Times, 100.   
22 
 
pieces my thoughts, the inmost entrails of my soul‖ (XI, 39).  This incoherence is the logical 
outcome of the internalization of the world as conversion is read as creation.  For the multiplicity 
of the world is now registered as a multiplicity in Augustine himself, registered as a multiplicity 
of wills.  When time becomes distension, it retains, as Alliez points out, affinities to both dissilio 
and multiplico – dissolution and multiplication.39  Turning towards that time within which the 
post-Fall subject now lives, turning away from the eternity that the subject‘s nature was created 
in, the subject now finds itself dissolved across time, in a multiplicity that cannot be brought 
together.     
So begins the revolutionary history of the future to come, which is also, and at the same 
time, the beginning of historical nihilism, where this world, as made possible by the past, is no 
longer of real value, and only time moving to non-existence. A non-existence moving behind us, 
and only a pure presence ahead.  As Danne W. Polk argues, this is a ―kind of ‗negative‘ logic 
which claims that if temporality is all there is, then there is no hope.  It is the other side of the 
gulf between time and eternity . . . which gives rise to hope.‖40  A soul properly directed, now 
determined for the future, is the only hope for Augustine, a hope to ―leave behind the old days 
[to be] gathered to follow the One, ‗forgetting the past‘ and moving not towards those future 
things which are transitory but to ‗the things which are before‘ me, not stretched out in 
distraction, but extended in reach, not by being pulled apart but by concentration‖ (XI, 39).  
Through this concentration, concentration on the Word and in the Word, intending toward the 
Word of the future, ―we appropriate grace in recollection, and through recollection we are able to 
effect the gradual convergence of virtue and self-determination.‖41  
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 For Augustine, it is by this appropriation of grace that the human comes to find itself in 
the Word, and the Word in the self.  By this inhabiting, a certain stability is achieved:  ―Then 
shall I find stability and solidity in you, in your truth which imparts form to me‖ (XI, 40).  It is 
the stability of being given a certain form, a form of the Word, that now both produces true 
words in the soul, by first being in the form of the Word.  What Augustine designates as 
conversion is the moment when he is aware that he is in the Word, and that by being in the 
Word, he can recollect himself into a narrative composed of true words about himself.    
And yet the weight of sin is not so easily overcome.  ―In this immense jungle full of traps 
and dangers,‖ Augustine wishes to boast, ―see how many I have cut out and expelled from my 
heart. . . .  Nevertheless when so many things of this kind surround our daily life on every side 
with a buzz of distraction, when may I be so bold as to say, when can I venture the claim, that 
nothing of the sort tugs at my attention?‖ (X, 56).  The buzz of multiplicity that is life in time and 
change continually pulls at Augustine‘s affections, pulling his will away from the True Word to 
all the words of this world.  Original sin is the fundamental weight of being in the world.  From 
within this world, ―the inescapable weight of the saint to complete this labor [of recollection] 
marks not the limit of God‘s power to redeem, but the incongruity of time-bound and timeless 
points of view.‖42  Eternity, the eternal Word, can never be fully at home in this world.  The time 
of rot intervenes into every point in life, so that now, post conversion, the two times, the frozen 
time eternity and the time of avarice, exist together in the heart of the Christian, as intention and 
distension.
43
  Augustine remains torn between a timeless intention for the eternal Word, and a 
time bound distension within this world of change.   
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It is, for Augustine, only in the end of time – in an absolute future that is beyond 
temporality – that the ―heaven of heaven‖ becomes a possibility again, when fallen humanity 
will be loved for what it will be.  ―It is not as we are,‖ Augustine argues, ―that God loves us, but 
as we are going to be‖ (The Trinity, I, 21).  Turning now away from the multiplicity of words in 
this time, turning away from itself as a time bound being,
44
 and turning towards the True Word 
of the future, the Augustinian soul longs finally for a timeless existence when change will be no 
more, when signification, as the necessity of time, will end.  For Augustine, at the end of time 
―there is no more need for the regime of symbols administered by the angelic sovereignties and 
authorities and powers. . . .  Until that happens, we see now through a glass in a puzzle, that is in 
symbols, but then it shall be face-to-face‖ (The Trinity, I, 16).  Salvation, for Augustine, moves 
through a series of displacements:  a turn away from the time bound self will open the possibility 
of a move away from all that is of time, a movement into the eternity of God.  Conversion and 
salvation demand that the self must only strive for what it has not been, what it is not, in favor of 
what it can be.
45
   These two movements – conversion and salvation – enact the demand to close 
the circle of creation by returning, through the future, to the absolute origin of the Word.  To 
become, as Augustine argues, a part of those ―matters which have been produced from the 
eternal and reduced back to the eternal‖ (The Trinity, IV, 25).  Mimicking the ―heaven of 
heaven,‖ salvation is registered as that moment of return to the Creator, the moment of absolute 
closure.  
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Until that end of time, history remains in this time of signification, of multiplying 
significations.  This finally brings us back to the narrative dimension of Augustine‘s own 
Confessions.  Here, then, the Confessions, which is also the culmination of conversion, is that 
mimicking of God‘s final gathering, now performed here on earth, within the individual.  That 
which God has performed and continues to perform in creation and recollection, Augustine must 
also continually perform on himself, as the continual work of conversion.
46
  Conversion follows 
the pattern established in the creation of the ―heaven of heaven,‖ now internalized into the soul.  
Although the buzzing multiplicity of time bound existence can never be fully controlled, when 
the chaotic seas of this time are internalized, there is at least possible a closer approximation to 
the frozen calm of the ―heaven of heaven.‖  Lost in the chaos of the sea, Augustine longs to 
become a ―nothing something‖ open to the power of God, to be seduced into cleaving to God.  In 
the depth of the Augustine‘s soul, the chaos of the ―nothing something‖ is interiorized.47  
This recollection, though, is never enough, nor even where Augustine properly begins.  It 
is clear in the creation of the world that God is the sole creator.  The entire movement of Books 
XI-XIII of the Confessions is to establish the creation ex nihilo.  If there is a parallel established 
between God‘s creation and Augustine‘s recollection, it may be tempting to see Augustine also 
as his own creator.  There is certainly warrant for understanding the development of the 
Augustinian tradition as entailing such a reading.  It may be the case that one mark of the modern 
is this usurpation by the human author to role of divine author.  For Augustine, though, this 
usurpation never occurs.  As Augustine insists, ―the mind of man, the natural seat of his reason 
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and understanding, is itself weakened by long-standing faults which darken it.  It is too weak to 
cleave to that changeless light and enjoy it; it is too weak even to endure that light.  It first must 
be renewed and healed day after day so as to become capable of such felicity‖ (The City of God, 
XI, 2).  The mind cannot on its own achieve that place of rest and purity of cleaving to God that 
the ―heaven of heaven‖ maintains.  
Unlike the ―heaven of heaven,‖ which renounced her mutability in a moment before time, 
Augustine must struggle in time to become one, still in the presence of God.  For just as, from 
the ―nothing something,‖ a certain portion was instantly frozen in time, while a remainder was 
still to be collected together out of its own multiplying distension, so too Augustine, at the 
moment of conversion, is able to come for a moment, face-to-face with God.  Yet this first 
conversion is never complete, and so Augustine remains in the world of time: a world of 
multiplying signification, awaiting a final moment when time will end.  Until then, there is much 
work to be done, both on himself, and within himself the world.  Living no-longer in the time of 
creation, and not yet in the frozen time of the heaven of heaven, all that remains is to work, here, 
now.   
As has already been argued, this reading of Augustine is not simply a reading of the 
Augustinian self.  It is, rather, a reading of the beginning of a long Augustinian sentence which is 
only now coming to an end.  It is this sentence that I want to designate as constituting and being 
constituted by the logic of a metaphysics of conversion.  Writing his own conversion into 
creation, Augustine produces a metaphysical machine for the production of a world: a world of 
time, place, and being.  ―Since Augustine, all the concepts of metaphysics – activity, will, 
subjectivity… constitute the provisions for that movement of human mastery and seizure of the 
word that ‗machinates‘ (says the citizens of the South) or ‗dissipates‘ (answers the Prince of the 
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North) time by determining the future from which time comes as in itself Unequal.‖48  We have 
not, of course, been given to speak this sentence directly.  Rather, we have inherited it as a logic 
of Western metaphysics, and so one which has passed through a history that cannot be fully 
recovered here.  A logic which has determined the very condition of being as simplicity, a 
simplicity that must constantly be produced against and out of the ravages of time.   
  It is in this sense that the Augustinian sentence is taken up into and read by the 
metaphysics of René Descartes.  Descartes, for his own part, is quite aware, if not also 
ambivalent, about this Augustinian heritage.  On the hand, in a number of cases, as in his 
response to Arnauld,
49
 he is willing to accept this attribution of inheritance:  ―I shall not waste 
time here by thanking my distinguished critic for bringing in the authority of St. Augustine to 
support me…‖ (CSM II, 154).50  More often, though, Descartes attempts to establish the absolute 
originality of his own position, most famously in his letter to Colvius:   
I do indeed find that [Augustine] does use [the same argument] to prove the certainty of our 
existence.  He goes on to show that there is a certain likeness of the Trinity in us, in that we exist, 
we know that we exist, and we love the existence and the knowledge we have of it.  I, on the 
other hand, use the argument to show that this I that is thinking is an immaterial substance with 
no bodily element.  These are two very different things.
51
   
If, at times, Descartes accepts the authority of Augustine to authorize his own innovation, 
as in his response to Arnauld, he will also, and with much greater rigor, attempt to reclaim this 
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principle, the first principle that is the certainty of the self, for specifically philosophic ends: the 
ground and beginning of certainty.  Whereas Augustine attempted to articulate the discipline and 
logic of creation which would allow for salvation, a becoming weightless, Descartes attempts to 
articulate the conditions of certainty, the certainty of being by being.  Yet in doing this Descartes 
will take up and repeat the logic of conversion, replicating in his own Meditation the discipline 
by which Augustine achieved his own simple being.  As Antonio Negri notes, Cartesianism is 
already, then, a methodical metaphysics, a metaphysics of technique, a technique for ordering a 
world into being.
52
  This technique is itself a technique for the mastery of the world:  
Through [my philosophy] we could know the power and action of fire, water, air, the stars, the 
heavens and all the other bodies in our environment, as distinctly as we know the various crafts of 
our artisans; and we could use this knowledge – as the artisans use theirs – for all the purposes for 
which it is appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, the lords and masters of nature 
(Discourse on Method, CSM I, 142). 
And it is in the development of this technique as a technique of conversion that Descartes is at 
his most Augustinian.       
Descartes begins the creation of this technique as early as the never completed Rules for 
the Direction of the Mind.  Here Descartes attempts to determine the world through the certainty 
of a mathematical order.  As Dalia Judovitz argues, Descartes takes mathematics as the science 
of knowledge for ordering the world because of its ability to generate and verify its own rules.
53
  
Within this mathematical determination of the world ―the object of knowledge must submit to 
the logic of these rules sketched out in advance.  Transferred to the domain of science, this 
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conception of mathematics becomes a model for reason which can gain insight only into that 
which it produces according to its own plan.‖54   
Mathematics is, for Descartes, both a knowledge of and method for pure and simple 
objects, a knowledge and method announced in Rule 6: ―In order to distinguish the simplest 
things from those that are complicated and to sort them out in an orderly manner, we should 
attend to what is most simple in each series of things in which we have directly deduced some 
truths from others, and should observe how all the rest are more, or less, or equally removed 
from the simplest‖ (CSM II, 21).  To the extent that this attention is an attention verified by 
intuition, the method of certainty becomes a method of simple intuition.  Yet this is not simply 
an undirected attention.  Rule 6 enacts, as Jean-Luc Marion argues,
55 
a decision to not take into 
view that which is made in the order of being, in the order of that which is given in a multiplicity 
and specificity, but rather to only take into view that which is made on the order of the mind, the 
order of mathematized intuition.
56
  And the order of this mathematized intuition is an order of 
―pure, simple, empty, and uniform objectivity.‖57     
Rather than simply marking the domain of certain knowledge, mathematized intuition is a 
determination of the mode of being of the intuitor and that which is intuited.  The world itself, 
for Descartes, is created as a mathematized world, a world created for intuition.  The 
mathematized experience of intuition, the world of mathematized experience, is a world of 
absolute simples, experienced by way of a pure experience that ―demands the disentangling of 
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the various objects of knowledge from the whole of things, and beaming light on the essential 
separateness of each – its own purity and discrete nature revealed as it is.‖58  The simple natures 
which are known by the decision which founds intuition are known precisely because they are 
simple.  These simple natures will be constituted by Descartes as a world in and as a 
mathematized order.  The certainty that Descartes desires is founded on the intuition of these 
pure simples, the intuition of the mathematically simple world.  
The world, as it is determined in the Rules, is a world that is ordered according to 
mathematized intuition, according to a simple mathematical order of figure and presence.  This is 
a world ordered, in other words, by a human logos of re-presented simple order.  Within this 
fixed and mathematized world, though, there seems to be no place for the subject which 
produces that world out of its own order.
59
  The subject, it seems, to the extent that it appears in 
the Rules at all, appears as an accident of its own production.
60
      
The Meditations are, at least in part, Descartes‘ attempt to write himself, and thereby also 
the human subject, into the order of the world, the ordered world of intuition, and so to create a 
necessity of this accidental production.  In what can be marked as a clear repetition of Augustine, 
Descartes turns to the autobiographical to accomplish this task.  But here, it is not, strictly 
speaking, a world that is already given in its order that Descartes must write himself into.  For 
Augustine, the problem of subjectivity is the problem of figuring the relation between creation 
and the creator as both the world and the human subject are already figured as creations, so that 
it becomes necessary to figure the subject as a figure of creation.  In the mode of a confession, 
the subject is written into the production of God‘s creation by way of conversion, establishing 
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the necessity of the continual production of this converted being.  The being of the subject only 
is by way of being converted.  For Descartes, in following the Rules, a different problem presents 
itself.  For now, the order of the world, the creation of the world, follows from the order of the 
human mind: the axiomatic rules of mathematics, determined as and for the order of intuition.  It 
is therefore necessary to figure the subject both as the creator of the world and the creation of 
that very creation, and so also master of its own creation, master of nature.   
The subject, in other words, must be written into its own writing, a world that must be 
produced as it is being written into.  As Foucault argues, the Meditations must be read following 
this double movement:  ―The Meditations require [a] double reading: a set of propositions 
forming a system, which each reader must follow through if he wishes to feel their truth, and a 
set of modifications forming an exercise, which each reader must effect, by which each reader 
must be affected, if he in turn wants to be the subject enunciating this truth on his own behalf.‖61  
The Meditations become an invitation into the production of a world, a world of truth and 
certainty, by way of a certain disciplining and creation of a subject, a becoming subject of truth.  
This invitation is extended by the guarantee of a secure and first principle, the absolutely simple, 
a first principle that will ground the truth of all knowledge that will flow from this first principle.  
A first principle that secures the place of the subject within the order of the world, but which 
also, and at the same time, produces this world of order. 
Famously this subject is produced through the procedure of doubt, a purifying of the self 
of all that is liable to doubt: history, the body, memory.  Doubt is the means by which Descartes 
attempts to purify thought of all that may come to corrode it, both from within and without,
62
 and 
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so he wills into thought a radical and all encompassing doubt in order to gain a pure origin:  ―to 
demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations‖ (CSM II, 12).   
Yet within the mediation this procedure of doubt reaches a certain limit.  After already 
placing into doubt what has been learned as history and what has been learned through the 
senses, Descartes encounters a first limit to his ability to doubt: ―There are many other beliefs,‖ 
Descartes argues, ―about which doubt is quite impossible, even though they are derived from the 
senses - for example, that I am here, sitting by the fire, wearing a winter dressing-gown, holding 
this piece of paper in my hands, and so on‖ (CSM II, 12-13).  And so on . . .  These beliefs, about 
things so close to the meditating subject, about the material conditions of the meditation, cannot 
be doubted simply because they come from the senses.  It would appear that the material 
nearness of these beliefs, the almost presence of these objects of belief as constituting the site of 
the meditation, render impossible the ability to fully doubt them.  To doubt these would be, 
Descartes suggests, madness; it would be to liken oneself to ―madmen, whose brains are so 
damaged by the persistent vapors of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when 
they are paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked‖ (CSM II, 13).    This is 
a material presence that can only be doubted by a physical malady, a physical and medical 
deformation.  The physical presence of the body, the actuality of the meditating subject,
63
 the 
bodied and embodied being of the subject in the world is almost registered as a self-presence, a 
self-presence that hinders and eradicates the possibility to doubt, a presence that is nearly an 
absolute self-presence, the absolute presence of intuition and certainty.   
To follow into this doubt, Descartes makes clear, would be to fall into madness oneself.  
Within the movement of the Meditations, though, as soon as the possibility of madness is 
broached, it is disallowed, so that the philosophical discourse can continue.  As Foucault argues, 
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the Meditations are only allowed to continue as philosophical in being secured by that which 
remains external to them.  In other words, madness can be so quickly dismissed within 
Descartes‘ philosophical discourse to the extent that it is already designated as a juridically 
excluded mode of being:  ―When Descartes wants no longer to characterize madness but to 
affirm that I ought not to follow the example of madmen, he uses the term demens and amens: 
terms that are in the first place juridical . . . which designate a whole category of people 
incapable of certain religious, civil, and judicial acts.‖64  Descartes‘ primary example of madness 
is itself quite telling here: it is not, strictly speaking, that the mad doubt the existence of their 
bodies, but rather that they misrecognize their place in the political-economic order of society, 
mistaking themselves for kings when they are simply paupers.  The excluded madness is, then, 
the melancholia of this misrecognition. It is only by properly recognizing oneself within this 
other order, this political order, that the meditation can continue to follow a philosophical order.  
If it is that the possibility of madness is foreclosed as soon as it is proposed, the same 
effect can be achieved, Descartes continues, by putting into play the memory of sleep and 
dreams.  Although it is necessary to put out of play the doubt of the mad, Descartes insists that it 
must also be remembered that these same experiences, mad experiences, are a regular occurrence 
in sleep: it is always possible to conjure the memory of ―a man who sleeps at night, and regularly 
has all the same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake - indeed sometimes even 
more improbable ones‖ (CSM II, 13).  The practice of sleep can, then, allow the meditation to 
continue.  Yet the doubt of dreams can itself only take Descartes so far, for this doubt will 
remain within and as a natural doubt.  If doubt is, for Descartes, to provide an absolute 
beginning, then it must move beyond the natural reasons for doubt already pushed to their limits, 
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to metaphysical reasons for doubt.
65
  It is in order to reach this metaphysical doubt that Descartes 
introduces the deceptive and malicious God.  Metaphysical doubt, the doubt that will come in its 
completion, to create an absolute space to begin again from, to begin to reconstruct all 
knowledge as absolutely certain, will be a beginning free from God, or at least the God of belief, 
of faith.  In order to achieve an absolute beginning, an absolutely free beginning, God has 
become for Descartes a malicious God, a deceptive God: the God of absolute doubt, and so also 
the God of absolute absence: the God against absolute presence of certainty.  
Within this movement of doubt, the radical completion of doubt is also a certain 
determination of the meditating subject.  Both the sensual subject, as that subject who can know 
through the senses and be known by the senses, as well as the metaphysical subject, the subject 
of being, are doubted into the uncertainty of nothingness.  The second Meditation begins not 
only with the doubting subject, but with a subject devoid of all physical being, all history, and, at 
least rhetorically, all being:  ―I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious.  I will believe 
that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened.  I have no 
senses.  Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras‖ (CSM II, 16).  It is in the 
midst of this doubt that Descartes comes upon the experience that will become the first principle 
of his new thought.  ―Does it now follow,‖ Descartes wonders, ―that I too do not exist?‖  
No: if I convinced myself of something, then I certainly existed.  But there is a deceiver of 
supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me.  In that case I too 
undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never 
bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something.  So after considering 
everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is 
necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind (CSM II, 17).   
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In the very radicalism of doubt, amidst the possible falsity of all that is believed, there remains 
this that cannot be doubted: doubt itself.  Or rather, within this total doubt there appears a 
doubter, a subject of doubt: one drawn from doubt to become a doubter.  A subject posited as the 
condition of doubt.
66
  Here are registered the full implications of doubt not simply as an 
epistemic possibility, but as an ontological possibility; doubt now becomes the means of the 
absolute first presence to oneself by way of doubt, a self-presence that cannot be eradicated.  In 
doubt, a circular presence that cannot be eradicated is enacted.  It is doubt, and the subject that 
doubts, and so doubt personified, that comes to be absolutely present to itself in its doubt, and by 
way of doubt.  This is then a presence of absence that assumes itself, that assumes its own self, as 
that which is present to itself.  In the absolute empty space of doubt, where all is doubt, the doubt 
that remains comes to be asserted as attached to one who doubts; the will to doubt is turned back 
on itself.  Rather than being overcome, doubt comes to determine itself and the subject of doubt 
so as to provide the absolute moment of certainty, the absolute presence of certainty.    
If this absolute doubt presents an absolute certainty, it does so only in the present, in the 
presence of its immediate present.  So it is precisely because of the absolute presence of the 
subject of doubt that the Meditations must begin again.  As we have seen, as established in the 
Rules, the certainty that is provided by the pure presence of intuition is only certain to the extent 
that it is a part of and fixed in an order of representation.  Intuition is the mathematized 
experience of the figure, the figure of representation, and it is as a figure of representation that it 
allows for certain knowledge of the world.  Yet the assertion ―I am, I exist‖ is an experience that 
has not yet attained representation, it is an experience that is ―outside the order of representation 
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proper.‖ 67  It is an experience within an absence that can only occur in the absolute presence of 
an absolute present.  The subject of doubt produces an experience of itself that is, as might be 
said, too pure, too present.  It is, in the language of Michel Henry, a pure presence that is a pure 
appearing: the ―auto-revelation‖ of the self, ―the revelation of thought itself and not of anything 
else, any alterity, any objectivity whatever.‖68  Purified of all exteriority, of all that is historical, 
of all that is material, of everything by way of doubt, Descartes produces a pure space within 
which to arrive at a pure presence to the self.  Yet for certainty, objectivity as the pure presence 
of representation is required.  Certainty requires that this pure experience become the pure 
experience of representation; doubt must be transformed into certainty, such that now, not only 
must the pure self-presence of the I to itself in the empty space of doubt be found, but this 
absolute self-presence must move to a certainty of the self that is able to be represented; absolute 
self-presence in doubt must become the re-presence of certainty.  So the Meditations must begin 
again, a beginning again to regain the subject of certainty beyond the subject of doubt; which 
will also be to recover a subject which can exist beyond its own moment of self-assertion.  
Drawn to the necessity of certainty, the fullness of certainty and the fullness of a certain world 
that must be rebuilt after the reduction of the first two mediations.   
Within this determination of assertable being, Descartes is able to assert that discovery of 
his own being for which the Meditations remains a central philosophical text: ―At last I have 
discovered it – thought; this alone is inseparable from me.  I am, I exist – that is certain.  But for 
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how long?  For as long as I am thinking. . . . I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that 
thinks; that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason‖ (CSM II, 18).  After the 
elimination of his being, Descartes asserts again the certainty of his own existence, now 
rendering that existence as the existence of a mind, a thinker.  In the second reduction of the 
subject, existence is posited not merely by way of doubt nor in doubt, but in the positivity of 
thought, of that which thinks, so as a subject already caught up in the movement of 
representation, already a subject of figure, of the figurable.  The absolute presence of doubt to 
itself has been rendered as the absolute presence of the self to itself in thought, in the activity of 
thinking; the absolute subject of doubt has, in other words, become the subject of certainty, as 
that is required in the Rules.  The second reduction of the subject – from the ―I am, I exist,‖ to 
the ―I am a mind‖ – is the full writing of the subject into the representational certainty of the 
Rules.   
This is also the discovery of substance, of the thinking being as a substance, as thinking 
substance.  In the midst of the proofs for the existence of God later in the Third Meditation, 
Descartes retroactively announces that among the ideas borrowed from the knowledge of the 
thinking subject is the idea of substance (CSM II, 30).  In thinking itself as a thinking thing, 
existing in and as thinking, the thinking subject is rendered as a substance, and so one limit of 
substance as existent thought.  Substance is now defined for Descartes following the simplicity 
of the mind in its own existence as thought.  The movement from the intuition of the existence of 
the I to the objectification of that I in and as thought also produces the determination of 
substance on the model of the thinking I.
69
  As Marion argues, ―The distinction of substances is, 
in fact, conferred in our knowledge; their completeness is understood on the basis of their 
simplicity; and this simplicity is delimited insofar as it is understood.  In short, the ego operative 
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in the thinking cogitatio deduces the real distinction of substances from itself.‖70  From this 
deduction of substance from the thinking I, Descartes attributes this same notion of substance to 
extended things, so that both thinking and material substance are rendered as simple, as unified.  
As Alfred North Whitehead observes, ―what is mere procedure of mind in the translation of 
sense-awareness into discursive knowledge has been transmuted into a fundamental character of 
nature.‖71 
The I thinking itself has become certain of both its existence and now also of its essence.  
Certain, then, of itself both as thinking and thinking substance.  If certainty is achieved here, the 
costs are extremely high.  For Descartes has of necessity doubted away all that he has been and 
all that he can become in order to simply be, and to be simply in the self-presence of certainty.  
Certainty has required the overcoming of history, of the body, of memory in the name of a 
simple being of self-presence.  And all of this has been achieved in the name of and following a 
discipline inherited from Augustine as a logic of conversion, a logic for overcoming the 
historical materiality of the self.   
If Descartes transforms the Augustinian logic of conversion into a metaphysics for 
certainty, Immanuel Kant takes up this logic of conversion into the transcendental, rejecting the 
Cartesian gesture by which a self-referential knowledge comes to ground all certainty in order to 
discipline the self not out of its own becoming but rather into a transcendental determination of 
the limit of reason.  No longer determined to a set of practices, the Kantian task of philosophy is 
the securing of the limits of reasons that have already enacted a demand for simplicity.  The 
critique itself and its unfolding will remain strictly tied to the logic of a rule bound conformity: 
―The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of 
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the possibility of objects of experience‖ (A111/138).72  The unfolding of the critical philosophy 
will itself be produced by the folding back into itself objects of knowledge through a law that is 
both already in place and secured in its own propriety prior to the appearance of the objects of its 
application; knowledge will come to be secured when objects are brought back into the limits of 
the rule bound knowing subject.  The simplicity with which Kant claims to begin will lead, 
within this rule bound circularity, to a radical re-determination of both objects and subjects, and 
the entire ontological and metaphysical order of knowledge.   
Within this trajectory, this Augustinian sentence which is now deployed for the securing 
of certainty, Kant rejects the possibility of the reductive meditation of radical doubt within which 
the Cartesian ego finds itself in a pure presence to itself.  Arguing, in the ―Transcendental 
Aesthetic,‖ that time and space are the conditions for any possible sensible experience, with time 
also being the condition of all inner sense, time becomes the necessary condition of all 
experience both by and of the ego:   
If the faculty of coming to consciousness of oneself is to seek out (to apprehend) that which lies 
in the mind, it must affect the mind, and only in this way can it give rise to an intuition of itself.  
But the form of this intuition, which exists antecedently in the mind, determines, in the 
representation of time, the mode in which the manifold is together in the mind, since it then 
intuits itself not as it would represent itself if immediately self-active, but as it is affected by 
itself, and therefore as it appears to itself, not as it is (B69/88).   
In taking up the Cartesian cogito, Kant, with the greatest severity, rends the unity of the 
Cartesian ego as existing knowing, and known about, severing it, as Deleuze notes, with the 
productivity of time:   
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Indeed, Kant explains that the Ego itself is in time, and thus constantly changing: it is a passive, 
or rather receptive, Ego, which experiences changes in time.  But, on the other hand, the I is an 
act which constantly carries out a synthesis of time, and of that which happens in time, by 
dividing up the present, the past and the future at every instant.  The I and the Ego are thus 
separated by the line of time which relates them to each other, but under the condition of a 
fundamental difference.
73
   
Within the Kantian determination of knowledge the subject of knowledge is marked by a 
temporality that renders its appearance as temporal appearance; a subject of knowledge that can 
only know itself within time, and is limited to a knowledge of that which appears with/in time, 
the effect of its being affected.   
As Theodor Adorno argues, this limitation is properly determined as a resignation, the 
resignation of finitude that marks the position of the subject within the world:  ―The Critique of 
Pure Reason has its source in the circumstance that it was in effect the first work to give 
expression to the element of bourgeois resignation, to that refusal to make any significant 
statement on crucial questions, and instead to set up home in the finite world and explore it in 
every direction.‖74  Without following through on the economic specificity of this claim, it 
remains necessary to recognize that, within Kant, finitude is no longer registered as a condition 
which must be overcome for the securing of knowledge, but is rather the condition within which 
knowledge can be secured.  The real order of the world, an order of the world that can be known 
without the restrictions of finitude, if it is even possible to speak this way within and after Kant, 
is unknowable in principle.  Knowledge is secured within and only within the limits of its own 
finitude. 
 
And yet, it is precisely the Kantian gesture to totalize this limit, so that a completed 
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metaphysic, and so a completed knowledge, is possible on this side of finitude.
 75
  It is this 
finitude that is constructed, from the ground up, by a prior set of desired determinations to 
certain knowledge.  With this, the ―Transcendental Aesthetic‖ constructs, from the start, the 
proper site of knowledge.  Finitude becomes the home within which the subject of knowledge, 
the knowing human subject, must encounter the world: it is the only mode of access to a world 
that is given, not as it is, but as it appears.  Yet this appearance itself, from within this limited 
home of finitude, can be completely looked over, determined, owned: ―We have found, indeed, 
that although we had contemplated building a tower which should reach the heavens, the supply 
of materials suffices only for a dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our business on 
the level of experience, and just sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it‖ (A707, 
B735/573).
76
   
Yet in constructing this home, at the same moment that Kant establishes the limit of 
finitude, a further existence is opened up, one which will open up an existence for the subject 
that transposes the very limits of its own finitude, so rigorously constructed.  The finite subject of 
knowledge comes to its knowledge through a pure law that determines the knowledge that it 
provides, a law that is enacted simply in its determination.  A pure law that will remain free from 
any encumbrance that may appear from outside itself.  Within this pure law of determination 
another ―I‖ appears, and a different trajectory for thought is opened up, one which cannot be 
subsumed as resignation, or limitation, at least limitation to that which appears, that which 
appears in the form of time.  Rather, a transcendence that is registered as the transcendental is 
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opened up within the finite.
77
  On this new level, the transcendental, the subject is taken up into a 
freedom, a freedom that ―passes beyond all limitation‖ (A317, B374/312).  As Deleuze notes, 
another ―I‖ that acts, that is active in its engagement with the world.  An acting that is a second 
taking up of the Cartesian ―I‖ now as the finite subject able to deploy itself beyond the limits of 
its own finitude.  This passage beyond the limits of finitude can be registered in two movements: 
a first movement whereby objects are produced as the correlate of the transcendental subject in 
the production of knowledge, as a determination that is made possible by a passing beyond that 
which is strictly given in sensibility as its transcendentally heightened ground, and a second 
movement whereby speculative reason itself passes through to the pure Ideas of reason, Ideas 
that are never encountered in the impurity of the empirical, but which come from beyond the 
given to determine appearance as that which appears.  In this second movement, speculative 
reason itself opens a space of pure reason, whereby reason can pass through the limits of its finite 
and sensible conditioning to a higher law that cannot be known but only freely obeyed.   
If this doubled going beyond is paradoxically a movement out of and so beyond the finite 
limits of the knowing subject from with the limits of finitude, it is so only as a movement that is 
already determined as a unity, as the production of unity by a necessary law of unity.  Unity 
becomes, in Kant, the necessary productive force of reason, returning from a certain transcendent 
beyond to enforce its own end.  If Kant will attempt to control this force in the production of 
knowledge by marking the limit at which the transcendental deployment of reason passes over to 
the transcendental illusion which reason is thereby led into, he also displaces this force into the 
practical, allowing it a free reign, the freedom to completely determine its own object.     
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Kant‘s philosophy, in the Critique of Pure Reason, becomes, then, a philosophy that 
determines the limits of the proper and improper deployment of reason in its various capacities 
under this final demand to law bound unity.  This determination itself is productive not only of 
knowledge, but in its being determined by Kant, becomes the production of a subject, and a 
nature: as Kant argues, ―we can discover [nature] only in the radical faculty of all our 
knowledge, namely, in transcendental apperception, in that unity on account of which alone it 
can be entitled object of all possible experience, that is, nature‖ (A114/140).  A determination of 
proper subjects, properly ensconced in their unitary propriety, and the world of this making that 
is made precisely as that which returns to itself through the subject of its own making.  A final 
return to a unity that has determined being all along.  In this logic of return that comes, by way of 
a taking up of Cartesian metaphysics, which was itself a taking up Augustinian conversion, a 
final radical transgression is entered into, whereby this logic itself passes through an internalized 
purity, a purity that has come to reside at and as the absent site of the transcendental subject, 
protected from and protected against anything that might come to challenge this absolute 
certainty.  So that in Kant, the pure logic of creation that began as a passage through the pure 
transcendence of God has come to pass through the pure transcendental absence of the subject.  
And in this pure transcendental absence sovereignty is again able to be deployed as the complete 
determination of certain knowledge as the objective capture of being.  
   Beginning as a narrative of conversion which is itself secured as a procedure of 
creation, a logic of conversion becomes a metaphysic of conversion, enacted in the capture of the 
world.  This capture is affected as the capture of being in simplicity, a simplicity that overcomes 
history and materiality, the marks of difference, and the differentiations of any becoming.  
Conversion is the demand of simple being, a demand that is only now meeting its limit.     
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3.  After conversion: a post-secular political ontology 
The metaphysical logic of conversion is a logic for the production of simple subjectivity; 
the production of a subject frozen in a time of the same, frozen against its own productivity, 
disappeared as both a subject of its own becoming and as an embodied subject within a material 
world.  If this metaphysical logic of conversion begins in Augustine as a theo-logic of creation 
and salvation, it has been taken up in the history of the West as the philosophical logic of 
certainty and being, the economic logic of value and the commodity, and the political logic of 
representation and the citizen.  It has been taken up as the logic of the secular project which has 
attempted to create this, our world.  The post-secular event becomes, then, an event for the 
undoing of conversion, for an unbinding of the productive logic of our inherited metaphysics 
from its theo-logic of production.   
Necessary for this undoing and unbinding is a post-secular political ontology of becoming 
that will resist the demand for a simple subjectivity.  This resistance will be accomplished as an 
experimental theo-poetics of creativity in which, following the work of Judith Butler and Alfred 
North Whitehead, being is its becoming, and this becoming is the becoming actual of the 
possible.  Specifically, and as an outline of the work that follows, the post-secular political 
ontology will be developed in three steps.  First, as the logic of conversion has itself become a 
metaphysic of conversion, the metaphysical demand of simple subjectivity must itself be undone.  
This undoing of a metaphysical demand for simplicity has been accomplished by Butler through 
and as the political undoing of metaphysics.  This undoing is begun in her first work, Subjects of 
Desire, in which the Hegelian subject is read precisely as a subject of becoming, always 
implicated in its own temporality, and is continued in Gender Trouble as the political insistence 
on the performative logic of subjectivity.  Performativity is, in this sense, both the articulating of 
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the logic of subjectivity and, at the same time, its conceptual undoing, opening the productivity 
of the subject to a becoming other.  The undoing of the metaphysics of conversion is, then, with 
Butler a political undoing, opening the metaphysical to its own historical practice, an opening 
that determines the metaphysical as a practice of the possible.   
In a move that is only now being recognized, though, the undoing of metaphysics is, for 
Butler, not simply a political task.  It is also a theological task.  Central to Butler‘s work, then, is 
a theological critique, a critique which is directed toward the determination of the subject as the 
singular and simple site of power.  Through this critique, the metaphysics of conversion is not 
only undone by the political but is unbound as the theological.  We are left, then, with a 
metaphysic that has been torn open by the political, rendered by the historical specificity of its 
own practice. 
It is not enough, though, to simply leave the metaphysical in tatters.  This would be to 
succumb to an irrationality of thought, acceptance of a fundamental incoherence into and as the 
world.  If the metaphysics of conversion is to be undone by a political practice of becoming, that 
political practice must itself become within a metaphysic.  The political must itself recognize its 
own being opened back up into the metaphysical.  Although it is often easy to forget this, this is 
the accomplishment of Whitehead‘s speculative project, the end of which is, in a rather strict 
sense, civilization.  To avoid this forgetting it is helpful to approach Whitehead as and through 
the route of a Foucaultian determination of Kant‘s critical project.  That Whitehead is a post-
Kantian thinker has been long recognized, but this recognition has often been in the name of an 
epistemological or ontological inheritance.  For Foucault, the Kantian legacy is the legacy of an 
enlightenment political project, and this project itself is the central achievement of the critical 
philosophy.  In this light, to recognize Whitehead‘s Kantian heritage is to recognize in 
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Whitehead a thought that attempts to articulate the conditions for the possibility of experience as 
a political project, one that is fully immersed in the historical becoming of its own being.  With 
this, Whitehead‘s metaphysics of creativity and becoming becomes a systematic discourse of the 
political. 
Finally, at the intersection of the work of Butler and Whitehead a political ontology is 
developed that arises as an ecological politics of becoming and creativity.  Political ontology is 
here developed as an analytic of the multiplicity of power as productive, as the historical 
conditions for the becoming of subjectivity.  This political ontology begins with a suspicion of 
grammar as a suspicion of a subject-predicate form of thought that grounds ontologies of 
substance.  With this suspicion, being is allowed to unfold as its becoming, particularly as a 
becoming material.  Actuality is a becoming materiality.  This is also a relational becoming of 
feeling, becoming as a process of intensive feeling that can never be finalized for itself, always 
suffering a death into the other.  Actuality is then a becoming of creativity, opened by a divine 
violence that ruptures history by the possible, leading to a post-secular political ontology of the 
future.   
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CHAPTER 1 
THE POLITICAL UNDOING OF METAPHYSICS 
 
Given that we are all, by now, aware that metaphysics is no longer possible – that it has 
been proven to be an illusion, a forgetting, or a simple violent capture of thought and being – the 
appearance, as the opening of the 21
st
 century, of Contingency, Hegemony, Universality might be 
quite surprising.
1
  Our surprise, of course, arises from the fact that the conversation staged in this 
collection between three of the most radical contemporary political theorists takes place within 
the metaphysical.  The collection itself aims, as the participants themselves claim in the 
―Introduction,‖ to ―establish the common trajectory of [their] thought and to stage in a 
productive way the different intellectual commitments that [they] have‖ (1).  Given the 
participants – Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek – we cannot be faulted for 
assuming that the central concerns of the conversation, establishing the common trajectories of 
thought and uncommon intellectual commitments, would arise as a contestation of the names 
Freud and Lacan, Marx, Gramsci and Althusser, Foucault and Derrida.  Yet it is, and here is the 
surprise, Hegel who becomes the central figure of both commonality and dispute, and so it is 
Hegelian metaphysics that becomes the site of contestation.   
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This is to immediately recognize, as Whitehead already has, that thought and practice 
arise within a ―universe exhibiting some general systematic metaphysical character.‖2   For our 
purposes, it is possible to read this partially against Whitehead‘s own meaning in two directions.  
First, thought and practice always arise against a systematic background of that which is given as 
our relevant history.  This given is both the given of thought and the given of practice, or, more 
technically, the given of dipolar experience.  To recognize that the political thought and practice 
made possible in and through Contingency, Hegemony, Universality arises within and out of a 
Hegelian metaphysic is only, then, to give specificity to an already metaphysical givenness.  
Second, the thought and practice of the political will itself only arise against a background of 
actuality which always exceeds the political.  This excess is the metaphysical generality of the 
totality of the becoming actual of experience.  The political and the theorization of the political 
draws on and arises out of this metaphysical excess of actuality.   
Although it will take the remainder of this chapter and the next to fully articulate what is 
meant here by the metaphysical and the political, as an opening, it can be proposed that 
metaphysics is the experimental and speculative conceptualization of the abstract and general 
conditions of the becoming of actuality.  Arising within and against the background of this 
abstraction, political theory is the experimental speculation of the conditions of subjectivity.  As 
we will see, when actuality is determined as the becoming of subjective experience, and 
subjectivity is determined as the movement of power, the distinction between metaphysics and 
the political becomes difficult to maintain.  And so although all three discussants in Contingency, 
Hegemony, Universality position their thought as distinctly political, and so as distinct from but 
arising within and out of the metaphysical, my primary concern here is the way in which Butler‘s 
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political thought and practice functions within the metaphysical.  Quite simply, in what follows I 
want to argue that Butler‘s political thought and practice arises within the metaphysical as its 
undoing.   
It becomes necessary, then, to begin with an articulation of the place of the political 
within the metaphysical as this relation is practiced by Butler, particularly in the early Subjects of 
Desire and the late Contingency, Hegemony, Universality.  After this metaphysical background 
is established as the background of Butler‘s thought, it becomes possible to unfold her political 
thought and  practice as an undoing of metaphysics.  Central here will be an understanding of the 
metaphysical arising of Butler‘s key early political concept: performativity.  In other words, 
performativity can be seen as the political thought and practice of the undoing of metaphysics.  
As we have seen, the metaphysical as it is has been inherited – a metaphysics that Butler 
designates as a metaphysics of substance – is inhabited by a theological logic of conversion.  The 
political undoing of metaphysics must also be accompanied by an undoing of this theos of the 
logic of conversion.  The political must then also enact and arise with a theological critique.  And 
so it is as a theological critique that Butler‘s political thought and practice is figured as an 
undoing of the metaphysics of conversion that we have seen to run from Augustine through Kant 
to our present.  Butler provides for us, therefore, an articulation of the political undoing of 
metaphysics, an unbinding that occurs through a theological critique.   
1.  The Remains of Metaphysics 
To return to the metaphysical site of the political, in Contingency, Hegemony, 
Universality, the speculation of the political is instigated by a questioning, each participant 
submitting a series of questions for and to the others.  Hegel is central to this originating 
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questioning.
3
  Both Butler and Žižek directly figure their instigations in relation to the 
metaphysics of Hegel.   Butler asks:  ―Does a serious consideration of Hegel lead us to rethink 
the Kantian oppositions between form and content, between quasi-transcendental claims and the 
historical examples that are invoked to illustrate their truths?‖ (CHU, 6-7); and Žižek asks:  
―Hegel: is Hegel simply the metaphysician par excellence, so that every attempt to assert the 
post-metaphysical complex of temporality-contingency-finitude is by definition anti-Hegelian, or 
is the very post-metaphysical hostility against Hegel a kind of index of its own theoretical 
limitation, so that one should, rather, focus on bringing to the light of day ‗another Hegel‘ which 
does not fit the doxa of ‗panlogicism‘?‖ (CHU,10).  Laclau is less directly referential, but no less 
situated in the metaphysical, beginning with a questioning of the universal (CHU, 7), and  
concluding with a questioning of the transcendental (CHU, 8).  Although Butler, in proposing a 
―serious reading‖ of Hegel, seems to answer Žižek in advance by proposing ―another Hegel,‖ 
with these two questions the conversation is staged as a questioning not only of Hegel, but of the 
history of Hegel: on the one hand, the place of history, the historical, the contingent that occurs 
in those moments that are anything but transcendental within Hegel‘s thought, and, on the other, 
the place of Hegel within the history of thought, as our executor of Kant, and patriarch of Marx.  
Butler‘s answer in advance will be to argue that, yes, there is another Hegel, another Hegel who 
demands that we rethink both history and the history of philosophy that runs through and to 
Hegel.  And this other Hegel is not only open to history, but is opened by history.  As Butler will 
argue later in the conversation, there is in Hegel a political operation, one that is ―a future, an 
open one, related to the infinity that preoccupies Hegel‘s own non-teleological reflections on 
time, and which surely has some resonance with the open-ended futurity of hegemony on which 
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both [Laclau and Žižek] also depend‖ (CHU, 174).  This other Hegel, this Hegel who does not fit 
neatly into his own history nor our history of him, does not bring an end to history, but rather 
opens history to a non-teleological future.  And this opening is, as we will see, an opening of 
metaphysics to and by a politics to come.   
This Hegel, or as we should say, Butler‘s Hegel,4 the Hegel which has returned as the 
metaphysical site of a politics to come, is able to return within the movement of a paradox.  This 
is the paradox that arises between the completeness of the Hegelian system and its openness to 
the infinite, or rather, the paradox that follows from Hegel‘s acceptance of negativity as that 
which will preclude any domesticating closure of infinite experience.  As Butler argues in 
Subjects of Desire, her first sustained reading of Hegel:   
For a metaphysics to be simultaneously complete and infinite means that infinity must be 
included in the system itself, but ‗inclusion‘ as a spatial relation is a poor way of describing the 
relationship of the infinite to the system itself.  To be able to think Hegel‘s absolute, the infinite 
and the systematic at once, is to think beyond spatial categories, to think the essence of time as 
Becoming.
5     
It is the ‗inclusion‘ of infinite experience within the metaphysical system that opens that system 
to the history of its own becoming.  Within Hegel, the inclusion of the infinite takes place not 
simply as a conceptually abstract inclusion, but as the narrative of Spirit becoming itself.  This 
Spirit is, as Butler describes him, an ―omnivorous adventurer,‖ who finally comes ―to be all that 
he encounters along his dialectical way‖ (SD, 5).  On the one hand, the subject of the Hegelian 
narrative of coming to be comes to be precisely as (dis)embodying the history of his becoming.  
On the other hand, this coming to be takes place not as a singular and positive history of 
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becoming, but as the movement of the dialectic.  The Hegelian subject becoming itself is, as 
Butler argues, the historical movement of negativity, where it is only in confronting an Other as 
its own moment of negativity, in being recognized as other and by an Other and so recognizing 
itself as a subject, that the subject comes to be itself at all.
6
  The Hegelian subject is only able to 
actualize itself, Butler argues, ―to the extent that the subject confronts what is different from 
itself, and therein discovers a more enhanced version of itself.  The negative thus becomes 
essential to self-actualization, and the human subject must suffer its own loss of identity again 
and again in order to realize its fullest sense of self‖ (SD, 13).  Infinite experience is, then, the 
continual experience of loss: the loss of identity in which the subject is confronted by what it is 
not.  It is this perpetual loss that introduces into Hegel, and Butler is willing to admit that the 
introduction of this perpetual loss works against ‗Hegelianism‘ itself, an infinite movement of 
history, denying to Hegel the final metaphysical satisfaction that his system desires, for this is an 
infinite failure that precludes the possibility of the subject finally and fully coming to know itself 
(SD, 12).  Given that, for Hegel, to come to know one-self as subject is also to become one-self 
as subject, negativity will also then preclude any possibility of completed metaphysical 
knowledge (SD, 13).         
 This is, on the one hand, for Butler to already introduce, within and arising out of a 
Hegelian metaphysical discourse, the ontological necessity of recognition as the ground of 
identity and being,
7
 and the centrality of negativity to the movement of the becoming subject.
8
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In this early reading of Hegel, recognition is a perplexed and perplexing moment.  Recognition 
―begins,‖ if it ever begins at all, as recognition of an Other, but a recognition that is for the self, 
that is in the service of the structuring of the self.
9
  At the same time, recognition is that which 
brings an Other into appearance, but again, this bringing into appearance is in the service of the 
securing and bringing into being of the self (SD, 47).  For Butler, this is to designate the 
Hegelian project as both narcissistic and fated to a perpetual failure, for the Other-that- is-for-
the-self can never properly fulfill its role as simple object of recognition-reflection for the self.  
As Butler reads this moment of failure in Hegel, the ―initial self-consciousness did not take 
seriously enough the extent to which the Other is, indeed, like itself, i.e., a principle of active 
negation, and so is scandalized by the independent freedom of the Other‖ (SD, 48).  If the 
recognition of an Other as the negative image of the self begins the moment of self-
consciousness, it is precisely in the scandal of failed recognition that the self enters into a life and 
death struggle with the Other, in order to secure itself through an Other that will never provide 
that security.  Yet, to complicate matters further, this Other that comes to be and to bestow 
recognition is not, for that, an Other that arrives from or as already an Other.  Rather, it is, for 
Hegel, the subject becoming other to himself through which the Other is first recognized as an 
Other.  This further complication is essential for Butler, for if recognition is ontologically 
necessary as a recognition of the self and the Other, through a recognition of the self as Other 
and the Other as self, then recognition is always a movement through negativity to an Other who 
will only impel the self into its own becoming Other to itself from itself.  Recognition, in other 
words, becomes a continual project. 
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 Recognition is not solely nor simply an ontological necessity.  It is, first and foremost, a 
movement of self-consciousness, and so a movement of knowledge.
10
  This movement of 
negative recognition originates, for Hegel, within Spinoza‘s metaphysics.  Butler reconstitutes 
the narrative of this philosophical inheritance by arguing that while Spinoza‘s metaphysics 
begins from the vantage point of a completed metaphysical system Hegel ―poses the question of 
how this system is known, and how the knower comes to know himself as a part of this system‖ 
(SD, 12).  In a strangely Augustinian moment, Hegel, it seems, attempts to write himself, as a 
knowing subject, into the drama of being, specifically, into the self-differentiating drama of 
Spinozistic substance.  The self-differentiating movement of Substance becomes, for Hegel, the 
self-negating movement of the Subject, knowing itself, as we have seen, through the negativity 
of an Other(ing).   
 If, then, the subject is founded on a movement of recognition through negativity, the 
subject is also, necessarily, implicated within and by a certain temporality, as is the metaphysical 
narrative of the becoming subject.  The Phenomenology is, Butler argues, a Bildungsroman, 
inviting the reader into a journey to become herself (SD, 20).  Yet this invitation into a 
metaphysical journey of becoming is an impossible invitation, for it becomes an invitation 
without end.   Following Alexandre Kojève, this is, for Butler, to invite history into metaphysics, 
and so, as we have seen, to open metaphysics to history.  By insisting on the historicity of the 
Hegelian metaphysical narrative, Kojève ―unwittingly introduces the possibility that historical 
action and metaphysical satisfaction may not imply each other mutually‖ (SD, 59).  Without this 
satisfaction, completion will never arrive, so the movement of negativity must continue.  On the 
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one hand, of course, this may be the beginning of arguing that history will always overcome 
metaphysics, marking Hegel as the inauguration of the death of metaphysics.  But this would be 
too quick, for as Butler argues, we are not yet done with Hegel.  Certainly Butler is not yet done 
with Hegel, as she argues in the ―Preface‖ to the 1999 edition of Subjects of Desire: ―In a sense, 
all my work remains within the orbit of a certain set of Hegelian questions‖ (SD, xiv).11  Given 
Butler‘s continued explorations of identity, recognition, negativity, and the temporalized 
becoming of the subject this claim seems to still hold.     
 Yet it is not simply Butler who is not yet done with Hegel.  In the final chapter of 
Subjects of Desire, Butler argues that, although contemporary French theory (and here she means 
primarily Lacan, Derrida, Deleuze, Foucault and Kristeva) attempts a certain opposition to 
Hegel, ―Hegel is not so easily dismissed‖ (SD, 175).   Certainly, of course, one could read this 
claim as the final insistence on Hegel‘s metaphysical mastery of the narrative of the becoming of 
Spirit, and the insistence of the final satisfaction of his metaphysics.  Yet this attempt to 
reassimilate the opposition to Hegel back into Hegel, is impossible (SD, 231).  For Butler has 
already quite clearly denied any metaphysical satisfaction to the Hegelian subject.  ―Hegel‘s 
subject,‖ she now argues, ―can no longer be entertained, even in an imaginary domain, apart 
from the thesis of its very impossibility‖ (SD, 231).   Yet this is strangely, for Butler, still not yet 
to be done with Hegel for the quite simple reason that the insistence of the historical into Hegel 
does not eventuate in the overcoming of metaphysics but rather in the coming of the political.   
In the final section of Subjects of Desire, ―Final Reflections on the ‗Overcoming‘ of 
Hegel,‖ Butler describes this movement of ‗overcoming‘:  ―Both the ‗subject‘ and its ‗desire‘ 
have come to suffer the process of historicization, and the presumed universality of the Hegelian 
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discourse becomes increasingly suspect.  Indeed, it becomes crucial to ask just how this subject 
is constituted, under what conditions, and by what means‖ (SD, 232).  The suffering of the 
historical is not itself an overcoming of the metaphysical in Hegel, but rather a return to 
metaphysics as the site of its own historical becoming, and a return of the metaphysical subject 
to its own history.  On the one hand, Butler has already read metaphysics – metaphysics in 
general as well as Hegelian metaphysics – as concerned with and given over to a certain 
―placing‖ of the subject.12  Metaphysics is, for the Butler of Subjects of Desire, a philosophical 
practice of giving and securing a place to a subject, even if, as we have seen, this ―place‖ is a 
temporalized and so moving place (SD, 5).  Yet, at least in its Hegelian form, this metaphysical 
placing is never simply nor solely concerned with the place of the subject, for that place is 
always a place within: within a community of Others, both human and non-human (SD, 58).  It is 
precisely the reconstitution of this metaphysical scene of becoming as internal to the subject 
itself that constitutes the subject in its becoming.  ―The substance that is known, and which the 
subject is,‖ Butler argues, ―is thus an all-encompassing web of interrelations, the dynamism of 
life itself‖ (SD, 23).  The place of the metaphysical subject is always a place within: within a 
community, within a history, within a world.   
On the other hand, the philosophical reconstitution of this narrative of becoming a subject 
is, for Butler, the systematic development of metaphysics.  The metaphysical narrative presented 
in the Phenomenology, though, is not simply a narrative about this journey to become a Subject, 
but ―is that journey itself‖ (SD, 21).  The metaphysical narrative stages the communal scenes of 
the subject‘s becoming into itself.  Yet if this metaphysical narrative is the metaphysical journey 
of becoming itself, it will always also be a journey of failure.  As Butler famously analogizes this 
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journey, the narrative is of ―the comic myopia of Mr. Magoo whose automobile careening 
through the neighbor‘s chicken coop always seems to land on all four wheels‖ (SD, 21).  If 
metaphysics is the sceneology of the becoming subject, the community within which the subject 
becomes, metaphysics is, for Hegel, always dislocated, enacting the scenes of negativity, of 
dislocation by which the subject becomes (SD, 176).  Metaphysics, then, becomes open to its 
own history of becoming the scene of and for the becoming subject.   
As we have seen, it is with her reading of Kojève that Butler finds this opening of Hegel 
within Hegel himself, within the negativity of recognition.  In the final section of Subjects of 
Desire, Butler turns to Foucault to fully enter into the historicization of Hegelian metaphysics.  
This historicization of the Hegelian metaphysical narrative becomes, through Foucault, a ―theory 
of discursive power‖ (SD, 219), a power that is productive, polyvalent, non-teleological, and 
always contested (SD, 223-232).  The historicized metaphysical narrative becomes, in other 
words, the political as the movement of power as the condition of the becoming of the subject of 
history.
13
 
It is within this reading of Foucault as a post-Hegelian that Butler determines a politics to 
come as a politics of subversion.
14
  At this early stage in her reading, Foucault proposes, Butler 
argues, ―a tactic of non-dialectical subversion, a position beyond subjection and rebellion which 
alters fundamentally the form of the cultural nexus of power and desire‖ (SD, 222).  As Samuel 
Chambers argues, it is possible to question Butler‘s reading of Foucault here, as she seems to 
over-read into Foucault a Hegelian understanding of the unfolding of history, in order to develop 
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her own theory of political subversion as completing Foucault‘s inadequacy.15  But again, and as 
Chambers recognizes, whether or not Butler properly understands Foucault at this point may be 
beside the point.  The importance of this final moment of Subjects of Desire is found in Butler‘s 
attempt to figure her own political thought within and as a politics of subversion, and Foucault is 
the catalyst and inspiration for this figuration.  Moving beyond Chambers, what is important 
here, within the current argument, is the fact that this determination of politics as subversive 
comes within and as the concluding moment of an exploration of Hegelian metaphysics.     
There is then, already, a political implication in the metaphysical as there is a 
metaphysical implication in the political.  Politics emerges as and within the historical opening 
of metaphysics, while metaphysics is the context within which the political unfolds its own 
possibility.  This mutual implication is well articulated in Vicki Kirby‘s recognition that within 
Butler‘s reading of Hegel, ―the aim is not so much a trumping of Hegel as it is the work of 
interrogating the political challenge and consequence of finding other worlds, other temporal 
exigencies and existential possibilities within what seem to be restrictive and oppressive 
determinations.‖16  Metaphysics is never gone beyond, even if it will also be an impossibility.  
What is at stake within and as this metaphysical politics, and what is at stake in the recently 
announced return of Hegel, is a determination of a politics of subversion: of the limits of 
metaphysical critique and the limits of political practice, now rendered as and within an 
immanent opening of metaphysics itself.      
To insist on the metaphysical arising of politics, and to insist on its continual working 
within a metaphysics, whether that metaphysics be Hegelian, or, as it will become by the time of 
Gender Trouble, a metaphysics of substance, is not to argue that Butler is, or should be read as, a 
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metaphysician.  It is, we might insist, as impossible to be a metaphysician as it is to be a gender.  
Rather, what is of interest here is that what is often construed as the political overcoming of 
metaphysics is, in this first work, determined as a subversive historical movement within 
metaphysics itself.  The political, it seems, must itself always remain within the metaphysical 
context of its arising.  Yet, at the same time, for this politics to arise within a metaphysics is to 
also open metaphysics up to a continual undoing, an undoing that is its own temporal 
productivity.  And it is this very undoing of metaphysics that is now registered not as its 
overcoming but as its political, historical becoming.   
2.  Subversive Practices 
It may, of course, be inappropriate to speak of the metaphysical movement of politics 
within Butler‘s thought given that Gender Trouble, the work that seems to determine the theory 
that continues to arrive under the name of ―Butler,‖ and that has most clearly marked Butler as a 
political theorist, is inscribed within and functions as an intervention within a feminist political 
discourse.
17
  Even if it seems to first arise within a Hegelian metaphysics, the full emergence of 
Butler‘s politics of subversion occurs within a thought that is already, from the first, political.  In 
the 1990 ―Preface‖ to Gender Trouble the political intervention of the book is designated as an 
attempt to ask the question of political possibility when ―a radical critique‖ of identity is brought 
to feminist political thought and practice (GT, xxix).  This radical critique is itself structured in 
two directions:  first, as a critical investigation into the possibilities that arise when a singular 
feminist identity is no longer determinative of feminist political practice, and second, as a critical 
opening up to contestation of the constitutive regulations through which that singular identity is 
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itself produced.  As this radical critique unfolds, both within Gender Trouble and through 
Butler‘s work subsequent to Gender Trouble, it becomes clear that the latter investigation 
grounds the possibilities of the former, so that the political possibility of feminism arises within 
the space of this critique.  And it is within this two-fold subversive aim that Butler‘s political 
thought seems to emerge.    
Here, of course, it is necessary to point to the importance of Foucault, now within Gender 
Trouble, but also within Butler‘s work in general, in formulating this radical critique.18  On the 
one hand, Butler‘s intervention into feminist politics is determined, in large measure, by her 
reading of Foucault, or rather, the deployments of Foucault against a feminist political discourse 
that continually returns to a non-thematized prior subject; either a subject of sex, gender, and/or 
the body.  On the other hand, performativity, the central political concept developed in Gender 
Trouble, is itself most fully articulated within Gender Trouble amidst a reading of Foucault‘s 
Discipline and Punish.  In this elaboration performativity becomes shorthand for designating 
both the practice of Foucaultian genealogy and the regulatory logic that genealogy uncovers 
within subject production.     
In this sense, performativity emerges as a means for engaging a feminist political 
ontology, or, as the case may be, a political anti-ontology (GT, 43), an engagement that attempts 
to de-naturalize and de-essentialize any singular feminist identity.  This de-naturalization will 
determine any identity that may seem necessary within a representational politics as contingent 
and constructed, and so contestable within the political itself.  Here it is necessary to insist, as 
Butler herself has continually done, that performativity, as both an analytic concept and a 
political practice, does not itself abandon the field either of identity politics or representative 
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politics.  If a radical critique of identity demonstrates that identities and gender identities in 
particular, are constructed, then ―the critical task for feminism is not to establish a point of view 
outside of constructed identities….  The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive 
repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of intervention through 
participating in precisely those practices of repetition that constitute identity and, therefore, 
present the immanent possibility of contesting them‖ (GT, 187-188).  Although this 
determination of the critical task comes by way of a conclusion, after the theoretical grounds of 
critique have been established, it should not be missed that the initial bi-directional movement of 
critique announced in the original ―Preface‖ to Gender Trouble is here repeated, with this added 
claim of double immanence: the radical critique of identity is itself taken up from within the 
practices of identity, and therefore the possibilities that are opened up through that critique are 
likewise immanent possibilities.  The theoretical distance that is traveled from the ―Preface‖ to 
the ―Conclusion‖ does not then leave behind the domain of identity politics or representative 
politics but, precisely in opposition to this movement, more strictly embeds the critical practice 
being developed within identity and representative politics.
19
 
As we have seen, it is within a reading of Foucault as a post-Hegelian in Subjects of 
Desire that subversion is first introduced as the determination of a political practice, a practice of 
political futurity that will remain imminent to the metaphysics it arises within.  For Butler, the 
immanence of critique follows, by necessity, from an analysis of the modern economy of 
power,
20
 especially as that economy of power functions within a politics of representation.  
Within modern representative politics, Butler argues, power is no longer deployed from a 
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position of sovereignty or from a singular site.  Rather, power begins to, properly and strictly, 
circulate through the field of representation itself, both setting the limits to that field and setting 
the terms of access into that field.  It is, as Butler argues in Gender Trouble, that ―the domains of 
political and linguistic ‗representation‘ set out in advance the criterion by which subjects 
themselves are formed, with the result that representation is extended only to what can be 
acknowledged as a subject‖ (GT, 4).  The economy of power within the political functions 
according to a strictly circular logic, where to be represented within the political field, one must 
already be representable within that field.  If there is an outside to this field, it is an outside that 
will always remain quite strictly other than the political itself, and so unknown to and as the 
political.  Any political subjectivity or critique must, then, to be political, arise within the 
political field itself, a field already determined by the limits of representation.   
In attempting to take up this circular movement of power in Gender Trouble, Butler turns 
to Foucault‘s analysis of the regulative and productive dimensions of power.21  Here Butler 
argues, as a Foucaultian inheritance, that ―subjects regulated by [political structures] are, by 
virtue of being subjected to them, formed, defined, and reproduced in accordance with the 
requirements of those structures‖ (GT, 4).  This is, for Butler, to argue that power, within the 
political, is both negative and regulative, on the one hand, and positive and constitutive, on the 
other.  In its negative determination, power functions through limitation, prohibition, regulation, 
control and protection, the most obvious deployments of power as the law both against and in the 
name of political subjects.  In this negative determination, power appears as that which simply 
prepares and secures a political field for already constituted individuals, determining as a limit 
the possible for the political subject.  If this is all power were it would be an individual choice to 
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enter into this already constituted field and to become a political subject within this field; to 
become, in other words, subjected to the political.  Yet, as Foucault has argued, and for Butler 
convincingly shown, to become subjected to the political is to also already have been ―formed, 
defined, and reproduced‖ as a political subject (GT, 4).  An individual must already have become 
a political subject – must have already been subjected to the deployment of law – in order to 
enter into the political field.  As we have seen, the productive movement of power as it appears 
in the movement of law is to produce a subject before the law. The very law which, in its 
negativity defines the limits and protections of the political field, also and at the same instant, 
determines the subjects of this negative limiting.
22
  This temporal productivity will, at the same 
time, provoke a crisis of temporality, for any political subject will always already be determined 
as a political subject, such that the invocation of any ―before‖ - the invocation of any ontological 
―before‖ of the individual, a temporal location from which an individual will decide to become a 
political subject - will come to be seen as a fictive invocation of the law itself (GT 5).
23
  In this 
instantaneous and circular political temporality, political ontology becomes tautology: to be a 
political subject is to be a political subject.
24
 
For Butler, this circular movement of power, which is both productive and dissimulating, 
concealing its own productivity, is given as the total domain of the political.  ―There is,‖ Butler 
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asserts in the opening gestures of Gender Trouble, ―no position outside this field…‖ (GT, 8). 
This is not, as should be clear, to argue for the already accomplished totalized distribution of the 
political field.  For to understand the political field in this sense, as a field that has, in a 
distributive movement across a plane of social or cultural existence, conquered or overcome a 
field of individuality that enjoyed a pre-existent but non-political existence, is to again fail to 
grasp the productivity of power itself.  For the political field itself is established in the very 
productivity of power.  To be a political subject is to already be within the field of the political, 
just as for there to be a political field is for there to be political subjects.  It is precisely in the 
positing and production of a before or outside to the political that constitutes the definitive 
political movement of power to obscure its own effects.    
For Butler, then, any political critique must recognize that the subject in whose name and 
through whose agency it is deployed is necessarily already caught up in the very structures of 
power it wishes to engage.
25
  The political subject is already subject to the politics of its critique.  
The import of this Foucaultian inheritance is that it marks as necessarily immanent any critique 
which attempts to open political possibilities.  Political critique must be genealogical (GT, 8).  It 
is, in this sense, that genealogy takes on a philosophical ethos of permanent critique, a critique 
that recognizes itself as and within the critique of its own possibility.
26
  And it is within this 
necessity of determining political critique as genealogical that the central concept of this 
subversive and permanent political critique, performativity, is first elaborated, within Gender 
Trouble, as a political concept: it is the concept for determining the genealogical moment of 
subjectivity.  Performativity comes to mark, and in its marking make visible and open to 
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contestation, the production of subjects, and so the production of political subjects.  It is in this 
sense that the first full elaboration, although not appearance, of a mature determination of 
performativity appears in Gender Trouble following a discussion of the genealogical opening of 
subjectivity within Discipline and Punish.  To quote this passage at length, Butler argues that: 
… acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this 
on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, 
the organizing principle of identity as a cause.  Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally 
construed, are performative in the sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to 
express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through the corporeal signs and other 
discursive means.  That the gendered body is performative suggests that is has no ontological 
status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality (GT, 173).   
Performativity designates that movement whereby identities and bodies are produced - are 
fabricated - in such a way that that fabrication itself is hidden and disavowed, and, further, that 
this hiding occurs through a reversal of internal cause and external effect. The crisis of 
temporality through which a subject is produced is registered here as a crisis of the boundaries of 
the subject, of the boundaries which will mark the proper interior and exterior of a subject.
27
  As 
a political concept and a political practice, performativity brings into itself the entire Foucaultian 
inheritance of subjectivity as the productive logic of desire and bodies, a production without 
outside, that establishes a temporal and spatial outside as its very concealment.   
With this we arrive at what would seem to be the full political overcoming of the 
metaphysical.  Arising as a designation for the logic of an inherited metaphysic of substance, 
performativity is here argued to undo the very ontological status of the subject which would 
seem to be necessitated within metaphysics as that has developed since Descartes, and so to undo 
metaphysics itself.  This is, though, to move too quickly.  For the very term fabrication should 
give pause here.  Fabrication can designate both an illusion and a production, and it is only if 
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fabrication is read as the ground of illusion that it is possible to quickly move to the 
abandonment of metaphysics.  Yet the entire movement of Butler‘s deployment of Foucault 
seems to move against just such a reading of fabrication.  The genealogical critique of identity, 
the genealogical critique of subjectivity enacted in and through performativity, displays not an 
illusion, per se, but rather a production, the production of subjects.  Specifically, it is not that the 
subject has no ontological status, but rather that the subject has no ontological status beyond or 
before the acts of its constitution, its fabrication.  
3.  Metaphysical Performances 
 Nearly two decades after being introduced in Gender Trouble, performativity remains 
one of the most important critical concepts for the thought and practice of radical democracy.  
Although performativity is not fully developed until the third chapter of Gender Trouble, and 
then further refined in Bodies That Matter and Excitable Speech, it arises in the opening chapter 
of Gender Trouble within a discussion of metaphysics.  Because of the politics that is made 
possible through its developments and refinements, the fact that performativity first arises within 
a discussion of identity and metaphysics, and so arises within and as a metaphysical concept, is 
often forgotten.  Yet this is precisely how performativity is first determined in Gender Trouble:        
In this sense, gender is not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes, for we have 
seen that the substantive effect of gender is performatively produced and compelled by the 
regulatory practices of gender coherence.  Hence, within the inherited discourse of the 
metaphysics of substance, gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is 
purported to be (GT, 33).  
Within this first fundamental announcement of the concept, performativity designates a 
metaphysical logic of production.  Gender performativity is determined as the productivity 
within an inherited metaphysical discourse: the movement by which identity is produced within a 
metaphysics of substance.  Within this metaphysic, Butler argues, identity, and here she means 
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specifically gendered identity (although we must also recognize that performativity will come to 
be a force of subjection in general, even if this is not quite a theory of subjectivity), is produced 
through a compulsive binding together.  In the case of gendered identity, this is a binding 
together of a certain set of attributes (the set of attributes that are announced in the title of the 
first chapter of Gender Trouble: sex, gender, and desire), bound together with and as the body.  
This binding is then completed in and through its insistence as the foundational essence of 
identity itself.  Performativity, then, designates a doubled productivity that occurs within or 
possibly even as a metaphysics of substance: a productive binding of identity that is completed in 
and through the concealment of its production.
28
   
It is possible to understand Gender Trouble, and the political critique it launches under 
the name of performativity, as itself producing a theory and practice for the unbinding of this 
production, the unbinding of identity, the subject and substance, as well as the unbinding of the 
political practices which remain bound within a metaphysics of substance.  If we are to 
understand the political promise of performativity it is necessary, then, to begin within this 
metaphysical site of its arising, and, to the extent that the unbinding undertaken through 
performativity is not strictly an abandonment, to see that in its political and critical work 
performativity comes to undo the metaphysics of substance within which it arises.  And it is this 
undoing from within that will determine the metaphysical site of performativity as the opened 
site of a political practice of subversion.
29
  
If the metaphysical arising of performativity remains to be demonstrated, this 
demonstration will take place against the decidedly anti-metaphysical reception of performativity 
                                                 
28
 Chambers and Carver, Judith Butler and Political Theory, 49.  
29
 Chambers, ―‘An Incalculable Effect,‘‖ 659.   
68 
 
and Butler in general.  Too often, and usually too quickly,
30
 the critical and political unbinding of 
a metaphysics of substance, enacted as performativity is deployed within the history of a 
metaphysics of substance, is assumed to be an overcoming of metaphysics itself, an overcoming 
that renders the metaphysical arising of performativity invisible, or non-consequential.  This 
performative overcoming of metaphysics is then given an intention, so that Butler herself is 
determined simply as anti-metaphysical.     
In her introduction to Butler‘s thought, for example, and as we have already seen, Vicki 
Kirby notes the way in which Butler‘s early work in Subjects of Desire is not an attempt to 
―trump‖ Hegel and thereby overcome metaphysics, but is rather a political interrogation of 
Hegel‘s metaphysic to find ―other worlds‖ to live in.  Yet in moving to a reading of 
performativity and Gender Trouble, Kirby reduces Butler‘s engagement with metaphysics to the 
brief critique of a metaphysics of substance in the first chapter of Gender Trouble, arguing that 
this critique is representative of ―a sustained criticism‖ of that metaphysic‘s ―illusory appeal.‖31  
For Kirby, this sustained critique is an overcoming of metaphysics, an overcoming that allows 
performativity a political life of its own.  Performativity is, in this instance, fundamentally and 
exclusively a political concept.  It is only in enjoying a release from metaphysics, it seems, that 
performativity is allowed to develop as a political concept.   
In a similar way, Christine Battersby, in attempting to develop a feminist metaphysic, and 
even while claiming a certain inspiration from Butler, determines the entirety of Butler‘s thought 
as anti-metaphysical.
32
  In The Phenomenal Woman, Battersby first encounters Butler as a 
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(failed) reader of Irigaray.  Battersby argues that this failure is occasioned by Butler‘s refusal to 
read Irigaray in an ontological register, instead ―marshalling‖ her for her own epistemological 
project of undermining and rejecting identity.
33
  With this fairly common determination of 
Butler‘s project as an epistemological undermining and rejection of identity,34 Battersby is able 
to render Butler‘s appropriation of Irigaray‘s anti-metaphysical arguments as fundamentally 
flawed for not properly engaging the ontological level of Irigaray‘s own work.  Rather than 
simply dismissing any metaphysical argumentation in Butler or Gender Trouble, Battersby 
argues that Butler‘s anti-metaphysical arguments, as drawn from Irigaray, fail precisely because 
they are not within the realm of proper metaphysical argumentation, where the epistemological 
is, apparently, outside the realm of metaphysics and finally separable from it.    
In continuing her critique of Butler‘s anti-metaphysical stance, Battersby turns directly to 
Butler's deployment of Nietzsche‘s critique of substance in Gender Trouble.  According to 
Battersby, Butler reads Nietzsche as calling for the rejection of metaphysics.  For Battersby this 
is not the only, or even the most appropriate, reading of Nietzsche, to the extent that there is an 
ambiguity in Nietzsche‘s critique of metaphysics: it is possible, Battersby wants to argue, to read 
Nietzsche either as critiquing metaphysics per se or as simply critiquing certain elements of a 
metaphysics of substance.  Yet Butler, according to Battersby, ―determinedly resolves the 
ambiguity in Nietzsche's position as to whether Nietzsche is simply against a particular mode of 
metaphysics, or against metaphysics per se, and, instead, presents him as simply anti-
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metaphysical.‖35  Yet this presentation itself, for Battersby, seems to follow from an already 
established anti-metaphysical position.  Butler, Battersby argues, takes up Nietzsche ―in support 
of her anti-metaphysical stance...‖36  It seems here that Nietzsche, and his sustained critique of 
substance and metaphysics, is only a tool of an already established and taken anti-metaphysical 
stance.  Butler is, then, fundamentally and prior to any encounter with metaphysics, anti-
metaphysical. 
The rendering of performativity, and the politics which Butler develops with 
performativity, as anti-metaphysical often takes place through a reduction of the argument in 
Gender Trouble to epistemology.  In this regard it is obligatory to mention the most famous 
epistemological reduction of Butler and the political practice that is developed as performativity; 
namely, the critique that is presented by Martha Nussbaum in her review of Butler‘s work, subtly 
titled ―The Professor of Parody.‖37  Enough has been written concerning Nussbaum‘s critique of 
the quietist politics that is the necessary outcome of Butler‘s parodic feminism that there is no 
need to rehearse the debate or defend either of the participants.
38
  Here it is enough to simply 
note that Nussbaum‘s critique begins with a separation between representation and the concerns 
of ―real women.‖39  Although these real women are nowhere clearly determined by Nussbaum, 
they are, it seems, ignored within the high theoretical and epistemological discourse that is, in 
Nussbaum‘s rendering, simply a play of representation.  This is, then, Nussbaum‘s fundamental 
critique of Butler: the reduction of her political feminism to a simple play of and on words that 
eventuates in an ineffectual politics of parody.  Butler has, according to Nussbaum, avoided 
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everything, in exchange for a simple play of signification.  Although, as we will see in what 
follows, Nussbaum‘s critique severely misses the mark, her argument remains important for 
highlighting the stakes at issue.  For Nussbaum recognizes, even within a fallacious differential 
between representation and real women, and even against her own reading, that representation is 
never simply a play on or of words, but that representation has political consequences, and so, in 
a more general philosophical discourse, does epistemology.
40
  Against her own reading, then, 
Nussbaum requires that we take all of Butler seriously if we are to take her politics seriously.         
Although we should and will question the reduction of Butler‘s argument in Gender 
Trouble to epistemology, or, for that matter, to any other simple and well demarcated discursive 
domain, it is also necessary to recognize that if these critiques of Butler are, generally, attempts 
to read in or into Butler an overcoming of the metaphysical, they are not, for that, entirely 
spurious readings.  Within the movement of Gender Trouble itself it may seem that the 
overcoming of metaphysics is necessary for the political efficacy of performativity to emerge.  
When compared to the determination of performativity that arises within the pivotal third chapter 
of Gender Trouble, and that is developed in Bodies that Matter and Excitable Speech, the initial 
determination of performativity as the logic of identity production in a metaphysics of substance 
appears as quite abstract.  Performativity is here, as Slavoj Žižek might argue, overly formalist as 
a metaphysical concept.
41
  In this brief opening announcement, where performativity designates 
the doubled metaphysical logic of identity production, first as a compelled synthesis through 
which an identity is produced as a subject, and second as the dissimulation by which this 
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synthesis is completed in being posited as the essential ground of identity itself, it seems that an 
elaboration of the historically specific productions of identity are not and cannot be critically 
engaged.  Either performativity as a metaphysical concept can be applied in any and every 
situation and so is politically vacuous, or it is transcendentally abstracted from any concrete 
situation, and so is rendered politically ineffective.  On this reading of performativity and Gender 
Trouble it will take the entirety of Gender Trouble and beyond to begin to determine 
performativity so that it can become an analytic and critical concept for the undoing of specific, 
concrete, historical determinations of identity.  It must, it seems, suffer the historical (SD, 231), 
and so become a genealogical concept.  And it is this genealogical determination of 
performativity that is necessary for performativity to become a politically efficacious concept.  
The genealogical historicization of performativity is then necessary to enact a critique of the 
material and political practices by which gender identities are produced, and to open these 
productive practices to the possibility of contestation. Within this reading of performativity, and 
the movement from the first chapter of Gender Trouble to Bodies That Matter and Excitable 
Speech, the development of performativity from an overly formal metaphysical concept that 
designates the logical productivity of a metaphysics of substance to a genealogical concept – a 
political analytic and practice – occurs as performativity undoes the site of its own metaphysical 
arising and overcomes this metaphysical site.
 42
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It is only against and within these movements of thought that it is possible to return again 
to the metaphysical arising of performativity within the first chapter of Gender Trouble.  
Although I have tried, already, to insist on a specific metaphysical arising of performativity, the 
above passage is not the first appearance of performativity within Gender Trouble.  Embedded 
within an earlier discussion of the law, Butler argues (to quote her at length) that:  
[j]uridical power inevitably ―produces‖ what it claims merely to represent; hence, politics must be 
concerned with this dual function of power: the juridical and the productive.  In effect, the law 
produces and then conceals the notion of ―a subject before the law‖ in order to invoke that 
discursive formation as a naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates that 
law‘s own regulatory hegemony….  Perhaps the subject, as well as the invocation of a temporal 
―before,‖ is constituted by the law as the fictive foundation of its own claim to legitimacy…  The 
performative invocation of a nonhistorical ―before‖ becomes the foundational premise that 
guarantees a presocial ontology of persons who freely consent to be governed and, thereby, 
constitute the legitimacy of the social contract (GT, 5).    
Even while noting that this is the first mention of the performative production of the subject, 
there is much in this brief passage to be unpacked.  First is the relation that is proposed here 
between the law and power.  There is, it seems, a certain confusion between power and the law, 
as the passage begins with a discussion of ―juridical power,‖ which then is read as ―power,‖ 
before concluding with a determination of the subject as standing ―before the law.‖  Butler is, 
one might be tempted to argue, quite confused by these various enactments of order.
43
  Certainly, 
a full articulation of the relations between law and power has been a continual concern of 
Butler‘s in her thinking through the political site of the subject.  Although we will return to this 
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relation in following chapters, it is important to note that a full and final articulation of this 
relation may not yet be fully articulated or articulatable by Butler.
44
  Yet this may, of course, be 
itself a first determination of the polyvalent movements of power, and not an analytic failure.  
What might be at stake, in other words, is the very confusing of its enactments that allows power 
its efficacy.  As we will see, power can be said in many ways.     
Of immediate interest, though, is the determination of the performative invocation of the 
subject as an ontological movement, an ontological movement that concerns the temporal 
production of an historical subject, and the retroactive invocation which completes this 
temporalizing production as nonhistorical and legally binding.  First, this threefold determination 
of a performative invocation of the subject should already complicate any easy distinctions 
between the epistemological, the ontological and the political.  Proposed here is not only an 
analytic of the historical production of the subject, but an analytic of the historical production of 
the subject as a temporalized being.  This is, then, a doubled temporalization of the ontological 
becoming of the subject.  Further, the temporalized subject does not simply arise as an 
ontological production, but as a production in and under the name of legal guilt.  The 
ontological, here, is always, and quite possibly already, political.  Finally, it is an essential 
practice of this production to regulate that which can appear and be hidden; that which can, in 
other words, be known or remain unknown.  As we will see and have already seen, this 
regulation of intelligibility and recognition is central to Butler‘s political thought.  Here she is at 
her most Hegelian, arguing both that the determination of being is a determination of 
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recognition, and that to know oneself as a subject through recognition is to become oneself as a 
subject.  For now, it is enough to note the extent to which this passage complicates any over-
determination of performativity as simply epistemological, as the epistemological is already 
implicated by the ontological, which is itself already implicated by the political.  In this brief 
passage, then, is an argument that the ontological, the epistemological and the political are 
always implicated in and by each other, so that any distinctions we may want, for analytic 
purposes, to establish between the three will be anything but simple.  
It is in the mutual implication of these domains and the subsequent blurring of these 
otherwise clearly demarcated lines between epistemology, ontology and politics that 
performativity arises necessarily as a metaphysical concept.  Only as a metaphysical concept can 
performativity begin to unravel the multiple determinations of identity that occur through 
epistemological, ontological and political discourses.  It is, in other words, precisely as within a 
metaphysics of substance that epistemology, ontology and politics operate to produce simple 
subjects of being.  In this economy of subject production, a simple subject is produced as a 
bound unity.  With this, a metaphysic of substance determines the limits of being as known, as 
actual, and as politically possible.  By determining substance and subjectivity as simple unity, a 
metaphysics of substance establishes the epistemic and ontological grounds of political 
possibility as that which is unified, as the simple singular, enacting as metaphysical necessity the 
demand of conversion.  It is precisely, as we will see, to undo this bound unity that 
performativity is deployed within and as a metaphysical concept.   
In the first chapter of Gender Trouble Butler begins to open the overlain determinations 
of a metaphysics of substance and a politics of unity, as these relations move through 
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epistemology and ontology.  The section begins with a superficially epistemological concern,
45
 
as does the entire opening section of Gender Trouble, exploring the interconnection between 
three totalizing theoretical gestures.  First, a ―monological masculanist economy‖ of 
signification, designated as ―imperialist‖; second, a phallogocentrism, designated as 
―colonizing‖; and third, a universalist identity claim, designated as ―globalizing.‖  Each of these 
theoretical gestures - the imperialist, the colonizing, and the globalizing - is epistemological: 
each constitutes a signifying practice by which gender is known within the capture of a singular 
logic of being (GT, 18-19).  The imperialist epistemological gesture is constituted by an 
amplification of a local economy of gender production such that any and all gender production is 
understood as taking place within or as a variant of that singular economy of production.  The 
colonizing epistemological gesture is an ―appropriative act,‖ whereby any encountered 
difference of being is brought into the same through a practice of totalizing signification.  The 
globalizing epistemological gesture grounds universalistic identity claims through the positing of 
a shared, or common, structural world, either the world of structural oppression or structural 
gender identity. 
In each of these, though, the epistemological gesture is itself predicated on while also 
being productive of an ontology of unity, of singular being.  To know a singular, unified gender 
identity in each of these signifying practices is to, at the same time, insist on the being of a 
singular, unified gender through these signifying practices.  And it is this very insistence that 
constitutes, in these early movements of Gender Trouble, the political, the entry into the standing 
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of what is through these gestures precisely as gestures, as signifying practices.  But these are not 
simply, or not only, signifying gestures, as if we could return to a philosophical scene where 
representation was itself simply a dematerialized, dehistoricized idealization.  On the one hand, 
these signifying gestures occur within and as the enunciation of a ―matrix of intelligibility‖ that 
is itself grounded in and by the unity of ―substance‖ (GT, 24-25).  If this substantial matrix of 
intelligibility is itself announced within and as a heterosexual economy of sex, gender and desire, 
it is its being grounded in and by substance that allows this matrix to insist itself into the various 
domains of its appearance (GT, 25).  It is, in other words, precisely as being determined within a 
metaphysics of substance that a heterosexual matrix of intelligibility can come to determine the 
appearance of sex, gender, and desire as what can be known, what can be, and what can be 
practiced.  So it is that in the final chapter of Gender Trouble, this inter-insistence of the 
epistemological, ontological, and political is precisely what is at stake in the determination of 
identity as the political name for substance as the contested site of politics itself (GT, 183-184).   
And it is this inter-insistence that is determined as the regulatory practices of normative 
heterosexuality, a normativity that requires and produces a unity of being in and as a sexed and 
gendered identity.  What appears, then, as beginning with and as an epistemological concern 
quickly moves into and becomes enmeshed within ontological and political contestations.   
At stake in these epistemological analyses‘ of Gender Trouble, then, is not simply the 
epistemological itself, nor even the ontological, but rather the connection between the 
epistemological, the ontological, and the political.  This is, though, to neither reduce nor judge 
epistemology or ontology by their political deployments.  Rather, Butler is interested in 
articulating the discourses and practices through which the epistemological, ontological, and 
political determinations of gender and subjectivity operate, opening to analysis the often 
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occluded epistemic and ontological operations of political practices.  ―To what extent,‖ Butler 
asks,  
do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute identity, the internal 
coherence of the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of the person?  To what extent is 
‗identity‘ a normative ideal rather than a descriptive feature of experience?  And how do the 
regulatory practices that govern gender also govern culturally intelligible notions of identity?  In 
other words, the ‗coherence‘ and ‗continuity‘ of ‗the person‘ are not logical or analytic features of 
personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained norms of intelligibility (GT, 23, 
emphasis in original). 
This is the opening up to analysis of the reciprocal relations, enacted through regulatory 
practices, between the signifying practices of epistemological determination and the ontological 
becoming of subjects, a reciprocity within which the political is practiced.  And it is, as we have 
seen, that these regulative practices arise within a metaphysics of substance such that the 
epistemic, ontological, and political practice is determined as a practice of unity.  Within a 
metaphysics of substance, these become practices which demand in their enactment a unitary and 
singular identity as the possibility of being.  Once these reciprocal determinations and practices 
are opened up Butler is able to turn to an opening of metaphysics itself, arguing that the 
insistence of unity is an insistence of metaphysics.  It is then a metaphysical demand for unity 
which will ultimately be seen to undergird and demand unity at the ontological, epistemological, 
and political levels.
46
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The language within which performativity appears as arising within a metaphysics of 
substance comes from Butler‘s quick reading of Friedrich Nietzsche, as mediated through 
Michael Haar.  Drawing on Nietzsche, Haar determines as ―constructs‖ of grammar the 
―illusions‖ of Being and Substance. 47  As ontological descriptions, Being and Substance are 
illusions to the extent that they claim to designate an ontological reality that exists outside of and 
prior to being designated.
48
 These illusions receive their force of effect in that they are drawn 
from and mimic a subject-predicate grammar.  This is, for Haar, the crux of the Nietzschean 
critique of a metaphysics of substance:  the genealogical unearthing of the illusory status of 
Being and Substance, an illusion that is determined and maintained by a faith in subject-
predicate grammar.  Further, Butler argues, it is, in the very act of being determined as 
ontological realities that these illusions produce the ontological necessity of simplicity, order, 
and identity (GT, 27).  The metaphysics of substance, then, which finds its ground of being in the 
mutual determination of Being and Substance, rather than being determined by the necessities of 
simplicity, order, and identity, a necessity deriving from the logical demands of Being and 
Substance, produces that very necessity in the determination of Being and Substance, a necessity 
which is itself no longer the necessity of metaphysics or Being or Substance, but of grammar.     
Beyond the direct critique of a metaphysics of substance, a critique which provides Butler 
with her own language for engaging metaphysics, of greater importance here is the movement 
whereby this critique becomes a critique of the psychological person.  When, in other words, 
Nietzsche is returned to what Butler takes to be the founding scene of the substantive subject: the 
Cartesian ego.  With this return, where the logic of a metaphysics of substance as the self-
positing of Being, is opened within the genealogical critique of Nietzsche, when the movement, 
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in other words, of the circular self-grounding of a metaphysics of substance is suspended in 
being designated precisely as an illusory deed, then both the subject which thinks itself through 
this self-referential productive language and the metaphysics which arises from it and is 
grounded in this produced subject are suspended and undone from within their own movement.  
The Cartesian ego which posits itself as the cause of its own thoughts is now seen to be the effect 
of thought thinking itself through grammar.  ―It was grammar (the structure of subject and 
predicate),‖ Butler quotes Haar as arguing, ―that inspired Descartes‘ certainty that ‗I‘ is the 
subject of ‗think,‘ whereas it is rather the thoughts that come to ‗me‘: at bottom, faith in 
grammar simply conveys the will to be the ‗cause‘ of one‘s thoughts.  The subject, the self, the 
individual are just so many false concepts, since they transform into substances fictitious unities 
having at the start only a linguistic reality.‖49  The Cartesian grounding of metaphysics becomes 
caught in its own desire for unity, a unity of substance that will secure a knowledge that will 
become, with the assistance of a verifying God, the total capture of being in a simple 
subjectivity.
50
  The unity of metaphysics is now determined, on the one hand, through its effect 
of producing a unitary subject, and, on the other, through its being grounded in a theological 
grammar of unity.  The Nietzschean genealogical critique is appropriated by Butler for making 
visible not only the illusion of this doubled production – the production of a substantive subject 
which is also the principle for grounding metaphysics – but for announcing the logic by which 
this illusion is produced.      
The certainty of a metaphysics of substance is grounded in and by the production of the 
substantive subject, a subject that is produced to ground the certainty of its own being.  And it is 
in order to avoid the self-enclosure of this metaphysical trap that Butler appropriates Nietzsche 
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directly, arguing for the need to explore the Nietzschean claim that ―There is no ‗being‘ behind 
doing, effecting, becoming; ‗the doer‘ is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is 
everything.‖51  It is precisely within this Nietzschean claim that Butler finds a summative 
determination of the relation between performativity and a metaphysics of substance.
52
  It is the 
performativity of gender in its functioning that creates the appearance of a doer behind the deed 
of gender, the appearance of a gender identity and a sexed being behind the expressions that are 
its effects (GT, 33).  With this performativity designates the deed which is everything.       
It is with the undoing of this deed that we return to the first appearance of performativity 
in Gender Trouble.  Here, the movement that is designated as a performative invocation of the 
subject is the deed of this becoming substantive subject, a deed that is, in its formal structure, 
similar to the metaphysical determination of the performative production of identity.  In both 
cases the subject, or the subject as that which is brought under a singular identity, is first 
produced, and then retroactively invoked as the preceding ground of that produced subject.  In 
both cases performativity designates a logic of dissimulation whereby a subject that is produced 
is invoked as and through a naturalized foundation.  Where performativity is determined as a 
metaphysical concept, the synthetic production is a bringing together of a set of attributes which 
are predicated of an already abiding substance that is the production of that synthetic act.  In this 
first, onto-political determination of the performative invocation of the subject, the production is 
a temporalization, bringing into being an ahistorical subject who is to stand before the law, and 
so will be called to stand before a temporality of guilt as an already guilty subject.
53
  Reading 
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these two together, then, it is possible to argue that performativity designates that logic – either 
ontological or metaphysical – of temporality and being, a logic that is, as the immediate passage 
indicates, a logic of law and guilt before the law.  
Beginning with Gender Trouble, then, it is this twisted productivity that Butler means to 
designate as performativity, a determination of performativity that will not alter, even as this 
twisting is complicated in its development.
54
  In The Psychic Life of Power Butler will attempt to 
think this twisted productivity together with the performative invocation of a subject before the 
law as a twisting of psychic power, but here, at this point in the first chapter of Gender Trouble, 
and as a continuation of what has already been seen, this twisted logic is a metaphysical logic 
that produces subjects through a grammatical twist productive of temporal causation.  
Temporality, then, is itself twisted, both as a temporal production and as a production of the 
temporal.  In a performative twist, that which has come to appear is twisted to become the 
substantive being which will ground its own appearance, and so will be caught in the temporality 
of its own production.  With this we seem to return to the metaphysical arising of performativity: 
as a metaphysical production, performativity is the twisted logic of the production of identity as a 
binding that hides its own productivity.  
4.  The Risk of Abstraction 
Performativity is not simply, or not only, an analytic and critical concept for thinking 
through the production of subjects within a metaphysics of substance.  It is also an analytic for 
thinking through and with a variety of otherwise heterogeneous critical theorists.  In other words, 
the twisted logic of performativity takes on a certain abstraction through which Butler is able to 
construct her own critical discourse.  As Butler argues in Gender Trouble, in the midst of 
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exploring a series of ―French feminist‖ and ―poststructuralist‖ accounts of the production of 
gender and sex,
55
 ―central to each of these views… is the notion that sex appears within 
hegemonic language as a substance, as, metaphysically speaking, a self-identical being.  This 
appearance is achieved through a performative twist of language and/or discourse that conceals 
the fact that ‗being‘ a sex or a gender is fundamentally impossible‖ (GT, 25).  To speak of 
performativity as a metaphysical concept is, then, to speak within a certain abstraction, an 
abstraction that is able to bring together a set of otherwise quite diverse discourses.
56
   
Specifically, in this case, a metaphysical abstraction of performativity is a way of investigating 
the possibility of developing an analytic of power as the production of substance within and 
through the work of Irigaray, Wittig, and Foucault.  Each of these discourses provides a distinct 
articulation of the field of power within which substance is produced as sexed and/or gendered 
subjectivity, and yet the metaphysical determination of performativity can be deployed to think 
through them in order to think power and the production of subjects (GT, 25).  The metaphysical 
abstraction of performativity becomes a way to think with and through these otherwise disparate 
discourses, so that the metaphysical determination of performativity is itself an abstraction 
arising out of and through the disjunctive possibilities of these diverse discourses.  
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Metaphysics, as an abstraction in this sense, may become, as Butler is aware, a risk.
57
  
Although Butler is willing to risk this metaphysical abstraction in order to think with and through 
a differentiated set of theoretical determinations of power and the production of sexed and 
gendered subjects, and so to also think with and through the political articulations of productive 
power, she continually announces a hesitation, a stammering that is a necessary mode of all 
risk,
58
 when encountering the possibility and demand to think with and through the productivity 
of multiplied subject positions.  In this sense, a metaphysical abstraction may come to determine 
all productivity, such that all logics of subject production – understood now as a productive 
structuring of power - will be reduced to one metaphysical logic, to enter again into colonizing 
and imperialist theoretical practices.   
In the concluding chapter of Gender Trouble, this stammering is the hesitancy of thinking 
through the ―embarrassing‖ horizontal proliferation of subject positions (GT, 128), a hesitancy 
that continues in Bodies That Matter through a direct engagement with racialized subject 
productions (BM, 18-19 &167-185).  In the ―Introduction‖ to Bodies That Matter Butler 
announces three reasons for her hesitancy in thinking racialized subject productions as analogous 
to sexed and gendered subject productions.  First, to privilege one logic of production will be to 
discount and devalue other logics of production, a critical fear that rests on the assumption that 
these logics are already distinct.  Second, in order to privilege one logic of production it would 
be necessary to discount the exclusions by which this production is privileged, assuming that the 
abstraction of one logic as a universal logic is given without the necessary work of becoming 
universal.  Finally, this privileging of one logic of production would perform a certain epistemic 
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imperialism, capturing and encompassing unto itself every movement a power, offering an 
impossibly pure reflection of the complexity of the world (BM, 18-19).   
This risk, though, is not strictly speaking a risk to be avoided.  Anticipating the 
arguments that will become central to her political thought,
59
 in both Gender Trouble and Bodies 
That Matter Butler announces the risk of metaphysical failure and contestation as a productive 
risk.  In the 1999 ―Preface‖ to Gender Trouble, this productive risk is registered as the 
productivity of the necessary continual iteration of theory itself, announcing as the fundamental 
question of performativity‘s trans-discursive possibility: ―what happens to the theory when it 
tries to come to grips with race‖ (GT, xvi)?  In this first instance, then, if metaphysical 
abstraction is the means of this trans-discursive possibility, the risk of failure is also the risk of 
political possibility: the risk of performativity‘s alteration in and as a response to its analytic 
failure.  This risk is more fully elaborated in the Introduction to Bodies That Matter, when it is a 
question of the production of racialized subjects.  Here a productive risk is opened at the moment 
any theory of productive power fails to totalize the field of power, thereby opening itself up to 
the internal differences occasioned by its historical production (BM, 18-19).  Performativity as a 
metaphysical concept, then, must always risk an internal differentiation that will rend its 
abstraction from within.  And it is precisely within this space that a new political figure of power 
will emerge.  This failure to totalize the field of power will arise through contestation, and so it is 
a failure that gives rise to a series of claims concerning the reality of power itself, a ―way of 
reconfiguring what will count as the world‖ (BM, 19).  The abstract will also become abstract, 
and in this very becoming abstract be open to contestation.  This then is to open to metaphysics a 
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process of becoming abstract, a becoming abstract that will always and only arise as contested 
and contestation.       
  To determine performativity as a metaphysical logic, then, is to also determine 
performativity as an abstraction.  This abstraction will always remain as a logic of production 
arising out of the production of sexed and gendered identities within a metaphysics of substance.  
Yet it is not, in this sense, a simple, already universal logic of production.  The question of 
abstraction is not, in this sense, whether it can, as an abstraction, be analytically deployed in any 
and every context as a totalizing explanation.  It is rather an abstraction for entering into, for 
thinking through and with the productive movement of power in the determination of subjects.  
And in this, in its movement to and through other discourses, other movements of power, other 
productions, it is always placed at risk, put into the risk of its own differentiation, and its own 
alteration.  The question of abstraction then is always a question of what happens to the 
abstraction.  What happens to the universal when it is put to work in becoming what it has not 
been?    
5.  The unbound and the undone: the political and the theological 
To this point, I have tried to establish a certain metaphysical reading of Butler‘s political 
project.  This is not to argue that Butler is a metaphysician, or that her project is a metaphysical 
project.  Rather, the argument has been that Butler‘s political project arises as an unbinding of 
the metaphysical demand of unity, and so arises within and as an unbinding of the metaphysical 
production of substance as unified being.  Political critique, then, is always, Butler proposes, a 
movement of unbinding that occurs within the various contexts of its arising.  Politics is, in this 
sense, subversive.  This is, as we have seen, the key accomplishment of performativity as a 
political concept: to arise within a metaphysics of substance in order to and as the unbinding of 
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that metaphysical production, the metaphysical production of a synthesized and unified subject.  
As a political concept it is, in this sense, matched by a Nietzschean critique of substance, so that 
Butler‘s appropriation of the Nietzschean claim that ―there is no doer behind the deed‖ is at once 
a political articulation of a metaphysical claim.  And this political-metaphysical claim is one 
which is concerned with an undoing of the temporality of the production of a unified subject.   
If this attempt to read Butler as one who always remains close to metaphysics is 
shocking, it will be even more shocking to recognize that Butler‘s political work is enacted 
within and alongside a theological critique.
60
  This shock is only recently drawing attention.
61
  
Yet one of the most consistent elements within Butler‘s work is her theological critique.  This 
theological critique is directed not against theology per se, but against the theological 
determination of secular theoretical positions.
62
  It is, we might say, a subversive critique, one 
which is deployed to open certain possibilities within theo-retical discourse, without rejecting 
those discourses.  The theological will then mark a certain closure of and within theoretical 
discourses.  It is within this theological critique that the movement from a subversion of 
metaphysics to a subversive politics is played out as and within a religious discourse.  Although 
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it will be necessary to provide a genealogy of the political subject as theo-political subject, a 
genealogy that is only begun in the Introduction, here it becomes necessary to follow through the 
metaphysical-political subversion of the subject as a theological critique, as a means of 
concluding the present investigation and providing the necessity for the investigation to come.   
We can begin to determine Butler‘s theological critique by again turning to the first 
chapter of Gender Trouble and its brief engagement with Lacan, post-Lacanian feminists, and 
materialist feminists.  Here Butler draws three principles that must guide any critical political 
thought of sexual difference and sexed subject positions:  first, a recognition of ―the constructed 
status of sexual difference,‖ second, a recognition of ―the inherent instability of that 
construction,‖ and finally, a recognition of ―the dual consequentiality of a prohibition that at 
once institutes a sexual identity and provides for the exposure of that construction‘s tenuous 
ground‖ (GT, 37).  Of greatest import is the latter realization as the culmination of the first two: 
the realization that the constructed nature of sexual difference is also the possibility of that 
difference being positioned differently.  But this possibility rests not simply on the fact that 
sexual difference is constructed (which, as Butler argues in Bodies That Matter, leads to a 
shallow understanding of construction as humanist freedom (BM, 6)), but rather that 
constructions are always open to failure and are never fully efficacious.  This understanding of 
the failure of the productive movement of power will be developed through and with Derrida in 
thinking through the citationality of performativity,
63
 but here Butler begins to explore the failure 
of the construction of sexual difference in and through Lacan and post-Lacanian feminists.
64
  In 
this context, it is not citational iteration that opens the possibility of constructing sexual 
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difference otherwise, but it is rather a theological critique which demands the recognition of an 
opening within the efficacy of the Law:  ―the paternal Law,‖ Butler argues, ―ought to be 
understood not as a deterministic divine will, but as a perpetual bumbler, preparing the ground 
for the insurrections against him‖ (GT, 58).  A strict binary seems to be posed, where a divine 
will, the will of a divine subject, a will that is fully efficacious in its intention, is opposed to and 
by an actualizing law, a law that is as it is enacted, a law without subject, but also a law that is a 
perpetual bumbler, a perpetual failure.  As Lacan, or at least Butler‘s Lacan, realizes, the Law of 
the Father is never fully efficacious: it is always bumbling in its actualizations, never able to 
fully bring about the sexed subjects which would fully fill its symbolic order into the historical.  
The actuality of the historical seems to be a bar that the Symbolic itself cannot pass intact.  For 
Butler, then, the Law of the Father cannot and should not be figured as a fully efficacious divine 
will, a divine law which is able to fully execute itself within the historical, and so a divine law 
that has complete control of history, able to positively affect itself in history.  The Law of the 
Father fails precisely in the prohibitive gap between its ideal structure and its actual appearance.  
Prohibition is, in the actualizing movement of the Law, the negativity through which possibility 
is opened.   
This first theological critique of the Law, a critique that prohibits figuring the Law as 
either a subject, or as a fully efficacious will, provides an opening to possibility.  At the same 
time it also leads to the need for a further theological critique.  For if the Law is, in Lacan, a 
perpetual bumbler, this bumbling does not, Butler argues, challenge the Symbolic structure of 
sexual difference in or for Lacan.  The bumbling Law of the Father, and precisely as a bumbling 
Law, forecloses on the possibility of challenging the Symbolic structure of its phantasmic order.  
Butler understands the Lacanian Symbolic as phantasmic to the extent that it is a never realizable 
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determination of sexual position.
65
  This phantasm is produced through a set of rules that 
determine a disjunction between the Symbolic and its actual instantiation in any cultural moment 
(GT, 71).  There are, then, two sets of rules at issue in Lacan: a first set of rules that structure the 
Symbolic distribution of sexed subject positions, and a second set of rules that necessitate the 
failure of the Law to actualize this structure in any historical moment.  If, in Lacan, the latter set 
of rules opens a certain possibility for actualizing the Law differently, this does not, Butler 
argues, affect the first set of rules except as their very protection.  As Butler argues, in a most 
strictly theological language,  
This structure of religious tragedy in Lacanian theory effectively undermines any strategy of 
cultural politics to configure an alternative imaginary for the play of desires.  If the Symbolic 
guarantees the failure of the tasks it commands, perhaps its purposes, like those of the Old 
Testament God, are altogether unteleological – not the accomplishment of some goal, but 
obedience and suffering to enforce the ‗subject‘s‘ sense of limitation ‗before the law‘ (GT, 72).66   
In other words, that the Law must necessarily fail solidifies, rather than challenges, the Symbolic 
structure of sexual difference precisely by placing that structure in a realm beyond challenge.  
The Law will necessarily fail precisely because the Symbolic will not change.   
It is in being necessary that failure is religious, and so this necessity itself requires a 
second invocation of this first theological critique.  In this Lacanian necessity of failure there is, 
Butler argues, a ―romanticization or, indeed, a religious idealization of ‗failure,‘ humility and 
limitation before the Law, which makes the Lacanian narrative ideologically suspect‖ (GT, 72).  
Even as the grammar here implies that it is simply in being religious that the narrative is 
ideologically suspect, the point is rather to articulate the religious idealization of the necessity of 
failure.  This religious idealization of failure is precisely the rendering of failure as both 
                                                 
65
 Kirby, Judith Butler, 79. 
66
 It will remain, for now, an open question the extent to which this determination of the law of the God of the ―Old 
Testament‖ might or might not also apply to the God of the Hebrew Bible.   
91 
 
necessary and as a failure of the historical, and so not a failure of the Symbolic/divine.  This is to 
offer a certain return, as we will see, to an Augustinian logic of creation/conversion, in which 
historical existence is always already a failure, a failure precisely as historical,  and a failure that 
requires the absolute surety of the divine and an absolute discipline before the divine/before the 
Law.  In rendering the Law as a necessary failure, Lacan, at one and the same time, renders that 
failure as a necessary lack and incompleteness before the Law, and renders the Symbolic as 
inviolable, just as the divine will be rendered as absolute and complete being, at the greatest 
distance from a creation that is always already corrupted by the nothingness of creation.   
In a final invocation of this first theological critique, one that is drawn from Nietzsche, 
the Lacanian Law is rendered as a law of ―slave morality‖:  ―the construction of the law,‖ Butler 
argues, ―that guarantees failure is symptomatic of a slave morality that disavows the very 
generative powers it uses to construct the ‗Law‘ as a permanent impossibility‖ (GT, 73).  As 
Adam Kotsko argues, in a way that turns Butler‘s own Nietzschean inheritance into a quasi-
Feuerbachian critique, Butler‘s critique of Lacan is that ―the subject, by participating in and 
thereby maintaining [the illusion of an immutable law], fails to recognize its own power.  The 
Lacanian who resigns himself or herself to the inevitability of the Symbolic does not just decide 
not to waste energy on something impossible – in conceding the immutability of sexual 
difference, the Lacanian or theological subject lends his or her energy to the ongoing struggle 
against any reformulation of the Symbolic order.‖67  Caught in the logic of slave morality, the 
subject of failure becomes caught in the power of its own failure, defending, at all costs, the 
Symbolic necessity of failure itself.  This is, fundamentally, to secure the immutability of the 
Symbolic through the distance of failure.   
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There is, then, a first determination of Butler‘s theological critique as a critique that 
demands an understanding of the law as that which is open, but not necessarily so, to failure, and 
to locate in this failure not a sin but a possibility, a possibility of becoming other.  Butler‘s 
second theological critique in Gender Trouble is directed more specifically at Lacan and 
Irigaray, and is also quite narrowly articulated.  Continuing her engagement with the Lacanian 
determination of the Law of the Father, and the ways in which this determination of the Law has 
been encountered and twisted within post-Lacanian feminist thought, Butler argues that, even 
with these twists ―‘the paternal Law‘ in Lacan, as well as the monologic mastery of 
phallogocentrism in Irigaray, bear the mark of a monotheistic singularity that is perhaps less 
unitary and culturally universal than the guiding structuralist assumptions of the account 
presume‖ (GT, 38).  As we have seen, the paternal law in Lacan is, for Butler, the law through 
which sexual difference and subject positions are established in Lacan, while the mastery of 
phallogocentrism is a reiteration of Butler‘s reading of Irigaray such that phallogocentrism is 
able to effect a total capture of being in Western metaphysical discourse, and so all discourse in 
the Western philosophical tradition.  Both of these positions, Butler argues, propose a singular 
foundational logic of subject production, a singular economy of Law, a singular movement of 
power.  On the one hand, this is, as we have already seen, the foundation of the colonial and 
imperialistic expansion of theory itself, as it moves from a specific location of arising to a 
universal capture of the productive field of power; what is seen as the productive movement of 
power in one moment is universalized to account for the movement of power itself as a theory of 
power.   
On the other hand, and in this context, this is also a determination of subject production 
as always following a singular logic even in the production of multiplied subjectivities.  As 
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Butler says, quite simply, in Bodies That Matter, ―it would be a mistake to impose the same 
criteria on every cultural product‖ (BM, 19).  In Bodies That Matter, the multiplication of subject 
positions is taken up as a challenge to Lacanian psychoanalysis directly in ―Passing, Queering,‖ 
where Butler explores the relations between sexed, gendered, and raced subject productions in 
the work of Nella Larsen.  This challenge requires, for Butler, a radical rethinking of the 
production of subject positions to account for the production of not only sexed and gendered 
subjects, but of raced, and sexed, and gendered subjects, where the relations between these 
determinations of the subject cannot be determined in advance.
68
  If in Bodies That Matter this is 
registered specifically as a further critique of the limited determination of the Symbolic in Lacan, 
in Gender Trouble this theoretical gesture of singularity is not simply registered as a theoretical 
move, but is determined as a specifically theological move, as a monotheistic singularity.  What 
is at stake in this second determination of her theological critique is, then, not a critique of a 
theologically determined figure of the subject as that which is, but rather a critique of a 
theological determination of the logic of power by which that subject comes to be.  This is a 
critique, specifically, of any theoretical position that claims for itself either to be able to totalize 
the field of power through a singular logic, or to totalize the subject through its reductionist 
production by and within a singular determination of power, a theological avoidance of risk.  For 
Butler the subject is always produced within a specific moment of power, and is always 
produced within multiple, unique movements of power.  It is only as a theological determination 
that a theoretical position can determine power as singular, as existing within one logos of being.  
                                                 
68
 As Butler argues in Bodies That Matter, ―[w]hat requires radical rethinking is what social relations compose this 
domain of the symbolic, what convergent set of historical formations of racialized gender, of gendered race, of the 
sexualization of racial ideals, or the racialization of gender norms, makes up both the social regulation of sexuality 
and its psychic articulations‖ (182).  As we will see, Butler‘s failure to perform this radical rethinking, and so to 
escape a certain Lacanian monotheism is the reason for my own de-emphasis of the psychoanalytic side of Butler‘s 
thought, and one of the reasons for the supplemental turn to Whitehead.   
94 
 
To the extent that this second theological critique is drawn back to Nietzsche (GT, 200, fn. 52),
69
 
we too are drawn back to Butler‘s deployment of Nietzsche‘s critique of substance such that in 
the density of these texts we begin to glimpse an onto-theological critique that is a political 
insistence within metaphysics of the opening to the productive becoming of subjectivity.   
  The second determination of Butler‘s theological critique dovetails into a third critique, 
one which takes as its concept of contestation the sovereign site of the Law and the subject.  
Immediately after determining the Law in Lacan and phallogocentrism in Irigaray as bearing the 
mark of a monotheistic singularity, Butler moves to reinvoke Foucault.  This reinvocation is to 
enact a doubled intervention: first, to question the temporality within which the subject is 
produced and is said to exist, and second, to question the effective field of the Law‘s power.  
Here, Butler reiterates an argument that has already been seen, noting specifically that within 
Lacanian, post-Lacanian feminist, and materialist positions, a certain temporal outside to the 
Law is produced, an outside that is determined as either a site of resistance or utopian desire.
70
  
Within this agreement on an outside, the ―location‖ of the temporal subject marks a disagreement 
between Lacanian and materialist feminisms.  Here, Butler argues, the ―quarrel seems to turn on 
the articulation of a temporal trope of a subversive sexuality that flourishes prior to the 
imposition of a law, after its overthrow, or during its reign as a constant challenge to its 
authority‖ (GT, 38).  Yet, Butler argues, the performative twist within which the subject is 
produced is also a twisting of time itself, so that this before the law is produced as a ruse of 
power, the dissimulation of the productive history of the subject itself.  As Butler argues, ―‘the 
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before‘ of the law and ‗the after‘ are discursively and performatively instituted modes of 
temporality that are invoked within the terms of a normative framework which asserts that 
subversion, destabilization, or displacement requires a sexuality that somehow escapes the 
hegemonic prohibitions on sex‖ (GT, 38-39).  The temporal production of an atemporal subject 
achieves, in this way, a final security for the hegemonic structure of the law itself.  The Lacanian 
religious idealization of failure becomes a religious idealization of an atemporal being that stands 
before an eternal law. 
In Gender Trouble the theological nature of this argument is made only by implication, 
through a rhetorical paralleling of the Lacanian religious idealization, and through the placing of 
this argument within a broader articulation of a theological critique.  In Excitable Speech the 
theological nature of performativity in the production of an atemporal subject is noted explicitly.  
Butler is here making a move to Derridean citationality for thinking the efficacy of power in its 
performative movements.  For Butler, Derrida‘s reading of performativity establishes the 
citational nature of every speech act, including performative speech acts.
71
  The critical space 
that is opened by Derrida through his rereading of performativity as a citational act becomes a 
site from within which Butler is able to further elaborate a theological critique.   
Within this space Butler adopts, and greatly expands on, citationality as a means for 
contesting the ―sovereign conceit‖ that appears, as she argues, in critical discussions of hate 
speech, and, in a more general sense, in the figure of the subject of performative speech (ES, 16).  
The sovereign conceit of the performative speech act is itself a threefold designation of the 
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 This is to begin to enter into the long history of the conceptual determination of performativity.  For present 
purposes, Derrida develops his understanding of performativity as a citational practice in the essays collected in 
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performative subject, both as the subject who is enacting a performative speech act and as the 
subject performed within the performative act of speech.  First, Butler means to designate as the 
sovereign conceit the determination of the speaking subject as fully efficacious in her speaking.  
Against this sovereign conceit Butler quite simply observes that ―Not all utterances that have the 
form of the performative… actually work‖ (ES, 16).  Butler has already, as we have seen in her 
critique of Lacan and the implication of the Lacanian law, announced the historical as a first 
principle of failure for that which may appear as necessary or demanding of a necessary 
implementation.  In Excitable Speech and as an elaboration of Derridean citationality, Butler 
develops two further principles of failure, now registered as the failure of the performative.
72
   As 
with her reading of the infelicity of the Lacanian Law, the failure of the citational performative 
arises from its necessary relation to history.  But here, the historical relation of the speech act is a 
designation of the historical and futural context of the speech act itself.  As a citation the speech 
act is both a reiteration of what has come before, a citation of a prior authority from which it 
draws its own author, and is an act that continues to act beyond the immediacy of its enunciation, 
producing effects that are not and cannot be anticipated.  The speech act is, in this sense, not a 
pure act, but ―a certain nexus of temporal horizons, the condensation of an iterability that 
exceeds the moment it occasions‖ (ES, 14).  A nexus that, in its own twist, Butler designates as a 
―ritual‖ (ES, 25).  Arising out of a time that is not its own, moving into a continuation of acts that 
cannot be foreseen in their totality, the ritualized performative act is an act of dislocation: 
dislocating the subject within a time that it does not and cannot control.
73
   And it is precisely this 
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ritual practice that undoes its theological subject.  To figure the subject as fully efficacious in its 
performative speech acts, as being fully in control of what it is and does, is, Butler announces, ―a 
clearly theological construction‖ of the subject (ES, 50), one which must elide its own ritual 
performative production.  This theological determination of the subject is to determine the 
subject as a pure causal origin, enacting from out of itself its own speech, will, and effect, as 
completely determined.  This is a ―divinely empowered subject‖ of complete control (ES, 50). 
Secondly, then, Butler argues, the production of this divinely empowered subject, with all 
the privileges of the sovereign conceit, standing at the origin of its efficacious act, is produced 
through the metaleptic covering of the history of its own arising (ES, 49).
74
  This metalepsis, the 
production of this ―subject-effect,‖ is an affect of citation itself.  As such, the displacement of the 
historical iterations through which the subject cites its own being by a divinely inspired originary 
subject occurs through a congealing of the very history which is overcome.  Citation is a 
stoppage of the historical movement of any becoming in and as a singular being, existing alone 
in its isolation.  And it is on the basis of this congealing of history that the originary subject 
becomes a subject to-be prosecuted.  As Butler argues:  
If the function of the subject as fictive origin is to occlude the genealogy by which that subject is 
formed, the subject is also installed in order to assume the burden of responsibility for the very 
history that subject dissimulates; the juridicalization of history, then, is achieved precisely 
through the search for subjects to prosecute who might be held accountable and, hence, 
temporarily resolve the problem of a fundamentally unprosecutable history (ES, 50).      
What was, in Gender Trouble, a covering over through a performative twist of the temporal 
production of the subject, is now argued to be a theological determination of a temporality by 
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 One should also note the way in which this understanding of the performative as a theological gesture structures 
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which a subject can become subject before the law.  It is not simply a juridical logic of guilt that 
will produce a subject before the law, but a theological logic that will install a singular doer 
behind every deed, overcoming the deeds of its own becoming through the assertion of its own 
individual being.  The sovereign conceit produces, then, a subject that, overcoming the weight of 
its own history, is both divine origin of its act, but also then full origin of its sin.   
 In a final determination of the sovereign conceit of a theologically determined subject, 
Butler reiterates that the power of performativity is itself a derivative power: ―If a performative 
provisionally succeeds …, then it is not because an intention successfully governs the action of 
speech, but only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority 
through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set of practices‖ (ES, 51; emphasis 
in original).  As we have seen, the power of the performative is, for Butler, a power of citational 
iteration, as both a citing of previous authority, and as an accumulation of history in the event of 
the performative citation.  As we will see, this accumulation is not only an accumulation of 
power, but an accumulating of matter, where matter itself becomes through a becoming 
temporality of citational iteration.
75
  This history that is cited is not simply a singular history, but 
is a historical community, or a community of history.  Continuing within arguments articulated 
by J.L. Austin and Pierre Bourdieu, the propriety of any singular performative, and so the 
possibility of its efficacy, rests on a proper citing of a prior authority, a proper citing that occurs 
within a properly determined context.
76
  As a communal in-citing, the performative not only 
draws on the historical weight of its citations, but the performative arises within a context, a 
context of authority and meaning (ES, 155).  The power of any citational performance, either to 
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enact a moment of violent hate, or to call into being that which it names, is therefore derived 
from and within the context of its arising.
77
  As the repeated history of proper authority, the 
properly authorized performative act is itself a ritualized performance of that history (ES, 51).  In 
a glance back to Hegel, it is possible to argue that the citational performative is only effective, if 
it is effective, in bringing about that which it names because it arises within a community, a 
history of citational practice.     
 Although it will become necessary to follow Butler‘s argument further here, to the point 
where the performative fails to maintain in its own propriety within its citational history and 
context, when, in other words, the citational performance begins to cite otherwise than it ought, 
to complete our own articulation of Butler‘s theological critique it is necessary to note that the 
sovereign conceit functions to elide this entire historical context.  The theological production of a 
sovereign subject is precisely the production of a subject who exists outside of all history and all 
context, being the singular origin of its deed, and enacting from afar a will through its own fully 
efficacious speech (ES, 50-51).
78
  This theological determination of the subject is then a 
restriction on the field of analysis itself (ES, 50).  Power cannot be followed through the 
movements of the historical or the social, as it resides simply in the subject, as its point of being 
and site of enactment.  With the sovereign conceit fully granted to the subject, Butler argues, 
political critique is not possible (ES, 50).   
 This is, then, to return to Butler‘s elaboration of a theological critique in Gender Trouble.  
Here, within a reading of Lacan and post-Lacanians, Butler reinvokes Foucault to offer a doubled 
critique: first, to question the temporality within which the subject is produced and is said to 
exist, and second, to question the effective field of the Law‘s power.  In regard to the latter, 
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Butler offers, through Foucault, a displacement of the law by power.  Power becomes the 
thematic of critical intervention  precisely because it moves through the historical, contextual 
becoming of the subject itself (GT, 39).  Within a determination of the subject as arising within 
and as a relation to the law, the law becomes the singular instance of being itself.  Analysis, and 
in Gender Trouble this is the analysis of the sexed and gendered subject, is then limited to the 
singularity of the law.  It is, then, only within the sovereign conceit of the subject that the subject 
is determined as arising within the singular space of the law, and it is as a theological critique 
that power comes to be the structuring movement of subject production, a movement that has no 
bounds.  If, on the one hand, this will make it possible for Butler, in Giving An Account of 
Oneself,
79
 to explore the possibilities of a becoming subjection that is not limited to the 
becoming guilty of a Nietzschean determination of the subject, it is also, by way of a theological 
critique, the grounds for a politics of subversive possibility.               
Within the early works that we have been exploring here, especially Subjects of Desire, 
Gender Trouble, and Excitable Speech, a doubled movement is seen: first, the movement from 
metaphysics to an analytics of power, and second, the movement from a theological critique to 
an analytics of power.  In both, the move to an analytics of power is rendered as a determination 
of power as political, as moving through the historical, the temporal, the social.  In this other 
onto-theological critique that Butler proposes, the opening of metaphysics to its own historical 
becoming is paralleled by an opening made into the production of the subject by a theological 
critique.  The trajectory of these texts, then, in this interplay between metaphysics, theology, and 
power, is not a question of a theological determination of the figure of being or Being, but rather 
of the determination of the logic of power, of productivity.   The unbinding of metaphysics, as 
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the opening of metaphysics to the history of its own becoming, an opening made possible by a 
theological critique, is then the beginning of the political.   
102 
 
CHAPTER 2 
UNBOUND METAPHYSICS AND THE POLITICAL 
 
 What becomes of metaphysics after it has been undone by the political?  We might, as 
one possibility, wish to be done with metaphysics in order to fulfill a politics of possibility to 
come.  Our desire would be for a post-metaphysical, and usually a post-religious, culture within 
which this politics could flourish.  This is, as one example, the proposal offered by Richard 
Rorty, especially in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
1
  Here, Rorty begins by determining the 
political and social aim of both metaphysics and theology as the articulation and production of a 
common essence through which humanity may be united in its rights to existence.  When 
confronted with the contingency of our historical being, which seems to make such an essence 
impossible, both metaphysics and theology posit a deeper reality through which humanity‘s true 
essence can be found.  Rather than providing a grounding for our social and political being, this 
move to a deeper reality is, Rorty argues, a flight from reality, an escape from the reality of time 
and chance.  We must be freed, Rorty continues, from this desire for escape, the desire of 
metaphysics and theology, in order for a politics of our historical being, of our freedom, to be 
practiced.           
As we have seen, Butler‘s proposal is not yet to be done with metaphysics in quite such a 
simple manner.  Metaphysics, as the discourse of our historical condition of being, as the thought 
of the context of our becoming and our making meaning, is not so easily done away with.  Rather 
than espousing an escape from metaphysics, Butler‘s project proposes to undo any final 
completion of metaphysics, or any metaphysical identity, so as to open metaphysics and identity 
to their own future becoming.   
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So again, then, what is to become of metaphysics when it has been undone?  In short, it 
becomes.  Or rather, it becomes a metaphysics of becoming.  Although Judith Butler‘s project 
will be amenable to a metaphysics of becoming,
2
 she has continued to avoid following through 
with a systematic ordering of the metaphysical desire that her own project begins with or, for that 
matter, any metaphysical desire.  But can we continue with her and avoid this desire for the 
metaphysical, a desire that will continue to push thought beyond itself to a feeling of the 
becoming of all actuality?
3
  When it has been undone by the political, when it has been opened to 
its own conditions of becoming, metaphysics becomes not as a desire for the final capture of 
being, but as the desire for a radical empiricism, for a feeling of actuality in all its becoming 
diversity and diversification.  The necessity of metaphysics becomes, in other words, the 
necessity of being accountable to the universality of experience, of all that ―we are conscious, as 
enjoyed, perceived, willed, or thought‖ (PR, 3).  And this is, as the present chapter will argue, a 
necessity that we must now follow. 
To follow this necessity we must turn from the political to the metaphysical.  And in this, 
I want to turn from the political thought and practice of Butler to the metaphysical and 
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speculative project of Alfred North Whitehead.  This for the simple reason that Whitehead‘s 
metaphysics, as a metaphysics of becoming, is itself already infected by the political.  Although 
it is often quite easy to forget, Process and Reality, Whitehead‘s metaphysical magnum opus, is 
the middle text of a trilogy that has as its end civilization.
4
  Although Adventures of Ideas 
literally ends with civilization, Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality are also, 
to varying degrees, also concerned with an articulation of the conditions of a civilization of 
experience.
5
  The aim of Whitehead‘s speculative project is to articulate the conditions of 
civilization, and so his metaphysics becomes the speculative discourse of an ever new immanent 
politics to come.
6
   
Given that Whitehead‘s thought is often reduced to the metaphysical as a way to 
overcome, or at least sidestep the Kantian critiques of metaphysics, a movement that downplays 
or disregards the political infection of his thought, the present unfolding of Whitehead‘s 
speculative project begins with a return to Kant as an attempt to articulate another origination for 
Whitehead‘s own thought, one in which the metaphysical is the systematic discourse of the 
political.  In attempting to follow Whitehead‘s own historical method, this return will not be 
simple or straight.  In figuring his own place within the philosophical tradition, Whitehead 
provides for us a determination of philosophy as both a historical and a creative practice. This 
practice is instigated by and in relation to the shock that the ―great philosopher‖ produces: ―A 
new idea,‖ Whitehead argues in the opening of Process and Reality, ―introduces a new 
alternative and we are not less indebted to a thinker when we adopt the alternative which he 
                                                 
4
 The final section of Adventures of Ideas articulates the conditions of civilization: art, beauty, truth, adventure and 
peace.  Adventures of Ideas, Adventures of Ideas. (New York: The Free Press, 1967).  Further references to 
Adventures of Ideas will appear in text, indicated by AI where necessary.   
5
 A.H. Johnson, Whitehead’s Philosophy of Civilization (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), x.   
6
 Keith Robinson, ―The Lure of Multiple Contrast,‖ Theory & Event 8.2 (2005) Project MUSE. Web. 28 Mar. 2011. 
<http://muse.jhu.edu/>. 
105 
 
discarded.  Philosophy never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher‖ 
(PR, 11).  Whether by acceptance of what is offered or the taking up of what has been rejected, 
although more often in ways less clearly defined between these two, philosophy is always caught 
up within a thought that is given to it.
7
  Following this, Whitehead‘s practice is to always 
announce his own philosophy as being already found in those philosophers which have come 
before – in that long series of footnotes to Plato – a practice that has given rise to a mixed review 
of his own historical acumen.  With his interest in not only what has been accepted but in what 
has been rejected, his interest in the other of philosophical conceptualization, Whitehead 
becomes, it seems, a most serious mis-reader of the philosophical tradition.  This is the fate of 
anyone interested in what has been made possible, and not simply in what has been made.   
Even with this historical orientation, Whitehead‘s philosophical practice is, at the same 
time, an attempt to avoid reducing the practice of philosophy to the practice of historical 
philosophy.
8
   Whitehead does not simply practice historical philosophy when he speculates his 
own metaphysic.  Rather his practice is the insistence that the history of philosophy is the 
condition for the practice of philosophy.  For Whitehead, philosophy is a practice that 
acknowledges that no philosopher is producing ex nihilo a radically new philosophy.  Rather the 
philosopher is a conceptual designer as re-designer,
9
 tinkering with what has been given, and so 
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allowing creativity into a world of continual production that has already been producing.
10
  For 
Whitehead philosophy is itself a practice of a creation of concepts, a creativity that is itself in the 
name of Creativity.
11
 
This also means, Whitehead continues, that philosophy never simply reverts to an earlier 
position of thought.  History will always intervene in the unfolding of philosophy, affecting how 
thought unfolds within and as the experience of what has been given.  Any retrieval of a thought, 
whether as a singular concept or a systematic apparatus, will always be a retrieval that takes 
place through and as what has been given.  And it is precisely this historical movement of 
thought that is condensed in the moment of the great philosopher.  The shock of a great 
philosopher is never produced simply by or out of the singularity of the individual; rather, 
philosophy is always unfolding within the wake of thought that the great philosopher also thinks 
within.  The great philosopher becomes a relay, a vector as Whitehead might say, among many 
philosophers, transforming a history of thought from what has been given into what might be.  
The shock of the great philosopher, then, is a shock-wave produced as the condensation of a 
history of thought producing a transformation, a redirection, the slightest or greatest of 
alterations, within the ever moving history of thought.  The practice of philosophy is, then, the 
deployment of a conceptual energy that is itself derived from that which precedes it, into a 
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history of thought in ways that can never be strictly originated, ended or fully determined, but 
which, more radically, if also more subtly, can only be taken up, relayed, redirected.
12
   
To follow the redirection of philosophy that Whitehead proposes, then, we return to Kant, 
to begin to read Whitehead again.
13
  To recover the unthought in Kant, that which Kant himself 
and his followers have left behind, this return follows Michel Foucault who opens up a political 
possibility within Kant‘s own transcendental project.  Within this opening, and against what 
Whitehead himself will, at times, argue (PR, xi), Whitehead‘s speculative project can be seen as 
a post-Kantian project, beginning at the closure of what we have designated as a metaphysics of 
conversion.   
This is to situate Whitehead‘s project in the condition of its own becoming with Kant, 
and specifically with Kant as the final moment of a metaphysics of conversion, that is opened up 
to and as a political possibility.  As Whitehead will continually argue, every completion is itself 
the condition for a new beginning, and so, if read against himself, Kant becomes not only the 
completion of the metaphysics of conversion, but the beginning of a metaphysics of possibility.   
It is Michel Foucault who, more than any other thinker, has worked to open Kant to this new 
possibility, to a new possibility.  Once Kant is opened up to his own beginning again, it becomes 
possible to articulate Whitehead‘s speculative project as a speculation of possibility.  With this, it 
is possible to argue that Whitehead‘s speculative project is a post-Kantian, constructivist and 
experimental metaphysics of possibility.  Though it is often easy to forget, for Whitehead this 
speculation of possibility arises under the strict demands of secularization.  Through this 
                                                 
12
 In the final passage of her Penser avec Whitehead, Stengers determines the Whiteheadian practice of philosophy 
with the aid of Deleuze and Guatarri, arguing that, for Whitehead, the philosopher is able to produce a thought only 
because he has become a ―piece or part of the machinery of that which has captured him‖ and not because he is the 
creator of that system.  (―Un devenir ‗machinique‘ ay sense de Deleuze et Guattari, au sense où le penseur ne peut 
produire cette pensée que parce qu‘il est lui-même devenu pièce ou rouage de ce qui l‘a capture bien plutôt ne l‘a 
créé‖ (572).  See also Isabella Palin, ―On Whitehead‘s Recurrent Themes and Consistent Style,‖ Process Studies 37, 
no.2 (Fall/Winter 2008): 79. 
13
 Robinson, ―Whitehead, Post-Structuralism, and Realism,‖ 66. 
108 
 
secularization of God and experience, the speculative project becomes, in its final moment, and 
in its completion, a philosophy of civilization.  So our exploration concludes with an articulation 
of this Whiteheadian civilization, a civilization of adventure and peace, articulated as a political 
possibility in the final section of Adventures of Ideas, and as a theo-political possibility in the 
final section of Process and Reality.  As the end of his speculative project, a civilization of 
adventure and peace becomes a civilization without end.       
1.  The end of conversion and the beginning of critique 
In the final section of The Order of Things, Michel Foucault determines the Kantian 
shock within which philosophy now works as the production of man.
14
  As we have seen in the 
Introduction, in Kant the full determination of being comes to speak through man and speaks 
man into being within and as a logic of becoming that is a conversion to being.  This conversion 
is a productive logic within which historical and material difference is captured and overcome by 
being transformed into singular simplicity, into simple objects and subjects.  This Kantian shock 
is not itself, of course, an absolutely new determination of the subject.  It is, rather, the final 
moment of a metaphysics of conversion through which Being is determined as and through a 
subject of conversion, a subject announced by Augustine as God.  This determination of Being is 
a demand of and by the simple unity of God now transposed into the transcendental subject that 
becomes the measure and mark of simple being.  The history of conversion is a history of the 
religious subject becoming as a desire to simplicity in the presence of God as it becomes a 
subject becoming its own demand for a priori simplicity.  And it is this transcendental subject, 
arising within a desire of simplicity and so within a demand of simplicity from itself and for 
itself, that is, Foucault argues, man.   
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Foucault is, of course, a difficult authority to cite in order to understand the history that 
has been traced from Augustine to Kant as a metaphysics of conversion.  As the most 
fundamental difficulty, in The Order of Things Foucault insists that the appearance of man only 
arrives after a threshold has been crossed, after a definitive break has been made with Classical 
forms of thought and representation (OT, 304).  Man only appears, Foucault argues, within the 
strictly delimited space of the modern episteme, an episteme that is marked by a determinate 
mode of representation.  And this mode of representation only arises within a space prepared for 
by the representational practices of the modern episteme.  The history of conversion seems to 
unfold within a metaphysical and ontological determination of being as a history without break.  
To the extent, therefore, that Foucault argues that the appearance of man occurs within and 
following from a fundamental break within representational practice, man would appear for 
Foucault within a different archeological trajectory than that which I have designated as the 
genealogical history of a metaphysics of conversion.  It might appear, then, that Foucault arises 
not to confirm the production of man but to contest conversion as the metaphysical demand that 
has continued as a demand from Augustine to Kant.   
There is, though, another history told in the final moments of The Order of Things.   
Here, in this other history, Foucault proposes that the movement that allows man to arise is a 
metaphysical inversion that is itself an inversion of Western thought (OT, 317).    This is a 
history that moves from a time much earlier than the modern, or its genius Kant, and so cannot 
simply coincide with the Modern.  This is also a history not simply of representational practice, 
but of metaphysical practice and so requires a reconsideration of the simple conditions of 
representational logic by which man appears.  Inversions are, in this sense, never simple 
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ruptures, never simple breaks, and metaphysical inversions must be more than inversions of 
representational practice.   
For Foucault the metaphysical inversion, fully enacted in Kant, is an inversion of the 
finite and the infinite.  With this inversion the finite returns only to itself, without passage 
through the infinite, either as from the infinite or to the infinite.  If this is, as Foucault argues, a 
certain opening of the metaphysical tradition, this inversion is also the completion of that 
tradition.
15
  It is, we might say, the completion of the metaphysics of conversion.  The productive 
logic that in Augustine is determined as a necessary movement through the infinite God becomes 
in Kant a necessary passage through the finite limits of man, and it is this inversion of the 
movement of power that allows man to appear.  In Kant the productive logic through and in 
which the subject arises circulates quite strictly in a now and forever closed circle: from the finite 
to the finite, from man to man, producing that out of which it arises.
16
  Within the history that 
Foucault provides this metaphysical inversion produces man, as finite, taking the place of God, 
as infinite, precisely as both ground and measure of being (OT, 316).
17
  And this metaphysical 
inversion is registered in both a negative and positive gesture: in its negative trajectory, Foucault 
argues, there appears the continual reduction of metaphysics to the human scale of finitude, 
while in its positive trajectory there is the appearance of man (OT, 317).  Man becomes, then, the 
measure and source of being, the fundamental ground of all determinations of both finite and 
infinite being and the site through which the logic of production must always pass.   
                                                 
15
 Amy Allen, The Politics of Ourselves: Power, Autonomy and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 33. 
16
 Beatrice Han, Foucault’s Critical Project: Between the Transcendental and the Historical, trans. Edward Pile  
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002),  3. 
17
 See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Second Ed. 
with afterword by and an interview with Michel Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 30. 
111 
 
In one sense, then, the history presented as the history of a metaphysics of conversion is a 
history not only of conversion but of inversion.  Foucault‘s desire for the end of man, as the 
product of this inversion, is also, then, a desire for the end of conversion.  But ends are always as 
complex as inversions.  On the one hand, the history of the metaphysics of conversion has arisen 
as a history of production that is more complex than its simple being.  As we have seen, the finite 
(man) does not simply replace the infinite (God) as the ground, source and determination of 
being, but there is also, in the production of man and world within the history of the metaphysics 
of conversion a continual redeployment of the powers and structures of the finite and the infinite 
in the determination of man and his world.  These redeployments always produce a crossing and 
over-crossing of that which is attributable to the finite and that which is attributable to the 
infinite.  If an inversion occurs within these deployments, it is an inversion of mutual implication 
and movement that can never simply be a displacement of God by man.  Inversions, in other 
words, must always be untangled, and not simply overcome, and in this untangling we confront a 
new beginning. 
In her recent reading of Foucault, especially concerning his relation to Kant, Amy Allen 
argues precisely this point: Foucault‘s call for the end of man as the final gesture of The Order of 
Things  is not itself an end, but a taking up of the Kantian critical project.  ―What Foucault is 
calling for,‖ Allen argues,  
is a critique of critique, which means not only a criticism of Kant‘s project for the way in which it 
closes off the very opening for thought that it had created but also a critique in the Kantian sense 
of the term – that is, an interrogation of the limits and conditions of possibility of that which Kant 
himself took as his own starting point, namely, the transcendental subject.
18   
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Rather than simply marking an end, a death, a final gesture, the completion of the metaphysic of 
conversion that occurs in Kant is itself the occasion for a new beginning.  In taking up both that 
which Kant has accepted and that which he has rejected a new possibility arises.   
Following from this, it is possible to offer a determination of Foucault‘s project as a 
critical project, precisely in the Kantian sense.  From beginning to end, Foucault attempts an 
exposure of the conditions of the subject.  This is to immediately challenge a rather common, 
although also superficial, reading of Foucault, one which is most forcefully articulated by Jürgen 
Habermas in his ―Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present.‖19  Habermas argues that two different 
Kant‘s appear in Foucault‘s various readings of and critiques of Kant.20   First, there is the Kant 
of The Order of Things, Kant as the epitome of Enlightenment rationality, founder of man, and 
enemy of Foucault‘s positive project.  Opposed to this Kant is the Kant who appears in 
Foucault‘s late essay ―What is Enlightenment?‖  Here, according to Habermas, another Kant 
appears, a Kant who authors the origin of an ―‘ontology of contemporary reality‘ that leads 
through Hegel, Nietzsche, and Max Weber to Horkheimer and Adorno.  Surprisingly, in the last 
sentence of his lecture Foucault includes himself in this tradition.‖21  This new Kant, or late 
Foucaultian Kant, is incommensurate with the early Foucaultian Kant, Habermas argues, and so 
is a symptom of a greater incoherence within Foucault‘s larger project.  For Habermas, and many 
of Foucault‘s readers, the final turn to Kant, and more generally the final (re)turn to the subject is 
also a final and incoherent turn.        
In proposing to find a consistent reading of Kant in Foucault Allen is also proposing a 
consistent Foucault.  The consistency or lack thereof is a minor concern of the present project.  
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In general, I find it important, for reasons that will become apparent, to heed Foucault‘s own 
admonition that we leave the desire for authorial consistency to the police and theologians.  For 
now, though, it is possible to follow Allen into this construction of a coherent Foucault.  The 
continuity that Allen proposes hinges on determining Foucault‘s project as, at least in part, an 
immanent critique of Kant.
22
  On the one hand, this means, as Allen emphasizes, that Foucault‘s 
project is always concerned with the final of Kant‘s three grand questions: what is man?  For 
Foucault, of course, this concern will morph into a question not only of man, but of the subject 
itself.
23
  But more directly, and certainly more directly for my interest, this question becomes for 
Foucault a question of the production of man, the production of the subject.
24
  In taking up 
Kant‘s critical project Foucault transforms the search for the transcendental conditions of 
experience into a search for the historical conditions of the production of the subject.  With this 
turn to the production of the subject, Kant‘s critical project becomes in Foucault a limit practice, 
a becoming limit in order to know the limits of what can be.  Again, Foucault offers us a new 
beginning: at the end of conversion, with the production of man, the metaphysics of conversion 
is opened to a new possibility: a productive possibility as the possibility of production itself.  The 
investigation of limits that guided the desire for simplicity which animated Kant‘s work to the 
production of transcendental subject is now opened to a production of the subject at the limit of 
its being.  
The articulation of critique as a limit practice will follow; for now it is also necessary to 
note that for Foucault, this opening of Kant, the taking up of the critical philosophy as a limit 
practice, is also the implosion of the Cartesian space within which the philosophical subject as a 
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subject of doubt is produced.  Specifically, the Kantian subject, Foucault argues, is 
fundamentally the author of his own escape, the subject who produces ―release from his self-
incurred tutelage.‖25  Although this self-produced release is quite central to Foucault‘s reading of 
Kant, it is immediately a complicated release.  For the Enlightenment subject is caught in a 
political bind, the bind that Foucault designates as a ―rational despotism.‖26  According to 
Foucault, the subject of the Enlightenment that Kant proposes is free to reason, to employ his 
autonomous reason, free to produce his own release from tutelage, on the one condition that he 
commit to a political obedience.  This political obedience, Foucault continues, is already 
established in the critiques through and as the limits of reason.
27
   
With this, it would be possible to argue that Kant‘s political thought arises precisely 
within Descartes‘ ―Second Meditation.‖  Foucault‘s reading of Kant‘s political Enlightenment 
arises, then, precisely as his own meditation on the political consequences of allowing a 
philosophical meditation to continue only as and within the politically protected space of a doubt 
that is not madness.
28
  Just as the Cartesian subject is only allowed to continue his mediations 
within a space secured by a juridical confinement of madness and a horizon of God‘s infinite 
presence, the Kantian subject is free to reason within the limits of reason, a limit that is secured 
by those who are, as Kant argues, not afraid of shadows and who have the power of force 
backing them.
29
  As Kant goads King Fredrick, this freedom of reason can be allowed by one 
with a well-disciplined army, and by an enlightened ruler who can announce to his subjects 
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―argue as much as you will, and about what you will, only obey!‖30  In this militarily backed 
announcement of freedom, Foucault finds articulated a mutual determination of the political and 
philosophical moments of modernity: the decision to subject oneself to a given rational rule of 
law is replicated by and grounded in the decision to subject oneself to an a priori transcendental 
ground of knowledge and being.
31
  The freedom to reason is itself announced within and as the 
space created by a political force.  This bind, and the willingness to remain caught within it, 
Foucault makes clear, is not a ―blind and foolish‖ obedience, but is rather an adaptation to 
circumstance, such that the use of reason is ―subjected to the particular ends in view.‖32  Reason 
is, in other words, never truly free, but always free within bounds, within limits.  The ends of 
knowledge, the ends of morality, the ends of politics: all are achieved within and as a subjection 
to an order that is always already given, backed by a force of violence.  
Foucault‘s immanent critique of Kant arises within this space of rational despotism, 
becoming a doubled implosion of the limits of critique: the limits of being determined by Kant as 
the limits of reason and the limits within which the subject itself arises.  As such, the immanent 
critique occurs precisely as a political practice, a practice for and of transforming Kant‘s own 
concern with limits and the proper determination of limits into a limit practice which is the 
creative transgression of the limits of what has been given.  The immanent critique, in other 
words, becomes that which has been excluded from philosophy from the beginning: practice.  
And in taking up the critical project as a practice, Foucault positions critique precisely within 
that which has always been excluded from the metaphysics of conversion: history.  Foucault‘s 
limit practice becomes an historical practice, a practice of history and materialism.  History and 
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matter come to implode the limits of that which has been determined to being within and as 
conversion.  
Yet at the exact moment that Foucault proposes this implosion of the limit of being by 
history and matter, he also insists on the imposition of his own limit: ―this criticism is not 
transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is genealogical in its 
design and archeological in its method.‖33 At that moment when Kant‘s own limits are imploded, 
when Descartes‘ limits are imploded, when Augustine‘s limits are imploded – when the history 
of conversion is opened to its own practice – Foucault insists on his own foreclosure, the 
foreclosure on metaphysics.  The ―historical ontology of ourselves‖ that Foucault draws out of 
Kant is always an exploration of the ―practical systems‖ that determine the human subject: 
systems of relations of control over things, relations of actions upon others, relations with 
oneself.
34
  As the analyses of these practical and relational systems, Foucault‘s primary concern 
will also always be with the human subject; when Foucault analyzes the body, he analyzes the 
human body; when Foucault analyzes institutions, he analyzes human institutions.  The tracings 
of power are always, in other words, tracings of that which flow through the human subject.     
With this, the Foucaultian opening of Kant does not lead to metaphysics.  It is rather ―a 
historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize 
ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.‖35   In determining critique as an 
experimental practice that is also a limit practice Foucault proposes a practice that is opposed at 
every point to metaphysics precisely because its concern is the historical production of the 
subject.  Even as Foucault recognizes a certain metaphysical opening in Kant, an opening which 
is then closed down, Foucault will continue to close down this metaphysical opening in order to 
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fully open the historical.  For Foucault, these two – the metaphysical and the historical – are 
opposed at every turn so that critique, when it becomes an historical practice, is, it seems, a 
groundless practice, a groundlessness that evacuates the possibility of metaphysics.  Drawing on 
his earlier reading of Nietzsche, it is possible to argue that for Foucault the practice of critique 
avoids the metaphysical promise of a fully grounded return home, a return to an origin, in order 
to avoid the imposition of an absolute limit that will bring an end to both the need for and 
possibility of experimentation.
36
  There is no home, in other words, from which to survey the 
territory of philosophies possession.
37
   
It will take the remainder of the present chapter to sort through the stakes of this 
foreclosure.  For now, we can begin by noting that in order to develop a politics of possibility 
within a metaphysics it is necessary to turn away from both Foucault and Butler, finding recourse 
in the metaphysical speculations of the last great metaphysician of the 20
th
 century: Alfred North 
Whitehead.   
In what follows, then, an opening will be made into the possibility of the politics to come 
through the opening that Foucault makes into Kant, an opening that Whitehead can then be 
opened up into.  In this, Foucault will become the pivot upon which politics itself is opened back 
up into the metaphysical.  What began as the political undoing of metaphysics becomes, in 
Whitehead, a metaphysical creativity of the political.  And it is this movement back out into the 
metaphysical that is begun by Foucault‘s theological critique.    
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2.  A theological opening  
            In the series of inversions and redeployments that have marked the history of the 
metaphysics of conversion, man has taken on one striking God-like determination: man becomes 
unknown to himself within this movement of productivity.  In this Kantian movement a 
reflectivity of self-knowledge seems impossible for a self-determining being.
38
  This is not 
simply a philosophical question, though, as this epistemic limit is itself, within this history of 
conversion, a replication of God‘s aseity as that is determined in Augustine‘s own opening 
confessional lament.  The demand and productive power of conversion, it seems, must always 
arrive from a place of unknowing that cannot be challenged.  Whether this foreclosure on 
knowledge, and as Judith Butler has so successfully argued, resistance,
39
 is justified by God or 
the a priori seems to make little difference in force of practice.   
It is precisely man as unknown to himself who occupies the ambiguous Kantian position 
designated by Foucault as both object and subject of knowledge (OT, 312), a position that also 
requires that man always disappears within his own knowledge and being.  The death of man is 
already announced in his appearance, and so the gap of his absence is already his only possible 
presence.
40
  To the extent that the Kantian shock is registered as the appearance of man, it is also 
registered as the appearance of man as always absent, as always withdrawing from the scene and 
source of his own production.
41
  In this sense, the Kantian man is, as has been seen, a 
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radicalization of the Cartesian subject of doubt who has already begun the disappearance into his 
own doubt, a disappearance that is itself a radicalization of the Augustinian subject‘s ignorance 
of his own dispersed temporal existence that is escaped only by becoming frozen out of time.  
Each of these subjects is, in its own way, a product of the demands of conversion, so that 
conversion is a demand to that which can, finally, never be known.           
With Foucault as a guide, it is possible to understand that to think in the wake of Kant is 
to think in the wake of a doubled theological determination of the subject:  on the one hand, the 
Kantian subject is determined within a movement of power that always passes through simplicity 
as its origin and destination, a simplicity that has been inherited from a theological discourse of 
conversion; on the other hand, the Kantian subject is a subject always absent from its origin and 
destination, and so absent from any contestation of the movement within which it arises, a 
subject inscrutable and unknown in its own becoming.  And so the theological is necessary, as 
Foucault implies, for the investigation of the gap of man‘s appearance and absence.42  This is 
precisely, of course, the insight of Butler‘s theological critique which is itself a critique of these 
overlain and overlapping determinative productions of the subject as a singular and simple 
subject.  Butler‘s theological critique is, in other words, a critique of the theological subject of 
conversion, even in its most secular appearances.  As we have seen, the theological subject is, for 
Butler, a subject that is determined to be singular, simple and the source of power, while, at the 
same time, a subject that is, in its fundamental character, unknown to itself, cut off from a 
knowledge of its own becoming, blinded to its own grounding in power, and so ultimately a 
failure that will also be ineffectual in its confrontation with power.  Butler‘s theological critique, 
then, attempts to lay bare the theological subject as having assumed the place of God, while 
                                                                                                                                                             
own absence.  See also Jefferey T. Nealon, Alterity Politics: Ethics and Performative Subjectivity (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 1998).    
42
 Foucault, ―What is an Author?‖ 209.   
120 
 
always noting the difficulties of this movement of assumption (BM, 5), to only and always be 
haunted by an absence that can never be challenged and that forecloses any resistance.  It is 
precisely this theological subject that Butler attempts to undo from within: unbinding the subject 
from its own theological determinations in the name of a possible becoming otherwise, becoming 
a subject of a possible politics to come.  The theological critique becomes, then, absolutely 
necessary for understanding the trajectory of conversion and for opening a politics of possibility 
within and as the undoing of the demand of conversion. 
There is, of course, something somewhat troubling in so quickly moving to the 
theological after beginning with Foucault.  But this is not the worst of it, for Foucault not only 
immediately demands a theological critique, but this theological critique is undertaken in order to 
open up a political critique, in  the not-so-strictly Kantian sense that I have already begun to 
articulate.  Foucault must become invested in and by a theological project precisely in order to 
continue the Kantian critical project.  Or, to say this more strongly still, Foucault‘s theological 
critique is at the same time a Kantian critical practice.  Although the theological critique seems 
to be demanded precisely as a critique of Kant, this critique itself is enacted in order to continue 
the critical project as a political project.  The theological critique is that which allows Foucault‘s 
critical project to arise.   
In order to understand Foucault‘s designation of Kantian critique as a limit practice in the 
late essays ―What is Enlightenment?‖ and ―What is Critique?‖ it is necessary to return not only 
to The Order of Things, but also to another of Foucault‘s earliest works, ―The Preface to 
Transgression.‖ In this reflection written at the same time as The Order of Things, we encounter 
a first announcement of the necessity of taking up a limit practice, here designated as the 
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experience of the death of God.
43
  In this early work the experience of the death of God is the 
condition for a limit practice that opens the becoming subject to the limits of its own possibility.  
Across the temporal distance of these texts, from the beginning and end of his thought, it seems 
Foucault will enter into critique as a practice of the experience of the death of God as the critique 
of limits and the opening of possibility.   
As we have already seen, Foucault begins his reading of Kant in the late texts by isolating 
a particular attitude, what he calls an Enlightenment attitude of critique.
44
  This critical attitude is 
often exhausted as an epistemological practice, and so Foucault is quick to point out that in its 
critique, the Enlightenment has given us more than an epistemology:  critique is, of course, a 
certain way of thinking, but it is also, Foucault argues, a way of ―speaking and acting, a certain 
relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society, to 
culture and also a relationship to others.‖45  In ―What is Enlightenment?‖ Foucault continues this 
determination of the critical attitude by arguing that it is ―a mode of relating to contemporary 
reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a 
way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and 
presents itself as a task.‖46   The critical attitude is at least, then, an epistemology, an ontology, 
and a politics: a way of knowing, a way of being, and a way of acting together.
47
  Within the 
critical attitude, what we know and what we can be are, for Foucault, mutually implicated 
determinations, and so whatever critical attitude the Enlightenment provides will be an attitude 
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that at once implicates one in epistemology, ontology and politics.
48
  With this, the critical 
attitude that Foucault derives from Kant is a specific way of encountering the limits of what we 
can know and what we can be. 
This is also a certain way of being in the present, in the moment of one‘s own historical 
being.
49
  In its specificity, the Enlightenment attitude arises in relation to the limits established as 
and in a certain form of being governed.  For Kant, the context of this governance is determined  
by the conditions of being governed that arose within 16
th
 and 17
th
 century Europe, conditions 
that are, as Kant acknowledges, religious.
50
  Again, within these conditions, Foucault argues, the 
Kantian ―release‖ is enacted in the desire to be governed otherwise, as the critical attitude enacts 
the desire of not being governed.
51
  The specificity of the Kantian release is a release from a 
specific form of Christian governance, a release that is itself made possible by a particular 
concept of freedom.  This release, then, is an encounter with forms of governance, an encounter 
that takes place  through ―acts of defiance, as challenge, as a way of limiting these arts of 
governing and sizing them up, transforming them, of finding a way to escape from them or, in 
any case, a way to displace them.‖52  The Kantian release becomes, for Foucault, the production 
of an opening, an opening within which governance can be challenged, and other ways of being 
governed can be practiced, but an opening that will always remain fully embedded within the 
impurity of its historical moment of arising.  It is, in other words, an opening of Kant to the 
historical specificity of his own critique, and so an opening of Kant to the historical.  This 
historical critique becomes a practice, a permanent practice of living otherwise in a present that 
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always arises within and as a particular historical moment.  Within the historical moment 
announced by Kant the structure of reason and the structure of governance intersect at and as the 
limit of being.  With surprising brevity, Foucault announces that critique ―consists of analyzing 
and reflecting upon limits.‖53   
For Kant, it seems, the primary concern of limits, as both rational and practical, is to 
arrive at a determination of the limits that will secure certainty.  For Foucault, this Kantian task 
of limiting becomes, in the present moment, the task ―to transform the critique conducted in the 
form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-
over.‖54  Critique is no longer, in other words, the establishment of limits, but is the critical 
investigation of limits that can only occur as a transgressive passage through the limit.  And it is 
this passage through that Foucault determines as a critique of critique: critique as a limit practice 
is an investigation into and of the limits within which the limits of knowing and being are 
determined.
55
  This is both a critique of Kant‘s own determination of limits, as well as ―an 
interrogation of the limits and conditions of possibility of that which Kant himself took as his 
own starting point, namely, the transcendental subject itself.‖56  Just as critique, when 
determined as critique of arts of governance, is a critique of particular practices of governance, 
and not, we might say, a transcendental idealist critique of governance itself.  Critique becomes, 
for Foucault, a historical practice of investigation, exposing and displacing forms of governance 
through exposing and displacing limits of possibility.  
In ―A Preface to Transgression‖ Foucault attempts to determine this limit practice within 
and as an exploration of the experience of the death of God.  The death of God, though, is neither 
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a simple nor singular matter, as Foucault reminds us.
57
  In ―Philosophy and the death of God‖ 
Foucault is quick to distinguish the death of God in Hegel, Feuerbach and Nietzsche.  In Hegel, 
Foucault argues, the death of God is enacted by Reason taking the place of God; in Feuerbach, 
the death of God is enacted in the realization that God is an illusion that alienates man; in 
Nietzsche, Foucault‘s seeming preferred determination of the death of God, the death of God 
―signifies the end of metaphysics, but God is not replaced by man, and the space remains 
empty.‖58  Confirming the earlier reading of The Order of Things, Foucault proposes not a 
simple replication and inversion of God and man, but an entry into this inversion, an entry that 
does not do away with the space created by God and man or the death of God and man, but is 
rather the filling of that space within and by the constitution of the historical conditions for the 
becoming subject, emptied of all a priori transcendental conditions.  The absent space of the 
now-absented theological subject is filled with the historical and the material.  This also means 
that the experience of the death of God is an experience that is always experienced, or is rather 
the condition of experience in the present moment.  It is not, Foucault insists, a onetime event, 
the inauguration of the modern period or any period, for that matter.  Rather, it is, as he says, the 
―now-constant space of our experience,‖ and that element in all experience.  
In ―A Preface to Transgression,‖ Foucault determines this continual experience of the 
death of God as experience without the limit of the Limitless or the boundary of exteriority.
59
  
Yet, precisely because of this, the experience of the death of God is itself impossible: it is an 
experience of impossible interiority.  In a world without limit, without a principle of limitation, a 
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principle that we will see Whitehead determine as a principle of concrescence, being itself is 
impossible.  This impossibility arises not simply because of an absence of being (a rendering of 
being and possibility that would make a necessity of the contingently historical, and return 
Foucault precisely to the absent Kantian subject), but rather it arises within and from a play of 
limits.  This playful anti-ontology is the eruption of transgression, rendered by Foucault as ―the 
flash of lightning in the night,‖60 a flash that now comes not only to destroy all limit, but to re-
ignite the limit of becoming in the rupture of this night of being.  Transgression, for Foucault, is 
―an action that involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash of its 
passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is likely that transgression has its 
entire space in the line it crosses.‖61  This is not, then, the absolute absence of limit, but the 
opening of experience to exhaust itself in the play of limits, in the continual crossing and re-
crossing of possibility.  As an opening of experience to movement, transgression is a becoming 
of what might be when limits become sites of movement and not determinations of being.   
Within the experience of the death of God the possibility of being does not depend, then, 
on the necessity of being within the limits of what has been, but on the necessity of the 
production of the possible through a contestation of the limits by which the (im)possible is 
determined.  Necessarily conjoined, Foucault argues, ―the limit and transgression depend on each 
other for whatever density of being they possess.‖62  The impossible experience of the death of 
God is the experience of the continual transgression of the limit of experience itself, a 
transgression that will, within the death of God, arise as an immanent determination of that very 
limit.  With this, the marking of boundaries and the maintenance of boundaries, and so also the 
creation of being as that which is properly  determined within bounds, is no longer the sole 
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domain of God, but is now the consequence of transgression itself, a transgression made possible 
as the continual death of God.  It is precisely, then, that a theological experience will open the 
space for critique.   
To the extent that the impossibility of experience, the experience of the death of God, 
refers, for Foucault, to both that which is experienced and the (im)possibility of that experience, 
it opens up to the archeological investigation of possibility itself.  In ―Philosophy and the Death 
of God‖ it is precisely within the opening of the death of God that the philosopher can, Foucault 
argues, study ―the space within which thought unfolds, as well as the conditions of that thought, 
its mode of constitution.‖63   What was, in ―The Preface to Transgression‖ the site of an 
impossible experience has become, here, also the site from which and through which to 
investigate the possibility of experience and the mode of its constitution.  This is precisely the 
determination of critique that Foucault will return to in ―What is Enlightenment?‖ when he 
determines critique as a practical practice of crossing over.  In this later text, critique is 
determined as a limit practice as a testing of the limits of what has been in order to attain to that 
which might be.  If in this later text Foucault develops a limit attitude in relation to the Kantian 
practice of critique, in the early texts this limit practice is developed in relation to and as the 
experience of the death of God and the possibility of transgression that is opened within an 
experience of this death.  The death of God, in other words, opens as a movement of 
transgression that forces a rupture within the limits of being itself, and it is this rupture of limits 
that constitutes the experience and practice of critique.   
From within the experience of transgression made possible by and as the experience of 
the death of God an immanent critique of power is opened, a critique of that which has marked 
and been the mark of limit.  The experience of the death of God becomes the experience of 
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limits: limits become known in the experience of their absence, and so the experience of the 
death of God becomes the experience and practice of critique.  It is precisely in the space opened 
by the death of the God that critique arises as a practice of transgression.  The movement beyond 
Kant, the movement that will open Kant to the historical as a means to continue the practice of 
critique, is occasioned by, through, and as an experience of the death of God, an experience of 
the limit as its being passed over.  In a double sense, then, critique is made possible through a 
theological critique.  On the one hand, critique itself is made possible through and as a 
questioning of religious forms of governance, a questioning that itself historically arises as a 
theological series of resistances to the Church.  On the other hand, critique is made possible by 
and as the experience of the death of God.  In both of these cases, critique is a limit practice, a 
practice of enacting and transgressing the limits of what might be.  To practice critique, then, is 
to enact an historical practice of encountering and transgressing the limits of what is in order to 
produce what might be.    
3.  From critique to an ecological metaphysics 
In his recent comparative exploration of the philosophies of Kant, Whitehead and Gilles 
Deleuze, Steven Shaviro proposes an imagined history, one in which Whitehead is read as the 
founder of the postmodern, taking a place often reserved for Heidegger.
64
  In its direct intention, 
Shaviro‘s imaginative reading of the history of philosophy is an attempt to rethink the agenda of 
postmodern theory.  This alterative agenda produces a theoretical agenda that is decidedly 
constructive, and no longer simply deconstructive, opening up to the possibility of a speculative 
metaphysical desire.
65
  Shaviro‘s imaginative project is also, though, an attempt to think 
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Whitehead as a decisively post-Kantian thinker, one who is working with and within a thought 
that is given by Kant.   
In this, Heidegger and Whitehead offer two alternative ways for taking up Kant.  Both 
Whitehead and Heidegger, in their strikingly contemporaneous works Process and Reality and 
Being and Time, respond, Shaviro argues, to the ―situation of modernity, the immensity of 
scientific and technological change, the dissolution of old certainties, the increasingly fast pace 
of life, the massive reorganizations that followed the horrors of World War I.‖66  On the one 
hand, of course, Heidegger directly draws from Kant a certain way of addressing the ontological 
question, as Kant is for Heidegger ―the first and only one who traversed a stretch of the path 
toward investigating the dimension of temporality.‖67   Beyond this initial taking up of Kant in 
Being and Time, in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics a reading of Kant becomes the 
occasion for Heidegger to develop his own ontological and metaphysical thought.
68
   
Whitehead likewise draws from Kant a certain way of addressing the ontological 
question, announcing, in language strikingly similar to Heidegger‘s, that Kant is ―the great 
philosopher who first, fully and explicitly, introduced into philosophy the conception of an act of 
experience as a constructive functioning‖ (PR, 156).  This is, for Whitehead, the beginning of 
thinking being as becoming, being as experience as a constructive practice.  This Kantian 
beginning is, in other words, the beginning of Whitehead‘s speculative project.  Heidegger and 
Whitehead can be seen, then, to situate their own thought in relation to Kant within a new 
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context of late modernity, while also determining Kant to their own purpose.  In imagining 
another postmodernity, one in which Whitehead replaces Heidegger, Shaviro is proposing a 
certain trajectory of thought, one which moves from Kant as determined by Whitehead and so 
takes up a history of philosophy that has largely been rejected.   
There is, of course, something unusual in attempting to read Whitehead in this Kantian 
manner.  In confirmation of this, it would be possible to turn to the opening ―Preface‖ of Process 
and Reality, allowing Whitehead himself to announce that ―in the main the philosophy of 
organism is a recurrence to pre-Kantian modes of thought‖ (PR, xi).  As Derek Malone-France 
has observed, this claim has ―exercised a powerful influence on process thinkers, leading many 
to simply disregard or denigrate Kant‘s importance, on the basis of their conviction that Kant‘s 
thought represents an unfortunate and unnecessary detour in the development of western 
metaphysics.‖69 Kant becomes, in this line of thought, not simply a detour, but an impossibility 
for metaphysics itself, so that in order for Whitehead to be a metaphysician, which he apparently 
and undoubtedly is, a certain bypassing of Kant is necessary.  If Whitehead himself determines 
his thought as a return to pre-Kantian modes of thought through a serious reading of the history 
of philosophy, it would seem possible, and necessary, for the follower of Whitehead to likewise 
engage in a careful examination of his thought in order to develop an alternative history of 
philosophy that likewise returns prior to and so makes possible a bypassing of or at least a 
diminution of Kant.  This bypassing of Kant would then also make possible a full appropriation 
of Whitehead‘s metaphysical thought.       
In his own attempt to rehabilitate Whitehead, and so appropriate Whitehead‘s 
metaphysics, George R. Lucas proposes not simply that Whitehead‘s recurrence to pre-Kantian 
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modes of thought allows a bypassing of Kant, but further that this recurrence positions 
Whitehead as an alternative to Kant.  Lucas is, at this point, exemplary of a common mode for 
taking up Whitehead.
70
  Figured as an alternative, Whitehead is for many, although strikingly 
Kantian in some respects, thoroughly other than Kant.
71
  Lucas begins his own project by 
arguing that Whitehead‘s philosophy contains a ―virulent anti-Kantian polemic.‖72  This anti-
Kantian polemic is unfortunate, Lucas continues, precisely to the extent that it is based on a 
failed understanding of Kant.  Whitehead is forced into a limited reading of Kant because of his 
own imprisonment within late-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy.
73
  Within this context, 
Whitehead can only read Kant as the author of the first Critique, and as such as a narrowly 
interested and minimally interesting epistemologist.  Lucas attempts to trouble Whitehead‘s anti-
Kantian polemics by demonstrating the purported inadequacies of Whitehead‘s reading of Kant 
as well as drawing a series of comparisons between Whitehead‘s thought and Kant‘s thought as 
presented in the second and third Critiques.  Specifically, Lucas ends his interrogation of 
Whitehead‘s relation to Kant by wondering what Whitehead would have made of Kant‘s third 
Critique, especially in its explorations of beauty and aesthetics.
74
  Although it would be possible 
to draw from this work a post-Kantian reading of Whitehead, which is precisely the procedure 
Shaviro takes, although without recognizing his predecessor‘s work,75 Lucas himself does not 
follow through on this possibility.  Rather, he uses his wistful longing for a more philosophically 
knowledgeable Whitehead to position Whitehead‘s thought as an alternative to Kant.  So while 
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Lucas will temper Whitehead‘s anti-Kantian polemic by tracing it to a socially necessitated 
ignorance, this same ignorance will mean that Whitehead cannot be, in any meaningful sense, 
post-Kantian.  By ignorance, Whitehead is positioned as avoiding Kant.     
 In what follows, by following Foucault, I want to take seriously Whitehead‘s own 
relation to Kant.  For Whitehead will include Kant not only in the list of philosophical geniuses, 
but also designates him as a ―supreme master of thought‖ (PR, 39).  With this, we can see that it 
is within the Kantian shock that Whitehead begins his own philosophical practice.  The Kantian 
shock is determined by Whitehead as the introduction of constructivism into the history of 
philosophy.  This is, as will be developed in what follows, both a constructivism of that which is, 
a determination of actuality as constructive, which necessitates a constructivism of philosophy 
itself, so that philosophy becomes an experimental practice.   
Yet this Kantian constructivism takes place through an inversion of Kant‘s thought itself.  
―The philosophy of organism,‖ Whitehead argues, is  
the inversion of Kant‘s philosophy.  The Critique of Pure Reason describes the process by which 
subjective data pass into the appearance of an objective world.  The philosophy of organism seeks 
to describe how objective data pass into subjective satisfaction, and how order in the objective 
data provides intensity in the subjective satisfaction.  For Kant, the world emerges from the 
subject,‘ for the philosophy of organism, the subject emerges from the world – a ‗superject‘ rather 
than a subject (PR, 88).       
In this inverted form, Whitehead takes up Kant precisely in order to over-take the demands of 
conversion within which Kant‘s own constructivism functions, thereby producing a material and 
historical constructivism.  Whereas Kant, Whitehead argues, determines the world as produced 
out of the subject, Whitehead himself proposes, as an inversion, that the subject is produced out 
of the world.  And so whereas the history of the metaphysics of conversion eventuates in the 
production of the transcendental subject as the measure and source of being, the undoing of the 
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metaphysics of conversion begins with a world of production, a world within which a multitude 
of subjects become in mutual productivity.   
With this overcoming of the demands of conversion, Whitehead‘s philosophy ―aspires to 
construct a critique of pure feeling, in the philosophical position in which Kant puts his Critique 
of Pure Reason.  This should also supersede the remaining Critiques required in the Kantian 
philosophy.  Thus in the organic philosophy Kant‘s ‗Transcendental Aesthetic‘ becomes a 
distorted fragment of what should have been his main topic‖ (PR, 113).  Whitehead returns to 
Kant, in other words, at his own beginning, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, when the world is 
determined for a givenness, now determining this givenness not as being given to nor by a 
singular subject, but as being given as the production of a singular subject that will continually 
be given by feeling its way into becoming.  And it is in returning to Kant that Whitehead will 
have recourse to modes of thought prior to Kant.  In this way, the return to pre-Kantian modes of 
thought is precisely a return that is mediated through and as an inversion of Kant himself.  By 
returning to pre-Kantian modes of thought, Whitehead is not avoiding Kant, but precisely taking 
up Kant in the only way possible: as one who shocks with what is now possible to think.    
Thinking within this constructivist Kantian trajectory, Whitehead produces a thought that 
is, surprisingly, metaphysical.  Surprising, of course, for being both Kantian and metaphysical.  
Surprising as well as a metaphysics that is also experimental: the Whiteheadian project is the 
attempt to experiment
76
 a constructivist metaphysical apparatus of and for intense experience.  
Returning again to Shaviro, this means that, directly opposed to a Heideggerian post-Kantian 
thought that attempts to escape the grasp of metaphysics, Whitehead ―simply does metaphysics 
in his own way…  He thereby makes metaphysics speak what it has usually denied and rejected: 
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the body, emotions, inconstancy and change, the radical contingency of all perspectives and all 
formulations.‖77  In doing metaphysics in his own way, Whitehead transforms the constructivism 
of Kant into a constructivist metaphysics of contingency, of materiality, of history, of feeling, 
even as it adheres to the strictest rational requirements of necessity (PR, 6).  To do metaphysics 
in his own way is, for Whitehead, to practice a constructivist metaphysics that is an unfolding of 
and an unfolding within both the body and the emotions,
78
 and a practice which arises within and 
as the in/consistent, the changing and the radically contingent.   
In practicing metaphysics in this way, in his own way, Whitehead is taking up a place and 
practice within Kant that we have seen opened up by Foucault.  Foucault, in other words, opens a 
space that Whitehead as a metaphysician and speculative philosopher has already occupied.
79
  
And yet if these two are surprisingly occupying a similar Kantian place, they do so in decidedly 
different ways.   If we turn now to Whitehead, for reasons that will only become clear as the 
development of his constructivist metaphysics unfolds, we immediately face a series of 
decisions.  A choice is made to follow Whitehead into a metaphysical ecology rather than to 
follow Foucault into a political ecology.  Whitehead, of course, proposes a metaphysic, and so 
will always aim to think subjects, bodies, institutions, power and limits within an eco-logic of 
metaphysical abstraction.  It is this level of abstraction that will fundamentally determine the 
metaphysical as a unique practice of philosophy.
80
  Yet this metaphysic itself arises within a 
larger speculative project, as the speculation of generality achieved through a certain practice of 
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abstraction.  To understand the metaphysic that is to come, it is necessary to begin with 
Whitehead‘s determination of the speculative project itself.    
In opening Process and Reality Whitehead proposes an initial set of conditions that will 
give rise to a speculative philosophy: ―Speculative philosophy is,‖ he famously announces, ―the 
endeavour to frame a coherent, logical, necessary system of general ideas in terms of which 
every element of our experience can be interpreted.‖  This initial determination is then refined 
such that the interpretive capacities of a speculative philosophy require it to be applicable and 
adequate to all experience (PR, 3).  Speculative philosophy is conditioned, then, through these 
four requirements: on its rational side, coherence and logic, and on its empirical side, 
applicability and adequacy.  Beginning with the rational side, Whitehead simply announces that 
the logical requirement of speculative philosophy will follow from its ―ordinary‖ meaning - 
―lack of contradiction.‖  Of greater importance for Whitehead is the requirement of coherence.  
This he determines in a two-fold manner.  First, coherence arises as a requirement from an 
ontological assumption about the becoming of actuality within a universe as ecological system: 
―no entity,‖ Whitehead asserts, ―can be conceived in complete abstraction from the system of the 
universe, and … it is the business of speculative philosophy to exhibit this truth‖ (PR, 3).  As 
experienced, being is relational, which means that, second, coherence requires that speculative 
philosophy must itself be relationally rational as a conceptual practice.  Whitehead again offers a 
two-fold determination of this requirement of coherence as relational rationality:  first, ―the 
fundamental ideas, in terms of which the scheme is developed, presuppose each other so that in 
isolation they are meaningless.  This requirement does not mean,‖ Whitehead continues, ―that 
they are definable in terms of each other; it means that what is indefinable in one such notion 
cannot be abstracted from its relevance to the other notions‖ (PR, 3). The concepts with which 
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the speculative philosophy develops must, in other words, be both interdependent and 
independent at once.
81
   
This conceptual democracy, though, is not enough for speculative philosophy.  
Speculative philosophy must itself, Whitehead argues, be drawn back into the experience out of 
which it arises.  This being drawn back into experience is the requirement that the concepts of 
the speculative project must be, first, applicable, verified  in at least one instance of actual 
experience, and second, adequate, such that ―everything of which we are conscious, as enjoyed, 
perceived, willed or thought, shall have the character of a particular instance of the general 
scheme‖ (PR, 3).  Everything experienced, which is to say all actuality, must ―find its niche‖ 
within the speculative scheme.
82
  Which returns Whitehead to the ontological assumption of the 
total relational fabric of experience: philosophical concepts, arising out of experience as actuality 
must always be returned for their own being to the actualizing of experience.  With these four 
requirements, coherence comes to determine a movement of thought and being through which 
speculation travels.    
These four conditions are, as Michel Weber has recently argued, wedded to each other 
through Whitehead‘s determination of communicative necessity, that necessity which, as 
Whitehead says, ―bear[s] in itself its own warrant of universality throughout all experience, 
provided that we confine ourselves to that which communicates with immediate matter of fact‖ 
(PR, 4).  As the maid of honor at this polyamorous wedding, as Weber continues, ―philosophy 
does not only assume that at the basis of nature there is a determinate, formal, logical order, but 
also that it is discoverable by a rational inquiry – the function of speculation being precisely to 
reveal these intimate bonds…  [T]he process of manifestation is susceptible to a revival through 
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discursive language.‖83  It should immediately be added, of course, that this revival is not a 
revealing of Being in its ontological or metaphysical nakedness.  For Whitehead, Being is always 
its becoming, and to reveal this becoming is to make manifest the practices of manifestation 
itself.  This revival is, in other words, a transcendental constructivism.  With this, the goal of 
speculative philosophy is, Whitehead argues, ―to make it easier to conceive the infinite variety of 
specific instances which rest unrealized in the womb of nature‖ (PR, 17).  Speculative 
philosophy becomes, then, an event,
84
 an enticing allurement of creativity, an aid in the 
conception of actuality. 
At this point we can realize the full extent of Whitehead‘s seemingly quick dismissal of 
the logical requirement of the speculative project: for the speculative project, logic is superseded 
by eco-logic determined as ecological coherence.
85
  Again, returning to the work of Steven 
Shaviro, we can say that coherence implies a ―contextual solidarity,‖ ―exemplified by the way 
that a living organism requires an environment or milieu – which is itself composed of other 
living organisms similarly requiring their own environments or milieus.‖86  Yet each of these 
environments is itself always an achievement, and an achievement that is itself always 
superseded.  So the ecological determination of the speculative project cannot simply mean its 
contextual inter-textuality.  This ecological world is always also a world of becoming.  In other 
words, as Roland Faber argues, the actual, ecological world is not simply given as a system, but 
―constitutes itself within a perpetual creative transition from multiplicity to unity.‖87  Arising out 
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of the relational actualizing of experience, the speculative project must now follow its own eco-
logical necessity, succumbing to and satisfying at once the requirements of its own arising.  
Beginning within the communicable and relational world of experience, speculative philosophy 
attempts to produce a conceptual scheme for conceiving the realizing and becoming of actuality 
itself, conceiving that which will, in its turn, give birth to a new world of experience, and so will 
require a new conceptual scheme.
88
         
 When Whitehead speaks, then, of the necessity of the speculative project, it is a necessity 
that is both contingent
89
 and that is derived from experience and not determinative of experience.  
It is, in other words, an historical necessity, a necessity that is no less contingent for being a 
necessity urged on us in its incessant becoming, and so a necessity of the historical as that which 
is always becoming other than itself.  It is, therefore, a necessity that cannot provide a limit, but 
which becomes the impetus for a continual practice of becoming necessary by becoming actual 
within the world of actualities.   
4.  Speculating at the limits of language 
In the practice of this speculative philosophy, the requirements of coherence and 
necessity are not simply allowed to roam where they may, to the heights or depths of 
imagination.  Rather, the speculative philosophy is also always constrained within the 
requirement of the ontological principle.  Although Whitehead determines the ontological 
principle in a number of ways across his body of thought, let us take the following as 
encompassing the general requirement:  the ontological principle is ―the principle that everything 
is positively somewhere in actuality, and in potency everywhere.  Thus the search for a reason is 
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always the search for an actual fact which is the vehicle of the reason‖ (PR, 40).  In conjunction 
with and as an elaboration of the requirement that a speculative philosophy be necessary, a 
necessity that arises out of its being abstracted from the actual and not a determination of the 
actual, the ontological principle determines Whitehead‘s thought as one of immanence, an 
immanence of reason and becoming.  Reason must be a reason of actuality and actualities, just as 
actuality must be the reason for actuality.  In this mutual determination of rationality and 
actuality, both reason and actuality are thoroughly historical.  This is not, of course, to be done 
with transcendence; Whitehead is quite insistent that the actual occasion, in its arising, 
transcends, for the moment, and in its moment of becoming, the conditions of its arising.  Yet if 
transcendence arises within Whitehead‘s thought, it arises out of the immanence of reason and 
actuality, out of the immanence of becoming.   
All of this takes place, for Whitehead, within the movement of a speculative philosophy, 
which is not simply a descriptive philosophy.  Any purely descriptive philosophy, Whitehead 
recognizes, must become a speculative philosophy not only because of the processual nature of 
actuality, but also because of the limits of its tools of analysis.  ―Every science must devise its 
own instruments,‖ Whitehead notes, and ―the tool required for philosophy is language‖ (PR, 11).  
This is, in itself a rather mundane observation, simply acknowledging that the practice of 
philosophy is a conceptual practice.  That philosophy is always caught within a linguistic turn is 
not that interesting of an observation, although in Whitehead‘s hands it will become quite 
interesting and revolutionary.
90
  In a similar way, Whitehead acknowledges that philosophy is a 
practice taken up by human subjects, and so is a practice that begins with the analysis of human 
                                                 
90
 As Whitehead argues in The Function of Reason, ―[m]ankind has gradually developed from the lowliest forms of 
life, and must therefore be explained in terms applicable to all such forms.  But why construe the later forms by 
analogy to the earlier forms.  Why not reverse the process?  It would seem to be more sensible, more truly empirical, 
to allow each living species to make its own contribution to the demonstration of factors inherent in living things.‖  
The Function of Reason, Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, 15.  
139 
 
experience (PR, 159).  If this discovery, which Whitehead attributes to Descartes, is fundamental 
in philosophy, this is, again, a function of its being made interesting.  That philosophers are the 
one‘s practicing philosophy is, in itself, rather uninteresting.  This realization only becomes 
interesting when it is further realized that this requires a fundamental rethinking of all 
metaphysical categories (PR, 159).  It becomes impossible after Whitehead to simply hide from 
or return to a hiddenness which can ignore the human subject as the subject of philosophy.
91
  The 
speculative project begins with the recognition of its own beginning as a practice of subjects, a 
conceptual and linguistic practice.  
This practice, as a practice of language, is, for Whitehead, an always troubled practice.  
One is reminded here, even if Whitehead does not make the connection, of a certain Nietzschean 
suspicion of grammar.  This is, directly, a reminder of the Nietzsche who worried that ―we are 
not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.‖92  Although Whitehead does not get rid 
of God, he does something much more dangerous: he demands the secularization of God as a 
continual downfall of God, so that God is no longer a determiner of limits but, in a way that 
resonates with Foucault, the transgressor of limit.  And with this secularization of God comes a 
distrust of language, a distrust of grammar.  Within this strangely Nietzschean trajectory of 
thought, Whitehead begins his own speculative project within a suspicion of grammar.   
 Although it is not possible, here, to provide a full elaboration of Whitehead‘s theory of 
propositions and language,
93
 it is possible to briefly note that language, for Whitehead, is 
troubled by its own contextual inadequacy.  In the opening of Process and Reality Whitehead 
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proposes two contextual deficiencies of language.  First, in the practice of philosophy, 
Whitehead argues, ―words and phrases must be stretched towards a generality foreign to their 
ordinary usage; and however such elements or language be stabilized as technicalities, they 
remain metaphors mutely appealing for an imaginative leap‖ (PR, 4).  This follows from the 
determination of speculative philosophy as determined to the requirements of eco-logic and 
necessity.  Again, the speculative philosophy is driven by a requirement for a rational and 
relational eco-logic and an empirical necessity arising from a breadth of adequacy and 
applicability.  Yet our philosophical practices always begin with a particularity, the observation 
of a particular actuality arising within a particular context, observed from within a particular 
perspective.  The speculative project is precisely a project of experiencing within this 
particularity and so deriving out of this particularity a generality of eco-logical and necessary 
import.  In its particularity the content of this becoming can never be known or determined in 
advance, not even by God.  The speculative project, then, must invest itself and interest itself in 
this movement of becoming, but always as a speculation, a leap, an imagining of what might 
become otherwise than what has been.  
The speculative project must become, in other words, an imaginative as well as 
speculative project, or a speculative project as an imaginative project.  For the speculative 
philosophy to succeed, Whitehead argues, the conditions of ―imaginative construction‖ must be 
adhered to: the construction must ―have its origin in the generalization of particular factors 
discerned in particular topics of human interest. . .  The success of the imaginative experiment is 
always to be tested by the applicability of its results beyond the restricted locus from which it 
originated‖ (PR, 5).  To the extent that philosophical practice arises within a particular 
experience, it must always make the treacherous move to a broader generality, moving across 
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and through the domain of its arising to a metaphysical generality.  This movement is, 
Whitehead argues, an imaginative movement, a leap, a poetic movement of language beyond the 
context of its own arising to a broader generality.   
The imaginative leap, though, is not simply a projection, a forced generalization by which 
the philosopher manipulates the language of her practice to a generalization.  Rather, as 
Whitehead argues, language itself calls for an imaginative leap of thought (PR, 4).  In his own 
imaginative abstraction, Whitehead moves from the restricted domain of language, an experience 
of late and narrowly arising consciousness, to the more general domain of propositions, 
determining propositions as lures for feeling (PR, 25), propositions of what might be.  In 
propositioning what might be, propositions lure subjects into becoming what they might be.  In 
being projected across a series of domains as a generalization, propositions become contestations 
of what is necessary as lures into what is possible.  
As lures of possibility, propositions are also productive of care, productive of a concern, 
productive of a certain form of mattering.
94
  As Stengers argues, for Whitehead propositional 
abstractions are lures, and so must be refined to ―induce empirically felt variations in the way our 
experience matters,‖ a mattering that is also, as Whitehead argues in Modes of Thought, a 
caring.
95
  Returning, then, to the specificity of language, to the specificity of the language of 
speculative philosophy, the limit of language which requires an imaginative leap becomes a lure 
into care, a proposition to care for what might be when language becomes other than its arising 
and so propositions for a subject to care for an other than it has already experienced.  The limit of 
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language determines the speculative philosophy to an experimental philosophy of practice and 
propositional becoming.   
Second, language is inadequate to the speculative task to the extent that it also assumes a 
metaphysical context that it cannot contain or exhaust.  Again, moving in and out of the 
abstractive practice under discussion, Whitehead argues that  
… every proposition refers to a universe exhibiting some general systematic metaphysical 
character.  Apart from this background, the separate entities which go to form the proposition, 
and the proposition as a whole, are without determinate character.  Nothing has been defined, 
because every definite entity requires a systematic universe to supply its requisite status.  Thus 
every proposition proposing a fact must, in its complete analysis, propose the general character of 
the universe required for that fact. There are no self-sustained facts, floating in nonentity (PR, 
11).      
As Luis Pedraja argues, there is a strong affinity between Whitehead‘s determination of language 
and propositions as presupposing a metaphysic for their meaning and Jacques Derrida‘s post-
structuralist determination of language as an indeterminate play of signification.
96
  Language, as 
the tool of the metaphysician, is always caught up in a continual play of reference, attempting to 
secure a metaphysic which it must already make reference to, depend upon and arise out of.  Yet, 
as we have already seen, this play is not the utter degradation of metaphysics or the speculative 
project, but rather puts into play its own possibility.  The play of language is, for Whitehead, the 
possibility of generative abstraction.  For language, in always referring beyond itself to a 
metaphysic that it can never fully designate is also always able to move beyond itself to a 
generality of speculative metaphysics (MT, 5).        
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Beyond these metaphysical suspicions of grammar, Whitehead also works within a series 
of ontological suspicions of grammar.  Here Whitehead announces that his metaphysical and 
speculative project is developed within a suspicion of the subject-predicate form of a proposition 
(PR, 30).  Most often Whitehead associates this subject-predicate form with Aristotle, or rather, 
when he is more suspect, the inheritors of an Aristotelian logic.  This logic has imposed on 
metaphysics, Whitehead argues, a set of categories, the most dangerous and ―evil‖ of which is 
substance (PR, 30).   The evil of substance and the evil of the Aristotelian inheritance, 
Whitehead argues, is felt in the imposition of ontological mystery onto actuality and 
determination of the subject as simply located.   
The imposition of mystery arises, Whitehead argues, from the attempt to describe the 
actual world from within a subject-predicate logic.  Within this logic an actuality is described in 
terms of a set of ―abstract characteristics, which are united into an individualized togetherness‖ 
(AI, 132).  This is, Whitehead deadpans, a beautifully simple description.  It is also, 
unfortunately, incoherent and unknowable, leaving out any interconnection between actualities.  
With a wonderful turn of phrase, Whitehead argues that ―substantial thing cannot call unto 
substantial thing.  A substantial thing can acquire a quality, a credit – but real landed estate, 
never‖ (AI, 133).  This credit, circulating among substantial things without every opening into a 
communication, remaining always on the surface of enjoyment, must rely on a background of 
mystery, a ―mysterious reality‖ that is ―intrinsically unknowable by any direct intercourse‖ (AI, 
133).  Although he does not follow through with it, this is the opening of what could become a 
powerful investigation of the metaphysical mysteries that underlie the capitalist circulation of 
credit, a circulation that never arrives at anything but its own superficial satisfaction.
97
 The 
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mystery of substance forecloses knowledge at the same moment that it founds an economy of 
credit circulation.   
For Whitehead, of more direct importance is the fact that this mystery will foreclose on 
the possibility of rationality itself.  To return to the principle announced in the opening passage 
of Process and Reality, ―what does not communicate is unknowable, and the unknowable is 
unknown‖ (PR, 4).  And this unknowable mystery of substance will always remain beyond the 
realm of reason, shrouded in the hiddenness projected by its qualities.  The subject-predicate 
logic will relegate any ontology trapped in its categories to remain in the irrational mystery of a 
surface circulation of qualities.  
In leaving out the interconnections between real things, the categories of a subject-
predicate logic also conceive of each substantial thing as ―complete in itself, without any 
reference to any other substantial thing‖ (AI, 133).  It should be clear by now that, for 
Whitehead, without such reference, an ontology that remains committed to a subject-predicate 
logic will always remain incoherent.  Whitehead specifies the condition of this incoherence by 
designating these self-complete substances as being simply located (PR, 137).  In Science and 
the Modern World Whitehead provides a much fuller analysis of simple location, one which 
finds its primary reference in relation to the determination of matter within space-time.  Here, 
simple location refers to the determination of matter as that which ―can be said to be here in 
space and here in time, or here in space-time, in a perfectly definite sense which does not require 
for its explanation any reference to other regions of space-time.‖98  Simply located matter can 
also be described as isolated matter, and as such matter that is incommunicable and so 
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irrational.
99
  This irrationality, Whitehead continues, is that by which modern philosophy has 
been ruined (SMW, 55).  The philosophical rejection of rationality, of an eco-logical rationality, 
rests on and is derived from a faith in simply located matter, a faith that is itself derived from a 
certain faith in a subject-predicate logic and grammar.  Whitehead‘s attempt to develop a 
rational, eco-logical ontology begins, then, with what is now a necessary suspicion of grammar.   
 The inadequacy of language, the tool of any philosophy, and the suspicion of grammar 
require that speculative philosophy, as determined to be eco-logical and necessary, must always 
be experimental and constructivist.  Experimental in understanding its own practice as a luring, a 
propositioning of what might be into becoming.  Constructivist in continually measuring the 
adequacy of its concepts against a context which is always becoming beyond a completion that 
can be fully determined.
100
  The speculative project becomes, then, the production of 
propositions, propositions that strive after an adequacy and necessity that can never be fully 
attained within an always productive actualization.  The speculative task, in other words, will 
always fail in the context of a continually receding metaphysical background, and in its failing 
will always proposition actuality into a continual becoming.       
In Process and Reality, as an unfolding of this speculative project as a metaphysical 
abstraction, Whitehead proposes an elaborate categoreal scheme which is a matrix ―from which 
true propositions applicable to particular circumstances can be derived‖ (PR, 8).  Within Process 
and Reality this matrix is produced within a metaphysical desire for completeness and necessity, 
and is articulated at a level of metaphysical abstraction or generality that will provide this 
completeness and necessity.  The achievement of this metaphysical generality and abstraction, 
Whitehead argues, is itself a desire, a practice to be achieved, and not the starting point of the 
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speculative project (PR, 8).  As we have also already seen, this speculative project is not a simple 
descriptive project, and so the development of a categoreal matrix is itself not descriptive.  The 
scheme is, Whitehead argues, that from which descriptive statements can be made.  The matrix 
is, to borrow a phrase from Foucault, a grid of intelligibility, through which it becomes possible 
to articulate an experience and through which experience itself becomes possible.  As such, the 
measure of the categoreal scheme is not its finality, but the progress that it makes possible (PR, 
14).  This measure of progress is, again, an indication of Whitehead‘s pragmatism, which always 
measures progress in both conceptual and existential terms and which is always moving beyond 
itself.   
In moving beyond itself, the categorical scheme will always be implicated in its own 
progress, accountable to that which it gives rise to.  The categorical scheme, the metaphysics that 
arises out of this scheme, and the speculative project itself are all required to be accountable to 
the movement of the experimental practice.
101
  Within this implication, Whitehead determines, 
by necessity, the Category of the Ultimate as the threefold movement of ‗creativity,‘ the ‗many,‘ 
the ‗one‘ (PR, 21).  Within this threefold movement Whitehead designates ‗creativity‘ as the 
―universal of universals,‖ a designation that undoes any and all onto-theological determinations 
of Being by returning Being to its own becoming.  This return will also, and at the same time, 
turn the categoreal scheme and the speculative project to its own becoming beyond itself.  The 
being of the speculative project is always determined as its becoming, just as the being of any 
actuality is always determined as its becoming.  With this doubled determination, ‗creativity‘ 
becomes the principle of novelty, which is itself the ultimate metaphysical principle (PR, 21). 
This novelty, though, is not an ex nihilo novelty, a pure freedom of creativity.  It is, rather, a 
novelty that always arises within and out of that which is given precisely as the movement of 
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becoming.  ‗Creativity,‘ Whitehead insists, is itself the process of becoming, of the many 
becoming one and being increased by one (PR, 21).  Here, ‗the many‘ and ‗the one‘ presuppose 
each other, as the movement which requires both ‗the many‘ as that out of which ‗the one‘ arises 
and as that to which ‗the one‘ returns.  ‗Creativity,‘ as the universal of universals, can only arise 
as a movement within the threefold determination of Ultimacy as implicated in the movement of 
the many and the one, out of and back into each other.     
The metaphysics of history is, as Whitehead says, the metaphysics of the many becoming 
one, and being increased by one (PR, 21).  And it is precisely as a metaphysic of process, of the 
continual practice of becoming one, that any Whiteheadian metaphysic will be an experimental 
metaphysics.  Metaphysics can no longer attempt to determine the world or fully describe a 
world that has been given in its totality.  Rather, metaphysics will become a part of that which it 
arises out of.  The turn to Whiteheadian metaphysics that follows, then, will of necessity be a 
turn to an experimental metaphysics that celebrates its own possibility of arising precisely as an 
experimental practice without origin and without limit, although possibly not without ground.
102
  
5.  The secularization of God 
If the choice is made to follow Whitehead into a post-Kantian metaphysical ecology that 
has been made possible by Foucault, there still remains a difficulty to the extent that Foucault 
opens Kant precisely through and as an experience of the death of God.  Even if we can, for the 
moment, remain within a reading of Whitehead that brackets the historical importance of process 
theology,
103
 it is impossible to read Whitehead as advocating a philosophy of the absence or 
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death of God.
104
  God is everywhere and ever-present within Whitehead‘s speculative and 
metaphysical project.
105
  Given this, it is quite easy to forget that the unfolding of Whitehead‘s 
speculative project takes place under the strict demand of secularization.
106
  As he argues in 
Process and Reality, ―The secularization of God‘s functions in the world is at least as urgent a 
requisite of thought as is the secularization of other elements of experience.  The concept of God 
is,‖ Whitehead continues, ―certainly one essential element in religious feeling.  But the converse 
is not true; the concept of religious feeling is not an essential element in the concept of God‘s 
function in the universe‖ (PR, 207).  Following this strange and, as we should expect, suspicious 
grammar, we can note that Whitehead begins to think through the secularization of God by 
disengaging God from the religious, an initial unbinding that allows two demands to be made.  
First Whitehead proposes, and here assumes, that the elements of experience must be 
secularized, a proposal that, within the speculative project, will come to be the secularization of 
the practice of experience itself.  This is a familiar sounding demand, and so with this it might be 
possible to read Whitehead into a rather standard and straightforward narrative of 
secularization:
107
 the demand for a non-religious medium or principle through which the 
elements of experience are united, producing a non-religiously secured subject who is able to 
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function in a public, and now secular, society.
108
  In a limited sense, this is a helpful narrative for 
understanding Whitehead.  Within Whitehead, the unity of the subject is secured neither by God 
nor the religious.  Rather, the unity of the subjective occasion is the achievement of the 
concrescent becoming of that occasion (PR, 28).
109
  Unity is its own achievement, completing 
itself in the satisfaction of its own becoming.  The movement through which this unity is 
achieved, a movement that, in good pragmatist fashion only functions out of and back into a 
radical pluralism, will of course trouble any secularism that still desires a single transcendent 
ground of or security for a unified subject.  Within Whitehead‘s speculative philosophy, the 
demand for the secularization of the elements of experience is the demand for thought to begin 
with the speculation of a pluralistic and contestatory movement through which a singular unity is 
achieved amidst, out of and back into a multiplicity without a transcendent or divine guarantee of 
success.      
 Yet this is not, as a certain secularism might desire, the banishment of God (or the 
religious) from the contested scene of becoming.  God, as function and concept, is not to be 
secularized from experience or out of experience, but rather secularized with experience and with 
the other elements of experience.  The secularization of God will require for Whitehead that the 
concept of God become another element within the ecological community of all actuality, of all 
becoming,
110
 giving up only the privileged position afforded to an empirical and metaphysical 
exception (PR, 343).   
In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead imagines a return to Aristotle as a 
beginning movement to articulate this secularization of and secularized God.  Whitehead 
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imagines this return in light of his figuring of Aristotle as ―the last European metaphysician of 
first-rate importance‖ to dispassionately consider the necessity of God (SMW, 173).  Without 
opening the question of Whitehead‘s understanding of Aristotle (remaining concerned primarily 
with his use of Aristotle), the importance of Aristotle for Whitehead lies in the fact that Aristotle, 
first, found the concept of God to be necessary within his metaphysical system, and second, 
unfolded this necessity within the strict limits of his metaphysics;
111
 an unfolding of the necessity 
of the concept of God that was, Whitehead argues, without religious passion (which is, it might 
be necessary to add, not without passion).  Hoping to follow this Aristotelian practice, 
Whitehead proposes that his own metaphysical system presents an ―analogous problem‖: 
whereas Aristotle‘s physics required a Prime Mover, Whitehead argues that his own processual 
and relational metaphysic requires a Principle of Concretion; ―we must,‖ Whitehead argues, 
―provide a ground for the limitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial activity.  
This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given: for all reason flows from 
it.  God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality‖ (SMW, 178).  
Within a decidedly Spinozistic conceptualization of reality as composed of a substantial activity 
and its attributes, God is the attribute of creativity through which potentiality becomes the 
ground of actuality.  Amidst the attributes of potentiality and facticity, God functions as the 
attribute and principle of limitation, a limitation of potentiality so that creativity might become 
concrete.
112
  If this limitation is the possibility of the concrete, of actuality, it is, for that very 
reason, itself an irrationality, that which is prior to and establishes the actuality of rationality.  
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The concept of God is necessary, then, as the primordial, and so irrational, principle of limitation 
through which actuality becomes.  
This is, of course, not the only determination of the concept of God that Whitehead 
experiments with: throughout his speculative projecting, the concept of God passes through a 
series of situations in which the Principle of Concretion comes to be determined as a dipolar 
event of decision.
113
  By Process and Reality, the Principle of Concrescence has become a 
principle of determination (PR, 345), understood as the valuation of possibility as the Primordial 
Nature of God.  God functions, here, as the primordial aesthetic decision from which possibility 
enters the world.
114
  The limitive and valuative decision that God performs becomes the felt 
passage between limitless potentiality and concrete actuality.
115
  It is as primordial decision that 
God becomes the primordial occasion of occasions of actuality as novel occasions, grounding all 
becoming through decision and proposing what might be to that which arises from what has 
been.  As Whitehead argues, God is ―the actual entity from which each temporal concrescence 
receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts.  That aim determines the initial 
gradations of relevance of eternal objects for conceptual feeling; and constitutes the autonomous 
subject in its primary phase of feelings with its initial conceptual valuations, and with its initial 
physical purposes‖(PR, 244).   In short, Whitehead continues to insist that if possibility becomes 
actualized as occasions of actuality, God is the necessary originary event of that actualizing of 
possibility.  Within the continuing developments of his speculative project, God remains, for 
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Whitehead, the necessary and originary moment of concrescence, first as principle then as event, 
opening the given world to the possible through valuative de-cision.       
In following Aristotle as the philosopher of the secularization of God, Whitehead 
attempts to unfold this necessity without, as he says, religious passion.  In the immediate context 
of the discussion of Aristotle in Science and the Modern World, Whitehead will add that it is also 
necessary to avoid the ―ethical and religious interest‖ that has ―influenced metaphysical 
conclusions‖ since Aristotle (SMW, 173).  The unfolding of the necessity of God within the 
speculative project cannot be overcome or dictated by a religious or ethical passion or a 
metaphysically deleterious religious interest.  Throughout the development of his speculative 
project, Whitehead adheres to these two demands by first, developing a critique of religious 
power and, second, by subjecting the concept of God to the demand of ecological coherence.   
Whitehead‘s critique of religious power is formulated as a critique of the imperialization 
of God and power as this has occurred primarily within Christian theology.  The theological 
determination of God, Whitehead argues, has produced ―the doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently 
real, transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it 
obeys. . . .  When the Western world accepted Christianity, Caesar conquered; and the received 
text of Western theology was edited by his lawyers‖ (PR, 342).  The theological determination of 
God is, in other words, the determination of power as emanating from a singular, transcendent 
source with absolute efficacy.  And this theological determination of power is always already a 
political determination of power, so that power is always figured as a theo-political 
determination of the Law.  This theo-political heightening and ―glorification of power,‖ as 
Whitehead designates it (RM, 55), leads not only to a ―barbaric‖ conception of God, but also to 
an ―over-moralized‖ determination of the social.  This over-moralization of the social, ―under the 
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influence of fanaticism,‖ is the demand for a single ideal for every actuality, a single ideal of 
perfection, which is an ideal that can only be met at the expense of life itself (PR, 84, 104).  
Within this religious, or more properly theological and political, determination of power and the 
power of God, God is deployed as the source of foreclosure on possibility through the enactment 
of (divine) Law.  Religious passion, in other words, comes to determine God as the capture of 
being in orders of foreclosure.  To unfold the necessity of God within the demand of 
secularization is, then, to unfold the concept of God without recourse to the determination of 
power as emanating from a single, transcendent source of absolute efficacy, which is to say, God 
must come to value life and not order.           
As we have already seen, Whitehead‘s speculative project unfolds as an ecological 
project, requiring a certain conceptual coherence.  Here, the ecological determination of 
speculative philosophy requires that if the concept of God is necessary, if it comes to be a 
necessary element within experience, it must become necessary within an ecological coherence.  
Again, as Whitehead argues, ―God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical 
principles, invoked to save their collapse.  He [sic] is their chief exemplification‖ (PR, 343).  If 
this is achieved, it will be through a secularized concept of God, one that determines God as 
disclosed within and functioning within experience.  Any speculation of the world, Whitehead 
argues, that ―commences with the consideration of the character of the actual world cannot rise 
above the actuality of this world.  It can only discover all the factors disclosed in the world as 
experienced.  In other words, it may discover an immanent God, but not a God wholly 
transcendent‖ (RM, 71).  This comes from Religion in the Making, where Whitehead unfolds this 
determination of God within the interplay of transcendence and immanence against three other 
determinations of God: first, the ―Eastern Asiatic‖ concept, which determines ―God‖ as ―an 
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impersonal order to which the world conforms‖; second, the ―Semitic‖ concept, which 
determines God as a ―definite personal individual entity, whose existence is the one ultimate 
metaphysical fact…, and who decreed and ordered the derivative existence which we call the 
actual world‖;  and finally, the ―Pantheistic‖ concept, which proposes ―an entity to be described 
in the terms of the Semitic concept, except that the actual world is a phase within the complete 
fact which is this ultimate individual entity,‖ (RM, 68).116  Whitehead confronts all three of these 
concepts of God, proposing instead a determination of God as the immanently transcending 
event of possibility.  The full articulation of this transcending immanence will come only 
through an articulation of a politics of adventure and peace.  For now, though, it is possible to 
simply determine this transcending immanence in terms that will apply to any actuality: God is 
constituted as internal relationality to all existence, becoming the singular occasion of Godself 
through a transcending decision, to return again to the immanence of actualities effecting the 
becoming of the world.     
6.  A politics of adventure and peace 
If it is often easy to forget that Whitehead‘s speculative project unfolds within the 
demands of secularization, it is also easy to forget that Process and Reality, Whitehead‘s 
metaphysical magnum opus, is the middle text of a trilogy that has as its end civilization.
117
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Whitehead proposes in Adventures of Ideas, the three texts Science and the Modern World, 
Process and Reality, and Adventures of Ideas constitute ―an endeavour to express a way of 
understanding the nature of things, and to point out how that way of understanding is illustrated 
by a survey of the mutations of human experience‖ (AI, xii).  If each of these texts can be read 
separately, as Whitehead also suggests, each would seem to arise with its own particular aim:  
Science and the Modern World as an anachronistically named work of science studies, 
expressing the nature of things as illustrated in the mutual determinations of science and culture; 
Process and Reality as a metaphysical text par excellence, expressing the  nature of things 
through metaphysical abstraction; and Adventures of Ideas as a sociology of civilization, 
expressing the nature of things as illustrated in the slow drift of ideas through history.  With this 
it is often assumed that we should take Whitehead‘s claim narrowly and literally, so that Process 
and Reality becomes a privileged text, providing the most rigorous and systematic analysis of 
―the nature of things,‖ while Science and the Modern World and Adventures of Ideas simply 
articulate how this metaphysic is ―illustrated‖ in science, society and civilization. 
 If Whitehead‘s claim is taken in this narrow and literal sense, though, it becomes 
incredibly difficult to take the trilogy itself very seriously.  On the one hand, it becomes difficult 
to account for the appearance of the quite innovative metaphysical and ontological arguments in 
the two supposedly illustrative texts.  It is only with the greatest difficulty and deliberate 
blindness that the three texts together can be read as proposing a single metaphysical or 
ontological position.
118
  On the other hand, this reading would seem to downplay what is actually 
achieved in the three texts as individual texts.  Beyond any illustrative functions that the texts 
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may serve, they all also perform independent articulations of the conditions of actuality.  Science 
and the Modern World enacts an historically oriented analytic of the conditions of Modern 
Western civilization in the science of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, with all the limits and 
possibilities that this conditioning provides.  Process and Reality enacts a conceptually oriented 
analytic of the conditions of the societies of our cosmological epoch, within the requirements of 
metaphysics and with all the limits and possibilities that this conditioning provides.  Adventures 
of Ideas enacts a sociological and conceptual analytic of the conditions of civilization as the 
―slow drift‖ of ideas from Hebrew and Greek thought, conditions which not only have given rise 
to contemporary civilization but, Whitehead argues, can become the conditions of a civilization 
of peace that is yet to come.  Under very specific conditions, and within very specific questions, 
each of these texts attempts to trace the production of the abstractions through which experience 
is made possible, not simply in itself, but in its specific historical and social context.     
Rather than simply presenting an illustration of an already achieved metaphysic, each text 
performs Whitehead‘s speculative project.  Again, the speculative project begins within a 
universe of given experience, within a specific historical context, arising out of that context in a 
flight of conceptual speculation, only to be returned to the historical conditions of its arising.  
And this speculation is an analytic of the possibility of what can arise as an actuality within the 
given of the historical.  Which is to say that the speculative project arises within and as the 
political.
119
  Or, more strictly speaking, the speculative project, as Whitehead argues, remains 
within and as the proper articulation of a transcendental aesthetic which is itself the speculation 
of the conditions of experience, of the becoming actual of an occasion out of that which has been 
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given (PR, 113).
120
  The metaphysic that arises from the speculative project is, in this sense, the 
speculative discourse of the political:  the conceptual systematic of the historic conditions of the 
becoming actual.   
With this we can begin to make sense of the fact that the end of Whitehead‘s speculative 
trilogy is civilization, and in particular, a civilization of peace and adventure.  Civilization is, 
Whitehead is quick to admit in Adventures of Ideas, a difficult concept for him; we are, he says, 
baffled by its meaning (AI, 273).  If civilization is to designate a particular ideal for either the 
individual or society, it becomes both difficult and dangerous to define.  We have already seen 
Whitehead argue that the positing of a singular ideal for any occasion or society arises out of a 
fanatical religious passion, which is itself a foreclosure on possibility.  Here, in Adventures of 
Ideas, he announces that the foundation of any understanding of human life is ―that no static 
maintenance of perfection is possible.  This axiom,‖ he continues, ―is rooted in the nature of 
things…  The pure conservative is fighting against the essence of the universe‖ (AI, 274).  With a 
speculative optimism that will always remain a challenge, Whitehead argues that a civilization of 
fanatical religion and pure conservatism will always fail.  Civilization is, rather, a conformation 
of the essence of the universe, a civilization open to Adventure, a civilization, in other words, 
open to the ―search for new perfections‖ (AI, 258).  A civilization of possibility.  And this 
openness will always be an openness to possibility that is the possibility of a radical alteration of 
the very conditions of its own becoming (AI, 260).  
Yet this optimism, the optimism of Adventure, Whitehead argues, rests not on utopian 
(im)possibility, the impossibility of a future democracy to come, but arises as the practice of 
three metaphysical principles.  First, Whitehead argues, ―the very essence of real actuality … is 
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process‖ (AI, 274).  This process is a synthesis of a given past and a possibility of the future, in 
the realization of a novel unity (AI, 275).  This processual reality is always a movement, 
transcending itself in the becoming actual of creativity becoming other than itself in continual 
advance.   Or, more poetically (and famously), ―the many become one and are increased by one‖ 
(PR, 32).  A civilization of Adventure is not simply, then, a many becoming one, but a many 
becoming one and so being increased by one in a perpetual becoming other.     
Second, Whitehead argues, ―every occasion of actuality is in its own nature finite‖ (AI, 
276).  The decision which is an occasion‘s becoming is, as finite, a cutting off (PR, 43), a 
limiting, a production of the self as a production of otherness (AI, 276).  And this othering 
production, Whitehead urges, should be the basis of political theory: the political, is, on this 
basis, the practice of universalization of the other, the urging forward of ideals not yet realized, 
not yet compatible for realization, for realization (AI, 276-277).  Yet, as finite, each achievement 
of realization is always an achievement against a background of that which is excluded as not or 
not yet achievable.  The attempted stasis of repetition, realizing only that which has already been 
achieved (pure conservatism), is the slow decline of civilization into the stasis of foreclosure, 
fixing that which has not been as the impossible to ever be.  This is to make a necessity out of the 
contingent at the moment when ―convention dominates [and] a learned orthodoxy suppresses 
adventure‖ (AI, 277).   
Finitude is also one of the conditions for the introduction of possibility, novelty, and 
adventure into actuality.  On the one hand, the finitude of each occasion produces a feeling of 
contrast, the contrast of what has been and what might have been (AI, 279).  Adventure is, in this 
sense, the vigor of what might be, insisting itself into possibility as having been foreclosed (AI, 
279).  On the other hand, the finitude of each occasion of realization is the perpetual perishing of 
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actuality, a perishing that is also a continual opening of actuality to the possibility of what might 
be achieved.  In the continual iterations of becoming there is a continual possibility of becoming 
otherwise.  That which Whitehead designates as the perpetual perishing of actuality can just as 
easily be designated as perpetual possibility (PR, 60, 201). 
Third, Whitehead proposes what he terms a principle of Individuality.  This is to 
reference a double individuality within the ecological becoming of actuality.  On the one hand, 
there is the individuality of the present occasion of experience.  On the other hand, there is the 
individuality of the ―real facts of the past [that] lie at the base of our immediate experience in the 
present‖ (AI, 280).  The experience of these individualities is not, Whitehead insists, an 
experience of bare sense, but rather the reality from which the present occasion ―derives its 
source of emotion, from which it inherits its purposes, to which it directs its passions.  At the 
base of experience there is a welter of feeling, derived from individual realities…‖ (AI, 280).  
Yet this basis of individuality is not simply felt, Whitehead insists, as a background of discordant 
multiplicity.  Certainly, Whitehead recognizes, discord is one of the conditions of possibility (AI, 
257). As theology has long recognized, the completion of perfection is the closure of becoming. 
But there is, amidst this discordant multiplicity of that which has become, a ―harmony of 
enduring individualities, connected in the unity of a background‖ (AI, 281). 
On the one hand, this harmony is the achievement of Beauty in civilization. The 
achievement of Beauty within an occasion is, for Whitehead, the achievement of a mutually 
enhancing intensification of the experience of discord into a unity of becoming (AI, 252).  An 
occasion achieves Beauty by achieving its own intensive unification.  And these intensive 
unifications become the given of civilization in its continual becoming.    
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Yet this initial harmony, is not enough for civilization, Whitehead argues.  ―Something is 
still lacking‖ (AI, 284).  And this lack is difficult to state.  What Whitehead is after, he claims, is 
a Harmony of Harmonies that will complete civilization, a Harmony of Harmonies that he 
designates as Peace (AI, 285).  This Peace is not, Whitehead is quick to point out, the 
tranquilizing of Adventure, or the diminution of turbulence in the process of becoming.  The 
completion that Peace brings to civilization is not, in this sense, a final closure of all becoming.  
As the Harmony of Harmonies, Peace begins with a feeling, a feeling of the coordination of 
values in the nature of things that we have seen as the production of Beauty (AI, 286).  But quite 
quickly, Whitehead wants to move beyond the simple harmony of the individuality of the given 
world.  Rather, the Harmony of Harmonies, Peace, is a ―grasp of infinitude, an appeal beyond 
boundaries‖ that arrives as a gift (AI, 285).  It is less an achievement of an occasion than a gift to 
the becoming of the occasion.  This gift is, Whitehead argues, a doubled gift of permanence: a 
gift of the permanence of value beyond the finitude of an individual occasion, which is, as well, a 
gift of tragedy as a remembrance of that which has been lost (AI, 286).  The Peace that completes 
civilization is the Peace of Permanence lasting beyond the finitude of the immediacy of 
individuality.  It is the gift that draws that which is achieved into a future of possibility of that 
which will come to be again.  Peace retains the possibility of what yet might be, and so becomes 
the condition of Adventure itself.  Peace is, then, the coming reconciliation of the value of what 
has been achieved with the tragedy of what has been lost, a reconciliation out of which 
Adventure comes to move through civilization.  
In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead argues that the loss of religion in the 
modern world is a threat to civilization itself (SMW, 204).  And it is precisely with the loss of 
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religion that civilization loses a vision of Adventure and Peace.
121
  Religion, and God are, 
Whitehead argues, necessary elements of a civilization of Adventure and Peace, and so necessary 
to a politics of possibility.   
To unfold this necessity, we can begin by noting that there is, Whitehead argues, an 
originary harmony, a teleology of harmony that is experienced as religious experience.  Within 
Religion in the Making, alongside the beginning developments of a secularized God, Whitehead 
proposes a determination of a secularized religion.  This secularized religion is designated as a 
―rational religion,‖ and is founded on a secularized religious experience, determined as a ―world 
loyalty.‖  Whitehead begins both of these secularizations by adopting a fairly common 
determination of secularization.  ―Religion is,‖ Whitehead argues, ―force of belief cleansing the 
inward parts‖; ―a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character‖; ―the 
art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself…‖; 
―Religion is what the individual does with his solitariness‖ (RM, 15-16, 47).  All of these 
determinations of religion are, it seems, claims of and for the privatization of religion.  Yet 
Whitehead will insist that this ―art and theory of the internal life of man‖ does not collapse into 
the self, drawing religion into the private realm of the self, but rather opens the self up to a 
greater sociality, a ―world consciousness‖ (RM, 40-41).  Moving beyond a mere social 
consciousness, religious experience produces a world consciousness that ―rises to the conception 
of an essential rightness of things‖ (RM, 41).  Religious experience produces this world 
consciousness to the extent that it is, Whitehead argues, a feeling of the character of the world, a 
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character of rightness.  This feeling of rightness is not, to be sure, a feeling of perfection, but it is 
a feeling of harmony, a feeling of harmony that is a haunting of freedom in civilization (AI, 281). 
In the final section of both Adventures of Ideas and Process and Reality this religious 
feeling of harmony arises from the reconciliation of the discordance of individuality as the 
completion of the world and civilization that is achieved as God.  In the final moment of 
Adventures of Ideas, just as in the final moments of Process and Reality, Whitehead endeavors 
what we can now only hesitatingly designate as a secular political theology, which begins with 
the immanent reconciliation of the world in God as the Harmony of Harmonies.  The adventure 
of civilization finds its unified rest in God, where every actuality, realized and foreclosed, evil 
and good, is felt in its own actuality.  Civilization finds its completion in God, and so, in a sense, 
―the world must die into God in order to live.‖122          
If this appears as a problematic teleology of harmony it is also a teleology of downfall.   
The second metaphysical principle which civilization enacts, the finitude of actuality, introduces 
into actualization perpetual perishing, a perpetual perishing that God, as ecological, must also 
necessarily suffer. So again, God‘s envisagement of possibility transforms what appears as given 
impossibility, as given foreclosure, into relevant novelty (PR, 108).  This introduction of relevant 
novelty is itself the ground of a decision that will become the background of the given from 
which further decisions will be made.  Whitehead proposes a threefold determination of God as 
―the outcome of creativity, the foundation of order, and as the goad towards novelty‖ (PR, 88).   
In this threefold determination, God is not creativity itself, but rather the first accident of 
creativity, the accident of creativity that allows creativity to become actuality (PR, 7).  As that 
which presents creativity to become actual, God is both the foundation of order and the 
percipient occasion for creativity to arise as novelty and not simply as repetition.  Yet as both 
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foundation and goad toward novelty God is determined by a singular purpose: the seeking of 
intensity within actual occasions (PR, 88).  With this determination of God‘s purpose as 
evocative of intensity the evocation of societies becomes a ―purely subsidiary‖ desire (PR, 105).  
Although God is the foundation of order, this is precisely in order to produce intensity, just as 
societies, Whitehead argues, are necessary as that out of which intensity arises (PR, 83).  With 
this, Whitehead‘s entire metaphysic becomes an articulation of the conditions for the ontological 
production of occasions of intensity.
123
 The introduction of relevant novel contrasts opens a 
possibility for an order of intensity within each occasion that works against any totalized order as 
a complete determination of what is given, in which Whitehead will still insist that God, as the 
occasion of this novelty, is ―seeking intensity, and not preservation‖ (PR, 105).  Whatever novel 
possibility is inaugurated here is inaugurated not to establish another order, but rather, to create 
the possibility for intensity, for an intensity of becoming.   
The secularization of God becomes, then, in conjunction with the secularization of the 
other elements of experience, the opening to a limit practice of transgression: God presents 
Godself as possibility, as the Primordial Nature, within an experience already occasioned by the 
limits of the historical precisely in order to open those limits to a possible future that has not yet 
been.  Yet in providing this opening, God is immediately overcome in the actual: God is luring 
the possible into becoming, and so the opening of possibility that God enacts is, in that same 
moment, the downfall of God by which God is overcome in the name of possibility.  In a manner 
of speaking, God must die in order for the occasion to become.  And if this is a continual 
iteration of possibility and actualization, it is a continual iteration of God‘s downfall.  It is only a 
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secularized God, it seems, who will have the strength to adventure this continual death.  A 
continual death that is necessary for civilization itself.   
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CHAPTER 3 
A SECULAR POLITICAL ONTOLOGY 
 
 Within the end of the metaphysics of conversion it has become possible to unbind the 
demands of simplicity.  Or this is, at least, the project that is being attempted here under the 
heading of a secular political ontology.  In order to perform this unbinding of the simple 
demanded by the metaphysics of conversion, and so to develop a political ontology unbound 
from its capture by conversion, it has been necessary to develop two trajectories of thought, 
which together, bring us into a determination of metaphysics as a discourse of the political.  
First, we have followed a movement of thought through a reading of Judith Butler that moves out 
of and through metaphysics as a political unbinding of metaphysics and the metaphysical subject. 
Within Butler this unbinding of metaphysics begins within and arises out of the thought of 
Hegel, and so begins within the shadow of the end of the metaphysics of conversion.  In the 
shadow of conversion the freeing of the subject from her being constrained within the demands 
of simplicity takes place through a performative political contesting of the simple being of the 
subject.  The unbinding of the metaphysical subject is an unbinding of the demands of simplicity 
as that which must be achieved because it has already been demanded.  Butler‘s intervention into 
the metaphysical demand that secures the simple subject is to take the performative failure of this 
production of simplicity not as an absence of being but as the positive site of possibility from 
which the subject is produced.  The unbinding of the metaphysics of conversion and of the 
metaphysical subject of conversion is then a releasing of the subject into its own failures of 
simplicity as the possibility of performatively becoming other-than-itself.  In other words, this is 
a political undoing of metaphysics in the name of possibility.   
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 Second, we have followed a movement of thought through a reading of Alfred North 
Whitehead that experiments a speculative and metaphysical project that is already infected by a 
politics of adventure and peace.  This movement of thought begins within an opening provided 
by Foucault and his reading of Kant.  Through this reading, Foucault provides a political opening 
of Kantian transcendental critique, and so an opening of Kant that will render the end of the 
metaphysics of conversion as the beginning of a critical politics.  For Foucault, this opening of 
Kant is not an overcoming of the Kantian critical project.   Rather this opening is the beginning 
of Foucault‘s own political practice.  A critical political project begins, then, within and as the 
continuation of a now opened Kantian critique.  Given Whitehead‘s own post-Kantian 
positioning, Foucault‘s reading of this now opened Kant allows a recognition of the political 
infection of Whitehead‘s own speculative and metaphysical project.  Experimenting a 
constructivist metaphysics that opens Being to its own becoming, Whitehead‘s speculative 
project produces a metaphysic that is infected from beginning to end with a political intention.  
With this, the political becomes the practice of the actualization of possibility at the same 
moment that metaphysics becomes the articulation of the conditions of actualization as the 
becoming of possibility. 
 Woven throughout these two movements of thought is, to follow Whitehead‘s 
designation, a secular theology.  For Butler, this secular theology begins as a threefold critique:  
first, a critique of the theological determination of the subject as simple source of power; second, 
a critique of the theological determination of the efficacy of the law; and third, a critique of the 
theological determination of a temporality of guilt through which the subject is captured in and 
by the law.  This theological critique does not, though, abandon the theological to the onto-
theological history of oppression.  As we will see, Butler‘s theological critique advances 
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precisely by taking up and enacting a theology that has been opened to and by this threefold 
critique.  In other words, the theological comes to be deployed against itself.  It is through this 
auto-immune critique that the metaphysics of conversion is unbound and the subject of 
metaphysic is freed from its simplicity.  
 Whitehead, of course, begins his own speculative and metaphysical project within the 
demand for the secularization of God.  For Whitehead, the secularization of God begins with a 
doubled critique of theo-political determinations of God as a barbaric tyrant and of metaphysical 
determinations of God as the absolute exception to metaphysics itself.  For Whitehead, this 
doubled critique does not lead to an absolute death of God.  Rather, it leads to a theopoetic 
determination of God as intimate event of possibility within the becoming actualization of 
occasions.  God arises, in other words, as the rupture and rescue of possibility within the 
becoming of the actual. 
 At the end of conversion, with Butler and Whitehead, at the intersection of these two 
movements of thought, we arrive at a place to articulate a secular political ontology.  On the one 
hand, this will be a political ontology that arises within and as a metaphysical project that has 
been unbound into the possibilities of becoming.  On the other hand, this will be a secular 
political ontology that does not abandon God to an absolute death, but that encounters God as a 
perpetual death that is also a perpetual opening of possibility.   
Specifically, this secular political ontology will develop through the following 
explorations.  First, following a certain Nietzsche suspicion, this secular political ontology 
begins with and unfolds within a suspicion of grammar as that doubt which will make critique 
possible.  Second, this secular political ontology is determined as an analytic of power 
understood as a materialization which is unbound from a theological determination of power as 
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simple, fully efficacious, and spiritual.  Third, this secular political ontology is determined as an 
analytic of the subject as becoming within the movement of power, freed from its determination 
as simple ground and capture of being.  This ontology of becoming will itself be driven by both a 
negativity and a desire for possibility, while always arising within the constraints of an already 
given social context.  Finally, this secular political ontology is opened up to a possibility that is 
itself a theopoetic possibility of a God of possibility.  With this, the secular political ontology 
opens up to a future politics of possibility to come.   
1.  Politics and the suspicion of grammar 
At the end of a long Augustinian sentence we are presented with an opportunity to re-
imagine the subject.  As we have seen, if this Augustinian sentence finds its final pronouncement 
in Kant, it is opened within the long echo of a Nietzschean lament:  ―I am afraid we are not yet 
rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.‖1  Within the suspicion of grammar that 
follows from this lament, a suspicion of the grammar through which a proper construction of 
God and the subject of enunciation is spoken, we find enacted the series of deaths that Nietzsche 
himself finds the grammar to announce, even if and as this is a grammar of madness: the death of 
God, the death of the subject, the death of metaphysics.  Through his suspicion of grammar 
Nietzsche comes to unravel all that Augustine attempted to confess as one simple being.  The 
suspicion of grammar comes to unravel the Augustinian sentence, and in so doing unravels the 
metaphysics of conversion through which God and the subject have been bound together within a 
productive logic of simplicity.   
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 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 
1982),  483.  
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As we have seen, Whitehead‘s own speculative project begins within a suspicion of 
grammar.
2
  This suspicion is registered as a failure of language and a questioning of the 
metaphysical commitments present within a subject-predicate grammar of articulation.
3
  In what 
will be the first among many surprising points of agreement to come, Judith Butler likewise 
announces that her political project must begin with a certain suspicion of grammar.  This 
suspicion is made explicit in the opening of Bodies That Matter where a reconsideration of 
performativity leads to a determination of constructivism that the performative logic of 
subjectivity requires.
4
  In this determination of constructivism, Butler is primarily concerned 
with challenging the critical constructivist theories that postulate – either explicitly or implicitly 
– a subject who wills or acts a construction.  Butler is quick to acknowledge that, within these 
constructivist discourses, the subject of construction need not be a human subject: the subject 
who constructs or initiates a construction has been determined as the human but also as the 
social, the cultural, the linguistic, and as power itself.  The subject is, in other words, not simply 
a human subject but the ―grammatical subject position‖ within a metaphysics of substance (BM, 
9).
5
   
The grammatical subject position is, in its human form, the position of what we have 
already seen designated as the theological subject: the subject as simple and singular originator 
of action.  Within an echo of Nietzsche, Butler is here working within a configuration of power 
and subjection where a belief in God is registered as a faith in grammar and comes to secure the 
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singular simplicity of a subject as the subject of any speaking or constructive act.  As we have 
also already seen, the political undoing of metaphysics that is unfolded through a performative 
determination of the subject is an undoing of this theological and now grammatical subject of 
construction.  So quite directly, to re-imagine power, and the subject of power, requires, Butler 
announces, a ―certain suspicion of grammar‖ (BM, 7).  This suspicion of grammar will allow a 
thinking of the subject not as the theologically determined simple subject who is originator of his 
own freedom, but rather a subject who has already been submitted and subjected to a certain 
subjecting and so always arises within a movement of power (BM, 7).  In Bodies That Matter, 
and much of Butler‘s early work, this submitting and subjecting is determined in relation to a 
gendering, so that the suspicion of grammar allows a thinking of the subject as the one who is 
―subjected to gender, but [also] subjectivated by gender, the ‗I‘ neither precedes nor follows the 
process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations 
themselves‖ (BM, 7).  In her late work, this suspicion of grammar has been developed to 
constitute a critique of the political subject in general, and so becomes the beginning gesture of a 
critical political ontology.   A suspicion of grammar allows a suspicion of the subject, which is to 
open the subject to the questioning of its own arising.  
This suspicion of grammar is also, Butler argues, an opening to a rethinking of 
constructivism itself.  If constructivism has required a secure subject as occupying the 
grammatical subject position, to be suspicious of this subject is to also be suspicious of 
constructivism as determined as a willful act of a subject.
6
  Within a suspicion of grammar, 
construction is ―a process of reiteration by which both ‗subjects‘ and ‗acts‘ come to appear at all‖ 
(BM, 9).  Construction, then, is the process of appearance, and if we are allowed to follow 
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through with this suggestion of Kantian language, construction becomes the name for the 
conditioning practice of the possibility of that which appears as a subject and as an act.  
Constructivism is, as Whitehead recognizes, the materialization as practice of the Kantian 
Transcendental Aesthetic.
7
  Whitehead‘s own constructivist philosophy, which we have already 
seen articulated as a conceptual constructivism, arises out of a constructivist ontology within 
which actuality is determined as the material becoming together of that which has been.  
Likewise, for Butler the appearing of that which is actual is determined as a materialization, a 
―process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, of fixity, 
and surface we call matter‖ (BM, 9).  Constructivism is then the materialization of that which 
comes to matter, a materialization that is always a process of coming to be.
8
   
When and as construction becomes determined as the process of materialization it also, 
paradoxically, loses its standing as a strict constructivism, if what is meant by constructivism is a 
positive determination of being.  For the process of materialization, Butler argues, is not simply 
the construction of matter but also the construction of the boundary through which matter is 
determined.  Construction as materialization is a differential practice of the production of the 
boundary of the outside, of the limit of being.
9
  With this Butler is continuing Foucault‘s project 
as the exploration of the limit practice through which that which matters comes to matter.  It is 
only through this differential practice, Butler argues, that the subject is produced as a material 
subject (BM, 8).  This becoming material, Butler argues, ―operates through exclusionary means, 
such that the human is not only produced over and the against the inhuman, but through a set of 
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foreclosures, radical erasures, that are, strictly speaking, refused the possibility of cultural 
articulation‖ (BM, 8, italics in original).  Not only, then, is the human produced through this 
differential practice of exclusion and foreclosure, but the inhuman against which the human 
arises is also produced as the necessary outside to the human.  The outside to that which arises 
and appears is not an absolute ontological outside, an outside or otherness that would precede 
and condition the arising and appearing subject.
10
  Rather, the outside itself is constructed within 
the process of materialization.
11
  So this constructive production is both a construction of that 
which is and that which cannot be precisely through the differential determination of a 
foreclosing against that which cannot be.  In this way the suspicion of grammar lays bare the 
paranoia by which the subject is secured against all ―outside‖ intrusion, and the limits of its own 
being are established. 
The suspicion of grammar within which Butler‘s project arises is not only a suspicion of 
the subject position.  As Whitehead also recognizes, the suspicion of grammar also arises as a 
recognition of the impossibility of totalizing the context of meaning within which a grammatical 
utterance is made.  The scene of utterance, Butler argues, always exceeds the utterance in ways 
that introduce an equivocity into the utterance (ES, 87).
12
  This fluidity of meaning can never be 
fully captured within the limits of a proper grammar.  This equivocity is one of the conditions, 
Butler argues, for the possibility of the performative to arise:  ―The disjuncture between the 
utterance and meaning is the condition of possibility for revising the performative, of the 
performative as the repetition of its prior instance, a repetition that is at once a reformulation‖ 
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(ES, 87).  This is not, as we will see, the only condition for possibility within the political.  Yet 
the impossibility of fixing the meaning of any utterance within a context which will always 
exceed that utterance opens a suspicion of grammar to a political contestation that is essential to 
the democratic project.
13
   
Absent the totalizing context within which the meaning of an utterance will find stability, 
every utterance is a risk.  This risk of meaning otherwise, of having one‘s utterance meaning 
something else, something other than what is intended, or other than what was inscribed within 
the utterance at a particular moment, is itself the risk of democracy rendered at the ontological 
level.  As Butler argues,  
If one always risks meaning something other than what one thinks one utters, then one is, as it 
were vulnerable in a specifically linguistic sense to a social life of language that exceeds the 
purview of the subject who speaks.  This risk and vulnerability are proper to democratic process 
in the sense that one cannot know in advance the meaning that the other will assign to one‘s 
utterance, what conflict of interpretation may well arise, and how best to adjudicate that 
difference.  The effort to come to terms is not one that can be resolved in anticipation but only 
through a concrete struggle of translation, one whose success has no guarantees (ES, 87-88). 
The context within which any utterance arrives, what is here designated as the ―social life of 
language‖ will always exceed the speaker of the utterance, and so will always require the entry 
of the subject into a field that it cannot fully control.  The utterance and the subject of utterance 
will always be vulnerable to this excess.
14
  This vulnerability will itself be the opening to a 
contestation of meaning, to a contestation of interpretation, which is precisely, for Butler, the 
movement of democracy itself.   
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 The risk of meaning otherwise is not simply, or not only, a future possibility.  Any 
utterance is always also open to a failure in its present enunciation, what Butler designates as a 
―performative contradiction‖ (ES, 89).  Here Butler is primarily concerned with the performative 
contradictions which become possible when the connection between the particular and the 
universal are no longer stabilized within a totalizing context.  In this sense, a performative 
contradiction is a claim by a particular to be ―covered‖ by a universal from which it has 
historically been excluded (ES, 89-90).  The utterance of a performative contradiction is, in this 
way, a political utterance of possibility, one which attempts to expose the limits of the universal 
as having been historically determined, and to expand the universal beyond its present limit.
15
  
This failure of the utterance to be contained within an already articulated determination of the 
universal is the essence of the universal, precisely as a futural essence.  ―The not yet,‖ Butler 
argues, ―is proper to an understanding of the universal itself: that which remains ‗unrealized‘ by 
the universal constitutes it essentially‖ (ES, 90).  It is precisely the present failure of an utterance 
to already be contained within the articulation of the coupled particular and universal that opens 
the universal to a future articulation of that which is at present its failure.
16
  And, in a move that 
we have already explored, this futural essence of the universal, the movement and practice of the 
failure of the universal, is also the futural essence, movement and practice of democracy itself 
(ES, 90).  Democracy becomes, within and as a suspicion of grammar, a practice of the assertion 
of universality. 
 Within his own suspicion of grammar, Whitehead will also find it necessary to challenge 
a traditional articulation of the particular-universal relation.  In what will become a major 
understatement for the radical reconfiguration of possibility that arises within his own project, 
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Whitehead argues that ―the terms ‗universals‘ and ‗particulars,‘ both in the suggestiveness of the 
two words in their current philosophical use, are somewhat misleading‖ (PR, 48).  They are 
misleading, Whitehead continues, to the extent that they suggest and are used to articulate a 
distinction that cannot be maintained.
17
  ―An actual entity,‖ Whitehead argues,  
cannot be described, even inadequately, by universals; because other actual entities do enter into 
the description of any one actual entity.  Thus every so-called ‗universal‘ is particular in the sense 
of being just what it is, diverse from everything else; and every so-called ‗particular‘ is universal 
in the sense of entering into the constitution of other actual entities (PR, 48).   
The suggestiveness of and philosophical use of the particular-universal distinction is misleading 
precisely because it leads away from the becoming actual of any entity as a coming together of 
the universal and the particular as a specific actuality.  Any actuality is, in other words, precisely 
what it is in its specificity as the unique coming together of this or these universals with this or 
these particulars.  Actuality is then the assertion of universality in the specificity of the 
particular, and the assertion of particularity in the specificity of the universal.
18
  Whether one is 
attempting to describe the world within a subject-predicate logic, or within a clear distinction 
between the universal and the particular, the result is the same: a ―violence to that immediate 
experience which we express in our actions, our hopes, our sympathies, our purposes, and which 
we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis.  We find ourselves in a buzzing 
world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures…‖ (PR, 49-50).  The suspicion of grammar gives 
rise to the possibility of accounting for and so participating in this buzzing democracy, of 
enjoying the buzz of a democracy of our fellow creatures.   
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 Here, then, a series of arguments seem to coincide between Whitehead and Butler: both 
work within a suspicion of grammar that is both a questioning of the dogma of the dictionary and 
the totality of the context of the utterance.  Further, this suspicion of grammar opens up to an 
ontology and political practice of universalization and the becoming universal of the particular 
and the particularization of the universal.
19
  And finally, this practice is determined within and as 
the practice of democracy.   
To speak of a common set of arguments is, of course, too simple and too quick.  A 
distance will always remain between the political and the metaphysical within which Butler and 
Whitehead work.  Yet the difficulty is not with the distance itself: the suspicion of grammar 
which becomes a constructivist philosophy is nothing if it is not an opening to the flight which 
gives rise to the buzzing movement across the categories of our inherited being and thought.  The 
suspicion of grammar is, in other words, an opening to a speculative and experimental 
metaphysical practice just as it is an opening to a political practice of possibility, and is the 
opening through which these two can be traversed.  What is necessary is the articulation of this 
movement within the political and metaphysical openings that are practiced by Butler and 
Whitehead, to remain within the tension
20
 created between these two ontologies of becoming.  
The suspicion of grammar stands at the site of this opening, an opening to the adventures of 
possibility that arise when and as the suspicion of grammar becomes a suspicion of ontology.   
 At the same time, as we have seen, this suspicion of grammar which becomes a suspicion 
of ontology is also an opening, an opening to a rethinking of the subject that will also be 
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registered as the possibility of a redetermination of a political ontology.  On the one hand, the 
suspicion of grammar and ontology is animated in Whitehead by a metaphysical desire for 
generality and abstractness.  Yet this metaphysical desire will itself always arise within and as a 
concern for the social conditions of the becoming actual of all actuality.  The metaphysical desire 
is, in other words, always a desire that arises out of a concern for a political ontology of 
becoming.  On the other hand, the suspicion of grammar and ontology is animated in Butler by a 
political desire for possibility within the matrices of power that are the condition for subjects.  
Yet this political desire is always a desire that arises out of and against the background of a 
metaphysical questioning of that which also exceeds the purview of the subject coming to be.  
Being pulled in these two directions an ontology arises that is an ontology of possibility.  
 2.  Becoming material 
In attempting to articulate a secular political ontology with and through Butler and 
Whitehead we are under the necessity to think power, and in particular, power and subjectivity.
21
  
Although this is not, as we will see, a claim just about Butler, for Whitehead too is concerned 
with power and subjectivity, with the becoming of actuality as the becoming of subjects, it is 
helpful here to begin with Butler.  Butler‘s thought has always been and remains given over to an 
analytic of power as that which is both condition and limit of livable life.
22
  This is not, of 
course, to propose a final determination of Butler‘s thought, or to announce a proposed final 
Butlerian theory of power, as if power (or life) could become a discrete object of analysis, 
determined either in itself or its complete structural being.  Rather, this analytic of power is a 
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question and questioning of possibility (the ―possibilities for a livable life,‖ as Butler proposes in 
the Preface to Gender Trouble) as that which arises within productive movements of power.
23
     
 In focusing on this analytic of power within which livable lives become livable, it is 
necessary to turn to an exploration of the movements of power that are prior to the becoming of 
subjects of livable life, and so prior to the becoming of subjects of representation through which 
life becomes attached to its own being.  These movements of power can, at least briefly and as a 
beginning, be situated in relation to Vicki Bell‘s recent questioning of Butler: ―from what 
background of indeterminate unintelligibility (impulses, desires, creativity, noise, virtuality, 
shadows),‖ Bell asks, ―does the ordered world of intelligible, disciplined, self-monitoring 
subjects emerge?‖24  If Butler is taking up the question of appearance, how is this appearance 
possible?  To address this question it is possible to turn to two moments where Butler takes up 
the work of Michel Foucault to think about power and subjectivity, and specifically power and 
the materialization of the subject in Bodies That Matter and the more recent ―Bodies and Power 
Revisited.‖25  Central to these two moments is the attempt to think power as a doubled 
movement, one which both produces and forms bodied subjects, and to think power specifically 
as a movement of materialization.  What is unique in these two moments of thought is the 
conceptual development whereby Butler attempts to think power by borrowing the determination 
of power as vectored from Foucault (BM, 34; ―BPR,‖ 187).  In Discipline and Punish, 
immediately after announcing that ―the soul is the prison of the body,‖ Foucault describes the 
prison and the prison environment by arguing that the ―materiality of the prison environment is 
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an instrument and vector of power [c‘était sa matérialité dans la mesure où elle est instrument et 
vecteur de pouvoir].‖26  In both Bodies That Matter and ―Bodies and Power Revisited,‖ Butler 
takes up this brief passage, offering a determination of power as vectored.  The determination of 
power as vectored is, for Butler, a determination of power as a productive movement which is 
itself a materialization, and this materialization is the condition for the becoming of the subject.  
In other words, power, when determined as vectored, becomes a materialism of becoming.   
In Bodies That Matter Butler attempts to think not simply bodies, a task that continually 
proves difficult, nor even bodies that matter, but specifically the ways in which bodies come to 
matter.  As the opening gesture of this thought, Butler turns to Foucault as the occasion for 
thinking the materialization of matter within a reworking of an Aristotelian determination of the 
actualization of matter.  This is already to perform a certain movement between bodies that 
matter and the matter of bodies, and so there is a certain ambivalence, as bodies are not the only 
materialities that matter.  In this opening movement, Butler draws two principles from Aristotle 
that she will attempt to maintain throughout Bodies That Matter: first, that the schematic form of 
matter appears as grammatical recognizability, and, second, that this schematic form cannot be 
thought as distinct from that which makes matter matter (BM, 33-34).  Here, Butler seems to 
begin by thinking the body through a priority of the formal determination of matter as 
recognizable, and as recognized within a grammar of recognition.  This recognition is itself a 
matter of mattering, a coming to matter of that which matters, and as such is a production of 
physical weight and a conferral of value.  Grammar, then, is the entry into the infinite play of the 
infamous pun, where what matters matters only by coming to matter; and this coming to matter 
is itself a becoming of recognition.  In other words for Butler, these Aristotelian principles 
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maintain that matter does not matter or come to be matter unless and only to the extent that it is 
already also recognizable.   
Butler, of course, does not remain strictly within this Aristotelian inheritance.  As we 
have already seen, central to all of Butler‘s work is a suspicion of grammar, a suspicion that is 
especially relevant here.  Beyond this general suspicion of grammar, Butler brings to this 
questioning of that which comes to matter a concern for that which must be excluded for this 
mattering to matter, and this concern places her at a certain distance from not only Aristotle but 
Foucault as well.
27
  In order to articulate that which does not come to matter, Butler argues that it 
is necessary to think these principles of materialization against the biological and natural 
teleology within which Aristotle develops them.  Here Butler argues that it is necessary to 
historicize the Aristotelian principles, and so to understand the schema of recognizability as 
historicized, which is also to think materialization within the schema of its historically contingent 
operations (BM, 33).  This is to think the formative and constitutive force of schema as the 
historical force of the immanence of power in and as the materialization of matter, which 
according to Butler is also ―something similar‖ to Foucault‘s determination of the materialization 
of the body in Discipline and Punish (BM, 33).     
Thinking within Foucault‘s determination to think the body as the materialization of 
matter as a historicizing of Aristotle, Butler takes up the problematic of the doubling of 
subjection (assujettissement) as analyzed by Foucault.  This is to take up the thought of power as 
both productive and regulative at once.   Butler argues that within this doubled conceptualization, 
power is defined as an operation that ―produces the subjects that it subjects; that is, subjects them 
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in and through the compulsory power relations effective as their formative principle‖ (BM, 34).  
This is, following Foucault, to render the materialization of the body as the investment of power 
in bodies and the investment of bodies in power.  And it is strictly as a materialization that is 
―coextensive‖ with investiture that power comes to matter (BM, 34).  In this sense, a subject is 
materialized, and a body becomes, precisely and only to the extent that it is invested with and by 
power.  Materiality is then the name for this constitutive and productive investment of power, so 
that the subject becomes precisely to the extent that it is materialized within the doubled 
subjection of power (BM, 34).  This is the principle of Butler‘s materialism, a pure materialism 
of power that is a materialism of becoming matter.   
In the specificity of  a reading of Discipline and Punish and the materialization of the 
prison, when power is read as materialization, Butler introduces the conceptualization of power 
as a vector:  ―The materialization of the prison, [Foucault] writes, is established to the extent that 
it is a vector and instrument of power‖ (BM, 34).  In other words, the conceptual determination 
of power as a vector is introduced as a possibility for thinking the investiture of power as 
materialization.  It is, it seems, precisely as a vectoring that power is also an investiture, and an 
investiture as a materialization.  The body, as either the body of the prisoner or the body of the 
prison, is not only the materialization of power invested, but also the vector of power; and so the 
subject, as materialized in a doubled subjection, is a site of the vector of power. 
 To determine the relation between power and bodies through and as a vector is to think 
power as a movement, a continual movement that cannot be a secondary attribute of power, for 
power itself is this movement of investiture.  This movement is a movement of materialization, a 
movement that is not simply the movement of bodies nor simply an acting on matter.
28
  Rather, 
                                                 
28
 Although a full exploration of the temporality of this production is beyond the scope of the present work, it should 
be noted, even if only briefly, that Butler‘s conceptualization of this becoming material is not simply or properly a 
182 
 
the movement of power is itself the condition of matter, the condition of its materialization as 
matter.  But this condition of materialization is not and cannot be separated from that which it 
conditions.  Rather, matter is the congealing of power in the particularity of its mattering.  
Materialization is an operation of power that ―can take place only within and by an operation of 
power.  This operation produces the subjects that it subjects‖ (BM, 34).  Taking place and also 
making a place, it is this determination of power as the movement of materialization that is the 
full designation of the vectored nature of power.  To determine power in this vectored relation to 
and as the materialization of bodies is, then, to determine this relation as an investiture, so that 
the body is invested in power, just as power is invested in bodies.   
In ―Bodies and Power Revisited,‖ Butler continues not only an exploration of Discipline 
and Punish, but she also continues to explore the vector character of power.  This exploration 
begins, again, within the problematic of the doubling of subjection, and so the doubling of 
subjection as that which acts on bodies and also, at the same time, crafts and produces bodies.  
Here Butler highlights that power is not simply a force, but is determined by Foucault as a 
strategy (―BPR,‖ 183).  Thinking of power as a strategy entails a thinking of power and the body 
through a series of disclaimers and transferences which complicate the very being of the subject, 
for a strategy is neither appropriated nor possessed by a subject, and so, in a sense, the subject is 
left behind when power is determined as a strategy (―BPR,‖ 184). Working within a theological 
critique, Butler argues that the subject left behind is the subject determined as either the singular 
site of the possession of power or the singular site from which power emanates (―BPR,‖ 184).  In 
thinking power as a strategy Foucault is proposing, therefore, a unique determination of the 
relation between the subject and power, which then also requires a unique determination of the 
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movement and deployment of power.  When the relation between the bodied subject and power 
is understood as a strategic relation, it must be thought as one of active movement, and so power 
becomes a movement that is related to a certain becoming-subjection.  By determining power as 
a strategic movement, Butler argues an ambiguity is produced within Foucault‘s determination of 
power and bodies, such that it is impossible to determine whether it is the body that is active or 
power (―BPR,‖ 184).  It is no longer possible to determine power simply as that which works on 
a body or subject as its object, nor to determine the body or the subject as that which deploys an 
objectified power outside of itself.  Instead, the conjunctive ‗bodies and power‘ must be read 
precisely as a conjunction, as a mutually ambiguous implication of bodies and power and of 
subjects and power.  
 The ambiguity that this relation gives rise to is materialized in Discipline and Punish as 
the relation between the body of the prisoner and the prison as a body. Butler argues that when 
Foucault doubles the body by using it to designate both the body of the prisoner (des corps) and 
the prison itself (le corps même de la prison), he is attempting to materialize the ambiguity 
between the body of the prisoner and the power through which that body is.  In this way, the 
body becomes determined by and as a site of transference, as the site of the prison‘s 
materialization  of the materialization of bodies.  At this site, where it is impossible to determine 
the body simply as the prison or the prisoner ―materiality might be said, then, to diverge from 
itself, to redouble itself, to be at once institution and body, and to denote the process by which 
the one passes over into the other (or, indeed, the process by which both ‗institution‘ and ‗body‘ 
come into separate existence in and through this prior and conditioning divergence).  And the 
distinction between the two is the site where the one makes a transition into the other‖ 
(―BPR,‖186).  The distinction between bodies and power and subjects and power, then, is 
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registered not with the aid of a subject-object grammar, but as and within the movement of 
power as a materialization.  As we have seen, power as the movement of a materialism of 
becoming matter is precisely a movement of investiture, where to become material is to become 
within and as a materialization of power.  For Butler, this is to redefine both the body and power 
through the language of a ‗nexus,‘ where the body as a ‗nexus‘ redefines power as that which is 
strategy, activity, dispersion and transvaluation.  Here, then, the ‗nexus‘ redefines the body as 
that which is ―a kind of undergoing, the condition for a redirection, active, tense, embattled‖ 
(―BPR,‖ 186-187).  To speak, then, of the body as a nexus is to determine the body as a site of 
transference, as the site of the continual materialization of that which becomes precisely as a 
materialization of power, a materialization that occurs precisely through and as a contestation, a 
tensed battle of power within and against itself in its becoming other as a materialization.  And it 
is precisely this becoming other that is the condition for the determination of ‗the‘ body as the 
body of the prisoner or the prison as a body.    
 In order to avoid a certain reduction of Foucault to Deleuze, Butler further determines 
this movement of power through and with the body as a nexus by returning again to the language 
of vectoring, such that materiality is itself, as in Bodies That Matter, a continual movement of 
materialization.  In ―Bodies and Power Revisited,‖ the possibility of thinking power as a vector, 
as a movement of materialization, is produced through a series of negations: the body is not a 
substance, a thing, a set of drives, or a ―cauldron of resistant impulse‖ (―BPR,‖ 187).  Within the 
space opened by these negations the body becomes the ―site of the transfer for power itself‖ 
(―BPR,‖ 187).  The body is a site of transfer for power, which is not simply a site of power, but 
somehow other than that.  It is a site constituted as the movement of power itself, a taking place 
that is the making of a place of matter.  Here, movement is not simply the movement of flow, but 
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the movement of iteration, of citational repetition: the movement of the event as the repetition 
which creates movement and in this creates a place of becoming.  It is from within this place that 
bodies come to matter, where matter is determined as the body of the prisoner or the prison as a 
body.  Thus, to speak of the body as the site for power is to speak of the body as strictly nothing 
more or less than the materialization of power, as the site where power materializes precisely by 
becoming other than itself in its movement of materialization.  
At this point, having briefly introduced the conceptualization of the body as a nexus it 
seems that we are now compelled to turn to Whitehead.  There is much that can be achieved 
through Butler‘s thinking power as a vectored materialization that is and can be amenable to 
Whitehead‘s own conceptualizations of power.  For Whitehead the determination of power as 
vectored is the means for thinking power as productive, prehensive feeling.  Whitehead argues 
that ―the vector character of prehension is fundamental,‖  so that the vector character of 
prehension is precisely the means for understanding power as a prehensive movement; it is, as 
Whitehead says, the feeling of what was there, here (PR, 87, 317).  Whitehead‘s own 
determination of power as vectored begins with a series of translations.  First, there is the 
translation from vector physics to metaphysics.  In a reverse translation of the present concern, 
Whitehead argues that ―mathematical physics translates the saying of Heraclitus, ‗All things 
flow,‘ into its own language.  It then becomes, All things are vectors‖ (PR, 309).  Here 
Whitehead argues that a straightforward translation between physics and metaphysics is possible.  
The metaphysical movement of becoming can, in a quite direct way, be rendered by the 
mathematical language of vectors, for both are determinations of actuality as movement, a 
movement that Whitehead will determine as becoming.  The specificity of this becoming is both 
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that which determines all actuality, and is determined as a movement that is rendered in both 
physics and philosophy by determining the nature of actuality as vectored.   
With this first translation in place, it becomes possible to perform a second translation, 
whereby the constitutive movement of this becoming is rendered as ‗power.‘  For Whitehead this 
second translation arises from the necessity to think power as constitutive of actuality.
29
  As he 
argues, ―in order to understand ‗power,‘ we must have a correct notion of how each individual 
actual entity contributes to the datum from which its successors arise and to which they must 
conform‖ (PR, 56, emphasis in original).  Here, Whitehead draws a principle of power from John 
Locke, namely ―the principle that the ‗power‘ of one actual entity on the other is simply how the 
former is objectified in the constitution of the other‖ (PR, 58).  There is, of course, nothing 
simple about this principle, either in its elaboration or its functioning.  To risk an 
oversimplification, it seems that within the strict requirements of the ontological principle, the 
being of an actual occasion is the achievement of having become as a concrescent process of 
unity out of that which is given.  And this process of unification is itself an achievement that is 
aimed at a becoming-constitutive cause for other actual occasions.  This achievement is what 
Whitehead will name as the ―subject-superject,‖ which is 
the purpose originating the feelings.  The feelings are inseparable from the end at which they aim; 
and this end is the feeler.  The feelings aim at the feeler, as their final cause.  The feelings are 
what they are in order that their subject may be what it is.  Then transcendently, since the subject 
is what it is in virtue of its feelings, it is only by means of its feelings that the subject objectively 
conditions the creativity transcendent beyond itself (PR, 222). 
As will be seen, this causation by feeling is not simply the causation of an external relation, but 
is the power of objectification within the constitutive becoming of another actual occasion (PR, 
58).  With this, Whitehead transforms what begins with Locke as an epistemological concern 
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with power into an ontological determination of power as the real internal constitution of a 
subject through the objectification of its past.
30
  It is in attempting to meet the necessity to think 
power as that which is constitutive of actuality that Whitehead comes to a determination of the 
vector character of feeling:   
Primitive experience is ‗vector feeling,‘ that is to say, feeling from a beyond which is determinate 
and pointing to a beyond which is to be determined.  But the feeling is subjectively rooted in the 
immediacy of the present occasion: it is what the occasion feels for itself, as derived from the past 
and as merging into the future (PR, 163). 
The vector character of the feeling becomes, then, the means for thinking power as the 
constitutive contribution of one actuality to another: a feeling of what has been, to what is, to 
what will be.  From physics to metaphysics, the vector character of actuality becomes the means 
for conceptualizing the constitutive force of past actual entities in the moment of subjectivity, a 
constitutive force determined as ‗power.‘         
For Whitehead, to determine power as constitutive objectification is to determine power 
within creativity, and so within the metaphysical movement of becoming.  Significantly, 
Whitehead concludes his long discussion of Locke and power by designating as the ―doctrine of 
organism‖ the ―attempt to describe the world as a process of generation of individual actual 
entities‖ (PR, 60).  As metaphysically and ontologically determined, power is the movement of 
generation.  This is a movement of what has been into what is becoming, by way of 
objectification.  When this generative objectification is determined as the vector character of 
prehension, power is the feeling of ―what is there‖ transformed into ―what is here‖ (PR, 87).  It 
is the movement of what was there to what is, here and now.  Power as movement is not simply a 
movement to that which is becoming, but it is a movement to only as a movement within.  This is 
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a movement that is constitutive as the felt internal constitution of that which is becoming out of 
that which has been.  To speak of power as a vectored movement is to determine power as the 
movement of inter-exchange between occasions, and is the moment when what has been passes 
over into that which is becoming.  As vectored, power becomes the very name for the 
constitutive process of this movement.                 
To determine power as constitutive objectification and vectored is to determine power as 
doubled.  This is to think the doubling of power as constitutive becoming within the givenness of 
that which has become; a givenness that is both the condition for the becoming of any actual 
occasion and the imposition of a certain intensive feeling of becoming.
31
  As has already been 
noted, for Whitehead, power must itself be understood as ―how each individual actual entity 
contributes to the datum from which its successors arise and to which they must conform‖ (PR, 
56). Within this demand for thinking power as doubled, Whitehead argues that all actual things 
are both object and subject within the movement of creativity.  As object, it provides the 
conditions from which and out of which each actual occasion arises.  As subject, it becomes 
through the prehensive unification of the universe of its becoming (PR, 56-57).    
Yet as doubled, this movement of power is not exhausted as the positive condition for the 
arising of the actual occasion.  It is also, Whitehead argues, the ―imposition of conformity‖ on 
that very arising (PR, 56).  As such, each actual occasion will always retain the ―vector marks of 
its origin‖ (PR, 117), always remaining within the imposition of the conditions of its becoming.32  
The actual world of that which has been achieved, and so that which is given as the condition 
from which each occasion arises, presents itself as a limit of what that occasion can become.  
The mark of the given is the mark of limitation, an originary limitation of what can be (PR, 65).  
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As originary, Whitehead determines this limitation as conformation, for it is a re-enactment of 
the given world as the originating condition from which an actual occasion arises.  If this 
originating condition can be felt differently, a limit that functions only to be transgressed and 
passed beyond, this transcendent movement will always remain within the space of its 
origination.
33
  As Whitehead strictly argues, ―No actual entity can rise beyond what the actual 
world as a datum from its standpoint – its actual world – allows it to be‖ (PR, 83).  To think 
power as doubled is then, for Whitehead, always to think both the condition for the becoming of 
an actual occasion and to think this condition as that which will leave its mark in the being of the 
becoming occasion. 
This doubling of power is itself a determination that fundamentally undermines the 
distinction between efficient and final causation, the traditional philosophical problematic of 
power with which Whitehead begins his questioning of power.  For vectored power, specifically 
as prehensive feeling, has a ―dual nature‖ of being both cause and effect of becoming (PR, 237).  
When power is thought as the vectored transition of objectification, the feeling of another 
actuality as the constitutive and originary movement of becoming, the actual occasion is no 
longer simply the separable moment of a private final causation, but is rather the moment of 
transition within the movement of power itself.
34
  Thus the actual occasion becomes not simply 
that which arises from an efficient cause to become by its own final cause, but rather the site of 
becoming where efficient and final cause reduplicate themselves in the production of intensity.
35
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At the moment when the vector character of a prehension is determined as feeling, 
Whitehead returns to the materiality of power itself.  For within the concrescent becoming of an 
actual occasion, the most primitive form of feeling, and the ―bricks‖ from which all actuality is 
built, are simple physical feelings.  These are quite simply, Whitehead announces, ―the feeling of 
another actuality‖ (PR, 225).  With this the becoming material of an actual occasion begins with 
simple physical feeling, the feeling of another actuality as a duplicated vector of power (PR, 
237).  Certainly, this is only the beginning of a process of becoming materially actual for 
Whitehead.
36
  The becoming material of an actual occasion is only fully determined as, first, the 
determinate material actuality of an actual occasion as the becoming actual of the phases of 
concrescence eventuating in a satisfaction of subjective character.  Second, this becoming 
material of an actual occasion is itself understood within and as an atomization of the extensive 
continuum, and so as arising within the becoming relations of a space-time extensivity (PR, 67).  
Finally, within a certain determination to think metaphysically, and not merely culturally or 
politically, Whitehead determines the materiality of bodies as an achievement of coordination 
among materialized actual occasions (a coordination which is not itself nor strictly an actual 
occasion).  Even with the achievement of materiality that is to come, it remains that the primal 
movement of becoming material is found in the simplicity of the vectored prehension of actuality 
for Whitehead.  The movement of this primal feeling is, as he argues, a doubling of power, and 
so ―a partial identification of cause with effect, and not a mere representation of the cause‖ (PR, 
237).  Moving finally and fully beyond representation, power becomes a material reduplication 
beyond itself, and so a becoming materialization.   
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 At this point, we seem to arrive at a certain impasse.  On the one hand, it is now possible 
to articulate the contours of a determination of power as vectored: power as vectored is both a 
movement, a movement of constitutive materialization that is both condition and limit of 
becoming, and, quite strictly, a materialism: a becoming materialization that is the movement of 
power itself in its becoming other than itself.  Yet here, Bell‘s questioning of Butler and our 
guiding question seems to arise at its most insistent: ―from what background of indeterminate 
unintelligibility (impulses, desires, creativity, noise, virtuality, shadows) does the ordered world 
of intelligible, disciplined, self-monitoring subjects emerge?‖37  To speak simply of a singular 
determination of power as vectored risks overlooking the difficulty that the very possibility of 
articulating a prior materialism presents.  In other words, what exactly could Butler mean by 
designating the movement of power that is vectored materialization as the ―prior and 
conditioning‖ movement of the becoming of bodies, subjects and institutions?  Is this the same 
priority that Whitehead gives to primary physical feelings, as the constitutive and originary 
feelings of the subject-superject?  
In The Psychic Life of Power Butler again takes up an exploration of  materialism, here 
discussing it within the notions of interpellation and ritual.  The originating concern of Butler‘s 
reading of interpellation in Althusser‘s ―Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,‖38 is the 
relation between the production of the ideologically determined subject, and the place of the 
conscience within this production.   This concern with the conscience is itself an attempt to 
figure the relation between the call and the response in Althusser‘s paradigmatic scene of 
ideological hailing.  Here Butler asks why the response to the officer‘s hail is a turn, a turning to 
which is a turning into the call.  ―What kind of relation,‖ Butler wonders, ―already binds these 
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two such that the subject knows to turn, knows that something is to be gained from such a turn?  
How might we think of this ‗turn‘ as prior to subject formation, a prior complicity with the law 
without which no subject emerges?‖ (PLP, 107).39   And so, again, Butler raises the question of a 
certain priority, a prior relational becoming of that which is prior to the subject.   
Within ―Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,‖ interpellation is articulated as an 
analytic of the production of subjects as the ideological reproduction of the means and relations 
of production;
40
 yet ―Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses‖ concludes with recourse to an 
example of and mechanism for subject formation in Christian theology.  As Butler argues, this 
exemplary status of theology as it appears in Althusser‘s text is extremely problematic (PLP, 
114).  Althusser‘s recourse to the exemplary status of Christian theology, rather than further 
elucidating the function of interpellation, is precisely that which hides a prior productivity 
whereby the subject is already determined as a subject that can be hailed and will be attached to 
that hailing.
41
  For Butler, if interpellation is to be a useful concept for understanding the 
mechanism of the production of subjects, then it will be necessary to explore these prior 
mechanisms that allow the hail itself to function.        
In attempting to uncover the prior mechanisms of production that are hidden within the 
exemplarity of theology in Althusser‘s determination of interpellation, Butler turns to ritual as 
the means to dislocate the securely structured theo-ideological subject.  This turn to ritual 
dislocates the theo-ideological subject by returning the subject to the history of its own 
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production.  This return uncovers what Butler designates as a certain ―disposition,‖ a ―certain 
readiness to be compelled by the authoritative interpellation, a readiness which suggests that one 
is, as it were, already in relation to the voice before the response‖ (PLP, 111).  Prior to Giving an 
Account of Oneself, this prior relation to the law is figured by Butler, following Nietzsche, 
primarily as a relation of guilt and a guilty conscience, and it is this guilty relation that Butler 
finds operative in Althusser‘s account of interpellation.42  In this way, the exemplary status of the 
theological subject in Althusser‘s determination of interpellation ―underscores the paradox of 
how the very possibility of subject formation depends upon a passionate pursuit of a recognition 
which, within the terms of the religious example, is inseparable from a condemnation‖ (PLP, 
113).  It is precisely this paradox that remains as specifically unthematized in and through 
interpellation when it is covered within a theological guise.    
 If this paradox, as the founding movement of the subject, will remain the non-
narrativizable prehistory of the subject (PLP, 112), the dislocation of the subject in this opening 
to its own becoming will also be a dislocation of the thematization of interpellation as the 
becoming of the subject.  For Butler this means that the narrative of the subject who turns to face 
the law will no longer have as its primary agent the subject coming to be in subjection (i.e. the 
willful and intentional subject who is the author of her own act of being).  Rather, the movement 
of power through this becoming subject will become the analytic theme, and it is this movement 
of power that is analyzed in and through ritual.   
 The movement to determine the prior of interpellation as ritual begins with the 
recognition that, within Althusser, consciousness and a conscience, the conscience through 
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which the hail becomes effective, arises with the ideological re-production of skills, with the 
acquisition and mastery of the skills to ―speak properly‖ (PLP, 115).43  This acquisition and 
mastery, though, is not figured simply as a knowledge or a learning; it is figured, by Althusser, 
as submission, so that, as Butler argues, ―the more a practice is mastered, the more fully 
subjection is achieved.  Submission and mastery take place simultaneously, and this paradoxical 
simultaneity constitutes the ambivalence of subjection‖ (PLP, 116).  The terms within which this 
mastery is described are important for Butler, to the extent that Althusser argues that the mastery 
of ideological skills is a conscientious acquitting of oneself (―pour s‘acquitter 
‗consciencieusement‘ de leur tâche‖) (PLP, 118).44  This is, then, to propose that the acquisition 
of skills, the becoming subject to ideology through the mastery of skills, is also an acquitting of 
oneself in a moral, and as Butler argues, religious sense.  The submission to the ideological skills 
that is their mastery is then ―a submission to the necessity to prove innocence in the face of 
accusation, a submission to the demand for proof, an execution of that proof, and acquisition of 
the status of the subject in and through compliance with the terms of the interrogative law‖ (PLP, 
118).  Therefore, the labor of this becoming mastered by ideological skills is a confession, a 
confession of innocence through the deed of submission. 
 But the mastery of skills as the ideological production of conscience, is not simply, Butler 
argues, to follow a set of rules.  For to follow a set of rules, it seems, would be to remain within 
an external relation to those rules, at most internalizing them into one‘s practice as the guide of 
practice.
45
  Rather, the ideological mastery of a practice is ―to embody rules in the course of 
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action and to reproduce those rules in embodied rituals of action‖ (PLP, 119).  Amy Hollywood, 
in her reading of Butler‘s turn to ritual, is certainly right in focusing on the temporal element of 
ritual: the turn to ritual is, for Butler, a turn to the repetitive nature of the performance of these 
ideological skills of being.
46
  But here, as in Excitable Speech,
47
 the emphasis of Butler‘s 
deployment of ritual is on the assumption of rules into a bodied and embodied being as a 
practice.
48
  It is in ritual, then, that Butler finds a new principle of materialism, the practice of a 
becoming material that is prior to, although not separable from, the becoming subject hailed in 
interpellation.  ―If,‖ Butler argues, ―ideology is material to the extent that it consists in a set of 
practices, and practices are governed by rituals, then materiality is defined as much by ritual and 
repetition as it is by more narrowly empiricist conceptions.  Moreover, the rituals of ideology are 
material to the extent that they acquire a productive capacity and, in Althusser‘s text, what rituals 
produce are subjects‖ (PLP, 125, emphasis in original).  It is this prior materialization, a 
materialization as the ritualization of ideology, through which the prior to interpellation is 
thematized as a prior becoming material.
49
  Although this prior cannot be given an ontologically 
distinct temporality of being, it is only out of this prior materialization that conscience itself 
arises, a consciousness of one‘s being called already into a hail of one‘s being.   
 If this is a determination of the materialization of power, and so a determination of 
materialism as ritual, it strangely misses the very materialization of power that is so important to 
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Foucault at that moment where a materialism of vectored power is introduced  As has been seen, 
the determination of power as vectored is achieved precisely in order to account for the scene of 
materialization, when the materiality of the body of the prison is no longer distinguishable from 
the body of the prisoner as the movement of power itself, through both the prison and the 
prisoner.  This is to understand materialism and the materiality of bodies as not simply the 
materiality of human bodies, but as a materialism within which and amidst which all bodies 
arise.  This is a materialization, in other words, of not simply bodies, but the entire material 
ecology of any becoming.  And yet it is precisely this materialization that is missing from 
Butler‘s invocation of Althusser.50  For as Althusser determines the scene of his own theoretical 
work, a certain assumption is already at work within which the scene of hailing occurs: ―the 
theoretical scene,‖ Althusser argues, ―takes place in the street‖.51  It is precisely this 
materialization, a materialization that no longer occurs between the prison as a body and the 
body of the prisoner, but as the materialization between a street and a body, that is absent from 
Butler‘s own determination of the prior materialization of power in the production of the 
interpellated subject.
52
      
 In this specific case, within Butler‘s reading of Althusser, it seems that what is missing is 
an awareness of the distance between a politics of normalization and the ―global procedure‖ that 
Althusser follows.
53
  For Butler‘s own determination of materialism as a movement of power 
that is a normalization will always require that a certain priority be given to the production of 
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human bodies, of bodies that exist with and for a body politic of the human.
54
  It is, in other 
words, within a political scene, reduced to a politics of the human, which takes place on a street 
that has already been planned, laid-out, and regulated.  The material scene within which a subject 
becomes is itself already assumed, assumed to already be in place, and so the rituals of 
ideological production, as Butler determines these, already take place within this scene that has 
already been determined.  It is the production of this site within which the scene of interpellation 
takes place that has been lost sight of.
55
       
To open up this materialization, an ecological materialization, it is necessary to pause for 
a moment, at that moment just prior to power being given over to the political production and 
normalization of human bodies when power remains the movement of materialization that is the 
production not simply of human bodies, but of the bodies of ritual sites, bodies of institutions, 
bodies of streets.  It is necessary, in other words, to remain within the parenthetical, where power 
is ―the process by which both ‗institution‘ and ‗body‘ come into separate existence in and 
through this prior and conditioning divergence‖ (―BPR,‖ 186).  For Butler it is at this moment, 
that power is the prior condition in its divergence from itself, for the existence of both 
institutions and bodies.   
This is a pause that is also occasioned by Whitehead‘s determination of vectored power 
as prehensive feeling.  Straining within a grammar that cannot be escaped, Whitehead proposes 
that the proper determination of the subject as a ‗superject,‘ is as that to which feeling directs 
itself, without depending for its origination on an already achieved subject (PR, 222).  Struggling 
to think power as that which is determined prior to the achievement of subjectivity, Whitehead 
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argues that the simple originary feelings of an occasion are without consciousness, language, 
representation, and entry, and we might argue, into the political.  Feelings are, in other words, a 
determination of power within a metaphysical ecology of becoming out of which and within 
which the political itself will be seen to arise.  And yet, as feeling, the priority of this originary 
feeling is not itself the priority of ontological distinction.  It is rather that reproduction gives rise 
to representation, and that this is itself a unique occasion.
56
  And so here the feeling of power as 
vectored, the feeling of reproduction, precedes the political, not as its ontological outside, nor as 
its other or condition of failure, but as the movement of a materialism that is itself the condition 
for the possibility of bodies.  Within the parenthetical of a political ecology of a materialism of 
becoming, metaphysics intervenes to open to us the matters of our own becoming.  
3.  Melancholy feelings 
Materialism, as the movement of power, always presents the risk of a certain positivism: 
a positivism of pure, unlimited becoming of that which is.  To the extent that materialism must 
also now be understood as a becoming actual and so also a historicized materialism, the 
temptation becomes one of historical positivism.  With this, materialism would present a 
totalitarian foreclosure on possibility, a foreclosure that has most often operated under the name 
of progress.  On the one hand, this totalitarian foreclosure can be opened by an absence, an 
absence of being at the heart of all becoming.
57
  On the other hand, and to be clearly 
distinguished from the first, the totalitarian foreclosure on possibility can also be opened by the 
movement of the negative, the movement of negativity.  This is, as will become clear, the path 
taken by Butler and Whitehead. 
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For Butler, this movement of the negative begins with and through a reading of Hegel, 
and so begins within an inherited metaphysical discourse.  As we have seen, though, with Butler 
this metaphysical discourse is undone in and through the political.  To trace the movement of the 
negative, then, we can begin not with the metaphysical but with the political, and Butler‘s most 
directly political work, Precarious Life.
58
  Precarious Life is, among other things, Butler‘s 
attempt to think responsibly after the events that have come to be signified simply by 9/11.  
―9/11‖ is no longer a simple signifier, but is rather an entire narrative; a narrative of violation, 
violence, and retaliation.  To think responsibly after 9/11, for Butler, is to think a response to 
violation and violence that does not itself continue the movement of violence (PL, xii).  Within 
this proposal to think violence otherwise two conceptual orders arise.  On the one hand, there is 
the ordering that will bring violation, violence, and grief together as the political movement of 
the negative; on the other hand, there is a joining of political action and ethical action.  Later in 
Precarious Life, Butler notes that there is a difference between a human psyche, and a nation, 
and yet both, she asserts, can be read as a ―subject‖ (PL, 41), and both, the nation and the psychic 
subject, must begin to recognize themselves within loss.  For both the nation and the subject, 
Butler argues, the capacity to mourn is also the capacity to develop a ―keener sense of life [that is 
needed] in order to oppose violence‖ (PL, xviii-xix).  Mourning will become then the central 
determination of a responsible ethico-politics for both the state and the subject.
59
   
The experience of 9/11 is, for Butler, an experience of violation, violence, and grief.  This 
is an experience of loss.  While acknowledging the risk of grounding her thought in a ―new-
humanism,‖ Butler is willing to assert that ―despite our differences in location and history . . . it 
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is possible to appeal to a ‗we,‘ for all of us have some notion of what it is to have lost somebody‖ 
(PL, 20).  To speak of the subject is to speak of a being that is vulnerable to loss, and a ―keener 
sense‖ of life will be to experience this loss in a new way.   
Amidst this universal loss, Butler argues, the fact that loss is distributed differently 
cannot be overlooked (PL, 32).  Different bodies and different subjects are subjected to different 
moments of loss, of different moments of violation, and different moments of violence.
60
  Even 
with this, it is not simply, though, that all subjects have some notion of loss.  Loss is what 
constitutes subjects as human subjects.  Human subjects are, at a fundamental level, ruptured by 
but also grounded in loss.  The seemingly external and mundane loss that all experience – the 
loss of a friend, of a loved one, of a family – can be, and often is, a loss that quite literally places 
one besides oneself (PL, 23-24).  To be ruptured by loss in this way is to no longer know what or 
who one is.
61
  Loss at this level is not merely, then, external, but is a loss that is internal – a loss 
of a something that was not known but that is, when, gone, seen to have been a part of the self.  
Butler is looking, here, for a way of understanding a certain relationality, what she will name an 
―inevitable interdependency‖ (PL, xii)62; a relationality that is experienced retrospectively in the 
moment of loss.  And if this relationality can be understood – or rather, maintained, for the 
moment of this constitutive loss is the threshold of understanding – a new ethics may be 
possible, an ethico-politics of relationality. 
Relationality is, though, a difficult concept for Butler.  As she admits in the opening of 
Precarious Life, she cannot easily think relationality.
63
  This, though, seems to be a conceptual 
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difficulty without content, for as is made clear in Giving An Account of Oneself, Butler has 
always thought a relationality through her Foucaultian reading of psychoanalysis (GAO, 181).  
Relationality is always, in Butler, the relation of oneself to another through a normative 
encounter (GAO, 8), an encounter that is an incorporation (GAO, 53; PLP, 195).  To understand 
this relationality that relates through mourning and loss it is necessary to return to Foucault, and 
specifically, the scene of the prison.    
As Butler takes up Foucault, subjectivity is to be understood as subjectivation, which 
denotes both the becoming of the subject, and this becoming as a process of subjection (PLP, 
83).  The movement into (although we will have to question where this is a movement from) 
subjectivity is always an achievement (although we will also have to question the efficacy of this 
achievement) and so a production that takes place through and within power.  In Discipline and 
Punishment, Foucault investigates the deployment of this power in the prison, wherein the 
subject produced is the prisoner.  As we have already seen, within the space of the prison, the 
subjectivation of the prisoner takes place primarily through the formation of a body, an 
imprisoned body.  Yet this imprisonment is not only, and not even foundationally, an 
imprisonment within the physical structure of the prison.  Rather, the prisoner is imprisoned by 
his, or at least a, soul.  As Foucault argues:  the prisoner ―is already in himself the effect of a 
subjection much more profound than himself.  A ‗soul‘ inhabits him and brings him to 
existence…  The soul is the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of 
the body.‖64  Power works through the soul, so that, as Butler reads Foucault, ―the soul becomes 
a normative and normalizing ideal according to which the body is trained, shaped, cultivated, and 
invested; it is a historically specific imaginary ideal under which the body is materialized‖ (PLP, 
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90).  With this production of a normalized and coherent body, normalized under the sign of the 
soul, the prisoner has become a subject.
65
   
For Foucault, this soul is also a production of power: the soul is itself an effect of power 
that becomes externalized as the prison of the body.  For Butler, Foucault has developed an 
account of the soul as the psychic principle of subjectivation, yet this is an account that he cannot 
elaborate within the terms of his own theoretical position (PLP, 86-87).  ―One cannot,‖ she 
argues, ―account for subjectivation and becoming the principle of one‘s own subjection without 
recourse to a psychoanalytic account of the formative or generative effects of restriction or 
prohibition‖ (PLP, 87).  With this move to psychoanalysis Butler argues that the production of 
the soul, now read in the psychoanalytic terms of the psyche, is the effect of a primary 
restriction, or foreclosure.  In a passage that brings together a discussion of Foucault and the 
exteriorization of the soul, with her earlier work on performativity, Butler states that 
―[psychoanalysis] argues that what is exteriorized or performed can only be understood by 
reference to what is barred from performance, what cannot or will not be performed‖ (PLP, 144-
145).  What is at stake, then, in the formation of the psyche, is the domain of the expressible, of 
the representable, and this domain can only be understood in relation to a foreclosure that 
disallows certain performances and representations.
66
  Although the subject of this phrase will 
become difficult, if not impossible, to name, these barred performances and representations, to 
the extent that they are barred, are lost.   
 To fully recast this language of the soul into the language of the psyche, the formative 
moment of the psyche is transformed into an effect of melancholy and mourning.
67
  Although 
Freud himself never settled on the distinction between these two, melancholy and mourning, 
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Butler marks the distinction as being between a loss that cannot be known and a loss that can, in 
some sense, be known (PL, 22).  Melancholia is the effect of a loss that cannot be known to the 
extent that the object lost is lost precisely because it cannot be acknowledged, and this lack of 
acknowledgement will also be an unrepresentability.  Melancholy permits ―the loss of the object 
in the external world precisely because it provides a way to preserve the object as part of the ego 
and, hence, to avert the loss as a complete loss‖ (PLP, 134).  Yet it is not that this lost object 
enters, literally, into the ego, but rather that the ego is itself produced by this loss.  This loss, in 
other words, can only be accepted by a preservation whereby that lost object is preserved in and 
as the ego.  As Butler argues this point, ―Giving up the object becomes possible only on the 
condition of a melancholic internalization or, what might for our purposes turn out to be even 
more important, a melancholic incorporation‖ (PLP, 134).  Although this loss is accepted by a 
melancholic interpretation, it is also, paradoxically refused.  The lost object is lost by not being 
lost.    
 Here we are at the limits of representation, and the ability to narrate this process.
68
  
Narration is only possible for an ego, for a psyche, that has already become, that has already 
arrived at the end of its own history of lost becoming.  To be able to represent this loss is to have 
already lost, and so to have already given up the possibility of acknowledging this object.  The 
point then is not to ask if there is an experience prior to representation, but rather to investigate 
this effect of representation which is also an effect of a foreclosure that delimits in advance what 
is representable.  To focus on foreclosure, is to focus on what is deemed livable, and this is the 
beginnings of ethical thought.     
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 Within a Lacanian reading of psychoanalysis, this foreclosure operates under the 
symbolic.  Foreclosure already and in advance is a bar on what can be represented under the 
Law.  To be representable is to be able to enter into the symbolic.  Yet for Lacan, there is also 
always a remainder that is produced by this foreclosure.  As Butler reads this remainder, ―The 
imaginary signifies the impossibility of the [symbolic] constitution of identity.  Identity [and here 
we might, with much hesitation, speak of subjectivation] can never be fully totalized by the 
symbolic, for what it fails to order will emerge within the imaginary as a disorder, a site where 
identity is contested‖ (PLP, 97).  It is here, in the domain of the imaginary, that resistance to the 
symbolic is registered.  Although this may seem hopeful, Butler is right to argue that this actually 
dooms resistance to failure.  As we have seen, once resistance is removed from the domain of the 
symbolic into the imaginary, it can never get back to effect the symbolic.  The symbolic, the 
Law, will always and everywhere remain intact, and so foreclosure will also always and 
everywhere already be determined by the Law without contest.  
 This movement through psycho-analysis has been made by Butler to explain the 
production of the soul in Foucault, to explain the peculiarity of an attachment to subjectivation.  
This attachment to subjectivation is an attachment to representation, which is also an attachment 
to social existence.  To the extent that the subject is an effect of the soul, which is an effect of 
foreclosure, which is in the name of the Law and the symbolic, subjectivation is the necessary 
site of social existence as representable.  For Butler, it is impossible, though, to remain within the 
Lacanian determination of subject formation.  Within the Lacanian narrative, Butler argues, 
resistance is always doomed to failure.  Here, a return to Foucault is necessary.  For Foucault 
recasts resistance ―as an effect of the very power that it is said to oppose‖ (PLP, 98).  On the one 
hand, this possibility of resistance to the symbolic is opened up by the realization that the 
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symbolic itself is not an a priori Law, but is rather itself constituted by power.  Although this 
move, of figuring no outside to power, can seem to limit and halt all efficacy of resistance, the 
effect is just the opposite.  For if the symbolic is itself an effect of power, resistance to this 
power is then also a resistance which will register its effects on the symbolic.  If we are always 
already implicated in power in our very standing as subjects, then we also are already in a 
position to contest power.   
 This, finally, means that melancholia, although at the limits of representation, is not an a 
priori, uncontestable foreclosure.  Rather, this foreclosure can itself be contested.  Although the 
livable will always already be made possible by foreclosure, and will always also be a 
melancholic life, this melancholia, as already mentioned is never complete.  Subjectivation, and 
therefore also foreclosure, must always be repeated, and it is in this repetition that resistance can 
be registered as a negotiation of what is a livable life.   
 It is this negotiation of the livable at the limits of representation that Butler comes to 
mark as the responsibility of ethics and the practice of politics.  This responsibility is the 
responsibility to mourn, or rather, the demand to be allowed to mourn that which has been 
foreclosed, and so to acknowledge the melancholy of the self.  On the one hand, this mourning 
will be a willingness to acknowledge the loss that founds the life of any subject.  But to 
acknowledge this loss will be to resist the melancholic foreclosure that has as its effect the being 
of the subject.  It will be to acknowledge what cannot be acknowledged about becoming, which 
is also to contest the very limits of becoming.  On the other hand, though, this mourning, to be 
ethical and political, must also be to mourn those Others who have already been foreclosed from 
the living.  For it is not merely one‘s own subjectivation that is at issue here.  To make an ethical 
and political turn is to turn to the Other as one who has already also been constituted by loss, and 
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who is always already a site of loss (PL, 30).  To mourn in this sense is, as Butler ends 
Precarious Life, ―to interrogate the emergence and vanishing of the human at the limits of what 
we can know, what we can hear, what we can see, what we can sense‖ (―PL,‖ 151).                      
In attempting to think through this formative foreclosure, Butler has already begun within 
the domain of the human.  Quite specifically, within her discussions of melancholy and 
mourning, and the circulation of power as the circulations of desire, she is already thinking 
within the domain of the ego, or at least the ego in its becoming stabilization.  She is, in other 
words, concerned with human loves and losses and the circulation of the desires of and for the 
ego.  In this, her analysis of the circulation of power through psychoanalysis already accepts the 
fundamental gesture of Freudian psycho-analysis: the separation of the self from its oceanic 
possibility of arising.
69
  In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud famously begins to think the 
development of the ego by positing an originary ―oceanic feeling.‖70  Freud admits that he has 
not himself had this feeling, but it has been described to him by his friend.  By way of this 
second hand reporting, Freud describes this oceanic feeling as ―a peculiar feeling ….  a sensation 
of ‗eternity,‘ a feeling as of something limitless, unbounded – as it were, ‗oceanic.‘‖71  Although 
Freud claims to not want to dismiss this feeling, he also cannot quite accept it, for it is not ―easy 
to deal scientifically with feelings.‖72  If it cannot be simply dismissed or scientifically handled, 
it can, he assures us, be explained by being explained away.  It is explained by recourse to the 
movement of foreclosure and loss, the foreclosure and loss that are necessary for the ego – the 
mature ego – to develop.73  To feel this oceanic feeling is only possible, Freud argues, when the 
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psyche has failed to properly separate itself from the world.  Prior to the ideation of the self, prior 
to any separation from a loved one, a separation that may be foreclosed or renounced, the psyche 
is first established by separating itself out from its own world of becoming.  It is only with this 
originary separation that we can begin to speak of the movement of the ego at all, and so the 
foreclosure on this feeling becomes the unacknowledged and unable to be acknowledged 
condition of the becoming ego.   
In beginning with the foreclosure of human desire as a feeling of and in the world, and so 
the foreclosure of human relationality as arising out of and beyond itself in its total ecological 
world, Butler herself forecloses from critique the practices of separation from the ecological 
world of this oceanic feeling through which not only critique but the subject of critique arise.  
This is, as we have seen, the unacknowledged foreclosure that troubles her analysis of 
materialization as the movement of power.  For Butler‘s thought begins with an exclusionary 
separation from the world in order to investigate the foreclosures by which the subject is 
established, foreclosing on the possibility of feeling a love as a feeling of the world in and as the 
eros of its own becoming.  In already accepting this constitutive foreclosure from which the self 
arises, she is unable to critically explore the ecological foreclosure of the subjects becoming as a 
human subject.
74
  It is not then, strictly speaking, the focus on the human subject – on the 
narrowly defined political focus – that troubles Butler‘s work.  As Whitehead himself 
recognizes, all thought, including critique, begins with a subjective bias that we cannot escape.  
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It is rather that her work begins with an ecological rupture that, as condition of her critique, 
cannot itself be recovered or reflected on.     
Is it possible to begin to think subjectivity without this initial foreclosure?  Or to think 
subjectivity within this foreclosure and not with-out it, on the outside, the other side of it?  
Thinking the subject without an initial foreclosure on the possibility of feeling within a broader 
sociality, one which pushes beyond the merely human to the ecological, to develop a politics that 
must itself become within the demands of an eco-logic of necessity?
75
  As we have already seen 
in relation to his determination of power as a becoming materialism, in his insistence that 
actuality immerses itself, arises out of, ultimately to return to these oceanic depths, Whitehead 
proposes just such a political ecology of feeling.
76
  Yet we must be careful here, for to feel the 
world is not necessarily nor simply a positivity of total becoming.
77
  Whitehead does not propose 
an absorption into nor a purification in the seas of becoming.  Whitehead‘s is not a New Age 
utopia.  Within the Whiteheadian ecology of feeling the exclusion of feeling as the feeling of 
exclusion enacted as the decision of becoming, which is itself an incision of actuality by 
possibility, will always be the necessary constitutive feeling of the exclusion of what was and 
might have been but was not.  As Whitehead argues, ―the completion of ‗givenness‘ in actual 
fact converts the ‗not-given‘ for that fact into ‗impossibility‘ for that fact.  The individuality of 
an actual entity involves exclusive limitation‖ (PR, 45).   If to become is to feel the world here, 
now, in this particular way, this feeling is always haunted by the feeling of what was not felt; of 
what cannot, at this moment, as this occasion, be felt; what is, for this occasion, impossible.  It is 
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only through the determination of the impossible that the possible itself can become actual.  This 
is, of course, a dangerous condition.  On the one hand, of course, this haunting can itself become 
the opportunity of possibility for a future occasion, the opening for the impossible to become 
actual precisely within a politics of possibility.  But on the other hand, as we have seen, this 
impossibility of feeling can become the occasion for a dogmatism of necessity, where 
impossibility for a particular occasion is transformed into the simply impossible, and the decision 
of one moment of becoming is enforced for all possible becoming.  The task becomes, then, to 
articulate the conditions for becoming within a world, a becoming that proceeds by both the 
positivity of feeling a relationality to this very world as the condition of arising, and the 
negativity through which every decision to become must pass.  To articulate the necessity of 
becoming within this feeling of that which has been absented, foreclosed, as that which will 
always also remain as the possible within a world of becoming as a constructivist project. 
Whitehead begins this articulation of a world of becoming through an ontological 
leveling, proposing that ―‘actual entities‘ – also termed ‗actual occasions‘ – are the final real 
things of which the world is made up.  There is no going behind actual entities to anything more 
real….  The final facts are, all alike, actual entities; and these actual entities are drops of 
experience, complex and interdependent‖ (PR, 18).  Within the metaphysical abstraction of 
Process and Reality, Whitehead speculates a univocal ontology of occasions of experience, 
occasions of feeling, as the final real things of the world.  If this is an ontological leveling, it is 
not, for that, an ontological simplification, as the complexification of Whitehead‘s categoreal 
scheme gives witness with its four kinds of categories, each further differentiated by three 
notions of ultimacy, eight categories of existence, twenty-seven categories of explanation, and 
nine categoreal obligations.  It is, in other words, many other words, an ontological univocity 
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that is open to its own continual becoming.  As a categoreal scheme of possibility and discovery 
it is also an ontology as much responsible to ethics as to epistemology.
78
 
Responsibility arises within Whitehead‘s ontology to the extent that it is an ontology of 
achievement, a constructivism of being as that which is achieved out of the past, as the present, 
for the future.
79
  This constructivism is itself a constructivism of every layer of ontological 
actuality that is or can be experience.  Within the ecological demands of necessity, both the 
subject, as the political subject, and the subject-superject, as fundamental actuality, are 
achievements of being.  For actual occasions, this is, as Whitehead designates it, the Principle of 
Process:  ―That how an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is…  Its ‗being‘ 
is constituted by its ‗becoming‘‖ (PR, 23).  This is, as we will see in a moment, an anti-
ontological achievement of actuality as the fundamental nature of actual occasions, privileging 
becoming as the fundamental nature of being.  It is also, though, when the move is made to 
explore not simply these fundamental actualities, but the objects of our world – bodies and 
tables, trees and squirrels – to determine the achievement of the human subject as that which 
becomes as the structured endurance of occasions as an eventual achievement of becoming (PR, 
90ff).  The human body is not the materiality of an already achieved singularity, but the event of 
an order that is achieved as a machine for the intensification of experience (PR, 119),
80
 just as 
the human subject is not the essence of an already given nature, but the achievement of the 
structured ordering of occasions as that which is both this achieved body and the enduring order 
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of personality.
81
  There is, then, nothing which is formally or ideally unique to the human being: 
as with all other spatially and temporally enduring events, the subject is the extended 
achievement of a particular social becoming, always necessarily achieving its becoming within 
an ecological world of experience.  This is, for Whitehead, in a way that Butler will certainly 
acknowledge, to demand a recognition of the porous vulnerability of the human body and the 
human subject.
82
  If the human subject arises within and from an ecological relationality, this 
arising is always both contingent and tenuous.   
Prior to this achievement of the human subject, although as we will see, this temporality 
is itself difficult to maintain, is the actual occasion, the occasional subject-superject of becoming.  
For Whitehead, this occasion of actuality is an occasion of feeling, a feeling of feelings.  The 
subject is, Whitehead argues, ―the entity constituted by the process of feeling… the unity 
emergent from its own feeling‖ (PR, 88).  The occasion of actuality is an occasion of feeling, a 
convergence of feelings as felt in the unity of a becoming subject-superject. Within this process 
of feeling, the subject-superject is not simply the subject which feels, but is rather constituted as 
the feelings being felt.  In a strict sense, the occasion is the feelings of a world (PR, 221).
83
  
Again within the limitive language of a given grammar, Whitehead is attempting to 
articulate here the becoming of an occasion as that which arises out of a world as the production 
of the world of its arising.
84
  On the one hand, the occasion is the demarcation of a singular 
intensive feeling of the world.  This demarcation occurs through what Whitehead designates as 
‗concrescence,‘ the ―process in which the universe of many things acquires an individual unity in 
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a determinate relegation of each item of the ‗many‘ to its subordination in the constitution of the 
novel ‗one‘‖ (PR, 211).   The acquiring of individuality is achieved, Whitehead speculates, as the 
intensive unification of the felt world as a particular moment and a particular place, or rather, a 
particularization of time and space.   
This occurs, Whitehead continues to speculate, as the becoming of three stages of feeling: 
first, there is what is designated as a conformal stage of physical feeling, in which the becoming 
occasion feels the world conformally, reproducing as repetition that which has been given to the 
occasion (PR, 245).
85
  This is, as we have seen, the stage of physical feelings, whereby the actual 
world as that from which the novel occasion arises becomes the constitutive internal condition of 
the new occasion.
86
  Second, there arises a stage of conceptual feeling, through which an 
evaluative subjectivity feels with the particularity of its own aim and desire.
87
  Finally, there is a 
stage of comparative feeling, in which the feelings which are becoming as the novel occasion are 
felt in their contrasted and complimentary multiplicity to achieve a single intensive feeling of 
satisfaction (PR, 266).  This is to arrive, again, at the determination of the concrescing occasion 
as ―the subject-superject [that] is the purpose originating the feelings.  The feelings are 
inseparable from the end at which they aim; and this end is the feeler.  The feelings aim at the 
feeler, as their final cause.  The feelings are what they are in order that their subject may be what 
it is‖ (PR, 222).  The becoming one that is the actual occasion is the becoming of the teleological 
aim at the occasion becoming itself.  
If this is the analytic of occasions that Whitehead presents, it is also, Whitehead 
acknowledges, simply an analytic, one which is already too straight, too linear, too given over to 
a subject-predicate grammar of substance.  First, Whitehead recognizes, the given world is never 
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simply given.  Rather, it‘s very givenness is a process, a constructive achievement of perspective.  
On the one hand, as we already seen, the intensity at which an occasion is aimed is always 
beyond itself.  All occasions, and now we are concerned with past occasions, are productions of 
an ecstatic intensity, which are hurtled forward into a becoming world.
88
  This then means that 
the novel occasion is the recipient of these occasions‘ ecstasis.  In Adventures of Ideas 
Whitehead goes so far as to define an object precisely as the which is given, but only and 
precisely as that which is given to be experienced.  ‗Object‘ defines not, then, a class of being, to 
be opposed to ‗subject,‘ but rather designates the temporality and positionality of antecedence in 
a relation (AI, 178).  The relation that is this occasion of experience is itself an active relation, 
one whose basic fact is ―the rise of an affective tone originating from things whose relevance is 
given‖ (AI, 176).89  In the relation by which an entity becomes an object of experience, the object 
is neither passive nor a simple object of knowledge.  It is, rather, an object of concern, an object 
felt as that which must matter in the relation of the becoming occasion.  In this relation the 
becoming occasion is provoked into this concern, into this feeling, so that the ecstatic being of 
the past occasion, now as object to the subject of experience, is a provocation into concern.   
On the other hand, and at the same time, the novel occasion of becoming takes up this 
ecstatic world precisely and only as its own world.  If the actual world out of which the occasion 
arises is itself the collection of entities that are antecedent to the novel occasion, provoking into 
the novel occasion an affective tone, the novel occasion is not, for that, thoroughly determined 
by the past.  The actual past is, in other words, determined for the occasion by the occasion.  
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―Each actual occasion,‖ Whitehead argues, ―defines its own actual world from which it 
originates.  No two occasions can have identical actual worlds‖ (PR, 210).  The ecstatic past, 
hurtling to the new occasion, is, in a rather strict sense, over-whelming, threatening to 
overwhelm the occasion with concern.
90
  Not all provocations can be felt, some must be resisted 
by and as the finitude of the occasion.
91
  One of the ways in which Whitehead attempts to 
understand this relation between what is given and what is determined as given is through the 
decision by which the multiplicity of the initial data of an occasion becomes the objective data of 
that occasion (PR, 221).  This transformation of initial data into objective data is made possible, 
Whitehead argues, by elimination, ―effected by the subjective form‖ of the occasion (PR, 221).             
In order to articulate this ‗elimination‘ Whitehead distinguishes between feelings, as positive 
prehensions of the world, and negative prehensions, which are not feelings, even if they are felt 
(PR, 41).  A negative prehension is, Whitehead argues, ―the definite exclusion of [an] item from 
positive contribution to the subject‘s own real internal constitution.‖  Yet, he continues, a 
negative prehension still ―expresses a bond‖ (PR, 41).  A negative prehension is, then, a feeling 
of absence more than it is the absence of feeling.  And this feeling of absence is itself doubled as 
a feeling without content, a subjective form without data, and as a feeling of that which has been 
eliminated.
92
          
To feel the world out of which and as the moment of the occasion of feeling is not simply 
to be as provoked by and into being by the past.  It is to be provoked through and as the 
eliminative decision of negativity, a decision that will always haunt the occasion as the feeling of 
what has been absented.  The givenness of the world as the condition of the occasion only arises 
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through decision, and decision as exclusion (PR, 43).
93
  This exclusion is, though, never 
complete or final.  The satisfaction which marks the completed unity of the occasion is and never 
achieves a simplicity of being.  The multiplicity from which the occasion arises remains as the 
felt intensive unity of the occasion, an intensive unity that contains within itself, as Walt 
Whitman will famously remark, multitudes.  The decision to become is the decision to feel this 
multiplicity as the occasion of its own becoming.  In this sense decision is, for Whitehead, the 
very determination of actuality (PR, 43).  To be is to become as the decision which cuts a space 
and time for oneself in the world, a world of ecstatic provocation.  
Yet to speak of decision in this way is not to reinstall a subject as the essence or 
underlying substance preceding feeling.  Just as there is for Butler no doer behind the deed, there 
is, for Whitehead, no feeler behind the feeling.  Rather, ―the word ‗subject‘ means the entity 
constituted by the process of feeling, and including this process.  The feeler is the unity emergent 
from its own feelings…‖  (PR, 88).  The subject, the occasion as the feeler of the world, does not 
precede the feelings of its becoming.
94
  Rather, the occasion becomes all-at-once or not-at-all as 
the durational intensity of an occasion.
95
  The occasion is, in this sense, the collapsed moment of 
performativity where the subject becomes in and as the decisional atomicity of an intensive 
occasion of feeling.  An intensity that contains within itself the entire ecological world of its 
becoming, felt as that which has provoked it into its own becoming, a becoming that is its own 
decision to be a multitude that it can never fully contain.     
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4.  Death and satisfaction; or the order of law 
If power becomes a materialization, a materialization of becoming, and this becoming is 
always a becoming within a relationality, we are already within the realm of attempting to 
determine the becoming of possibility itself as a materialization.  If power is the movement of 
materialism, possibility is its own production.  We have already seen that for both Butler and 
Whitehead one realm of possibility opens within the limits and failures of language and 
grammar.  Yet this opening within language and grammar is not simply an epistemic opening, 
concerned with that which can be known through representation.  For Butler, as we have seen, 
the opening at the limit of grammar is itself an opening into and onto that which is allowed to 
appear.  For Whitehead, too, there is a reciprocal relation between a constructivist practice of 
philosophy and a constructivist ontology of actuality in which all becoming is the becoming of 
possibility.  For both Butler and Whitehead, though, the limits and failures of language and 
grammar are not the only openings to the possible.  For both possibility arises within the limit of 
death, both the death of the subject and the death of God.      
It is possible to begin exploring the relation between death and possibility by turning to 
the series of lectures given by Butler published as Antigone’s Claim.  In these lectures, Butler 
attempts, as she states it, to rethink Antigone, and the legacy of Antigone, as ―a figure for politics 
[that] points somewhere else, not to politics as a question of representation but to that political 
possibility that emerges when the limits to representation and representability are exposed.‖96  
Although her primary interest in this reading of Antigone is to question the ways in which the 
norms of kinship, and particularly the incest taboo, function in the stabilizing of a certain 
politics, from her reading of Antigone we can see that three grounds of possibility are being 
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proposed: the first, possibilities following from the failure of law in normalizing its demands; the 
second, possibilities that arise where two or more discourses intersect in their productions of 
recognition; third, possibilities that arise from the intersection of two times: the universalized 
time of the law, and the particular times of its instantiation.   
For many interpreters, and for Butler this means specifically Hegel and Lacan, 
Antigone‘s death, a death that is mandated by her disobedience of the edict of Creon, marks the 
transition to and establishment of a certain social being: Being determined by the political, as 
that which supersedes kinship.  Here, Antigone, as representative of kinship, is bound to kinship, 
bound to the order of kinship, and it is this binding that compels her to bury her brother – 
Polyneices, and not any other ―brothers‖ she may have – in defiance of the order of Creon, the 
representation of the state, and so the order of the state.  Much too simply, the failure of her 
resistance is the failure of kinship before the law of the state, and so her death is also the death of 
kinship.   
 Yet, as Butler notes, Antigone‘s life and death cannot be so clearly demarcated.  Her life, 
especially in the final moments of defiance, is less than a clear representation of the norms she is 
supposed to represent; she is, in her defiance, barely a proper representation of the subject of 
kinship.  It is less than clear that Antigone is properly following the norms of kinship in burying 
her one brother at the seeming expense of her other kin relations; what of her duties to her sister, 
to her as yet not born children, to Creon, who is still her kin?  Do these others, Butler wants to 
ask, not also impinge on the kin duties of Antigone?  Which is to ask: from a position within 
kinship, can Antigone‘s insistence on burying her one brother appear as anything less than a 
certain promiscuity, a certain unjustifiable attachment to Polyneices?  And what are we to make 
of Antigone‘s position within kinship as the daughter of incest, as a daughter to one‘s brother, a 
218 
 
brother to one‘s uncle?  And what of those often repeated, apparently kin-determined, 
announcements of her own manliness, as the caretaker of her father?  ―Though entangled in the 
terms of kinship,‖ Butler argues,  
[Antigone] is at the same time outside those norms.  Her crime [and we need to add ‗her death‘] is 
confounded by the fact that the kinship line from which she descends, and which she transmits, is 
derived from a paternal position that is already confounded by the manifestly incestuous act that 
is the condition of her own existence, which makes her brother her father, which begins a 
narrative in which she occupies, linguistically, every kin position except ‗mother‘ and occupies 
them at the expense of the coherence of kinship… (AC, 72).   
If Antigone is to represent kinship, and to be the representative subject of and within kinship, it 
is difficult to see how she represents or enacts any stable kinship.
97
   
 It is this stability that is of the greatest importance as the foundation of representation.  
Without the time to risk rehearsing Butler‘s argument, developed in Gender Trouble and Bodies 
That Matter specifically, representation, as the mark of a certain metaphysic, demands that one 
be intelligible within a particular system according to norms established by that system.  These 
systems, Butler argues, are always historically and socially constituted, so that they enact as their 
historical instantiation the demand that one be according to that which can be represented.  
Representation, for Butler, is not so much a matter of re-presenting that which is given, but is 
rather the determination of things, subjects, as representable, according to the historical and 
social norms of that system.  Only that which can be represented can be, in a quite strict sense.  
To the extent that Being is, or beings are, posited as the foundation of representation, the act of 
determining objects as representable is subsumed into an ontology that occludes its own 
productivity, the naturalization, Butler would say, of historical norms.  This act of representation 
                                                 
97
 Although Kristen Campbell is correct in noting the ways in which Antigone undoes any stable conception of 
kinship, she misreads Butler in proposing an opposition between a political Antigone who undoes kinship and a 
passive Antigone who is undone by kinship.  Kristen Campbell, ―The Politics of Kinship,‖ Economy and Society 31, 
no.4 (Nov. 2002): 649.     
219 
 
further demands a certain stability for its operation: only that which can be stably represented 
can be represented at all.  Being then becomes measured as a universal fixity.  For Antigone to 
be, then, means that she is representable within a system that has already determined the terms of 
being as representability; to be, she must occupy one of the normalized and representable 
positions within kinship: daughter, sister, mother.  The  inability to occupy any one of these 
positions properly renders Antigone unrepresentable, and so also something less than a being.  It 
is in this way, for Butler, that Antigone ―draws into crisis … the representative function itself, 
the very horizon of intelligibility in which she operates and according to which she remains 
somewhat unthinkable‖ (AC, 22).  Unthinkable precisely within the terms of kinship.  Yet it is 
precisely these terms that must remain stable, and within which Antigone must stably remain, for 
her to be representable, or rather, for her to be.  Butler‘s critique, then, is something less than a 
theory of the subject, for it is rather, a critique of representation that does not fully undo 
representation itself.         
 Antigone‘s instability, though, is not only a matter of her familial relations, or 
deformations.  ―Antigone is introduced to us,‖ Butler reminds us, ―by the act by which she defies 
Creon‘s sovereignty, contesting the power of his edict….  [S]he answers a question that is posed 
to her from another authority, and thus she concedes the authority that this other has over her….  
She asserts herself through appropriating the voice of the other, the one to whom she is opposed‖ 
(AC, 8, 11).  Creon‘s edict is announced to those who are his political subjects, to those who are 
political subjects.  The edict assumes the already political status of those who it is announced to.  
Yet matters are not so simple.  First, of course, the edict must be announced, a task that is only 
forcefully assigned.  Secondly, it appears that not all of Creon‘s political subjects properly hear 
his word; in the opening moments of Antigone, Ismene seems to have not heard the edict.  Is this 
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a first possibility that a certain kinship remains outside the political?  Would it then be possible 
for Antigone to claim a certain ignorance, a certain unintelligibility of the edict, where we may 
not be sure where this unintelligibility resides?  Maybe, but this is not what happens.  Rather, 
Antigone answers this call of the edict, turns toward the call, in a moment of strict Althusserian 
interpolation.  In turning to the edict, in accepting its call as applicable to her, Antigone accepts 
the position of being subject to the edict, a subject of the edict, a political subject.
98
  Her 
subsequent denial of the authority of the edict rests on the already accepted authority of the edict.  
To the extent that she will come to contest the edict, burying her brother in the name of another 
law (a law which as we have already seen it is difficult for Antigone to claim) this contestation 
already takes place within the terms of the political.  ―What this suggests,‖ for Butler, ―is that 
[Antigone] cannot make her claim outside the language of the state‖ (AC, 28).  To too quickly 
bring this back into the previous discussion of representation, for Antigone to represent kinship 
she must also represent the state.  In order for her to intelligibly act within kinship, she must also 
intelligibly act within the political.  In order for her to be within kinship she must also be within 
the state.
99
  Yet the edict that Creon announces precludes this possibility: Antigone must be one 
or the other; she cannot be both kin and patriot.  As Butler argues, ―she is precisely the one with 
no place who nevertheless seeks to claim one…‖ (AC, 78).    She finds herself positioned at the 
intersection of two incompatible discourses, discourses that require not only their mutual 
incompatibility, but also their mutual stability, and so a certain compatibility.  The political 
demands the stability of kinship as that which can be overcome by the political.  Kinship then 
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becomes reified as that which is overcome, and in this overcoming cannot be challenged.  This is 
the Lacanian development of the symbolic.     
 To step back for a moment, then, we can see that for Butler, these first two moments of 
possibility arise from certain instabilities: first, an instability that arises within specific 
discourses, and, second, an instability that arises from the intersection of discourses.  As to the 
former, Antigone comes to epitomize the inability of any normativity to nominalize itself such 
that it can properly represent with the universality that is required for representation.  Even in her 
criminality, Butler argues, Antigone demonstrates the singularity of the law in and through its 
applications.  As Butler argues, the  
law appears to have but one instance of application.  Her brother is, in her view, not reproducible, 
but this means that the conditions under which the law [of kinship] becomes applicable are not 
reproducible.  This is a law of the instant and, hence, a law with no generality and no 
transposibility, one mired in the very circumstances to which it is applied, a law formulated 
precisely through the singular instance of its application and, therefore, no law at all in any 
ordinary, generalizable sense (AC, 10).   
To the extent that any law must particularize itself in its application, it must also, to the same 
extent and in the same moment, fail precisely as universalizable law.
100
  It is in this failure of the 
law that a certain possibility arises: the possibility of a performative misapplication of the law.    
 As to the latter, possibility seems to arise for Butler at the intersection of various 
discourses, various laws.  Life is lived amidst a number of often competing laws, competing 
discoursive systems, with various demands and norms being enacted.  It is in this confrontation 
that possibility for new experiences arises.  The demands of one law may be abandoned, partially 
or fully, in the name of another law, so that one can become what one was not.  Yet here, as 
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Antigone shows for Butler, this movement is never pure.  Antigone finds herself within two 
intersecting discourses, and she does not move exclusively between the two.  She does not move 
from a position of pure kin to pure political subject as she moves between two laws, two 
discourses.  Rather, her being always appears as a deformity.  With this, Antigone‘s ―situation 
can be understood, but only with a certain amount of horror‖ (AC, 57).  Antigone, in other words, 
misrepresents both kinship and the political, and so appears as the misrepresented, the deformed.  
Antigone does not appear within an empty space between discourses that can be willfully or 
intentionally traversed by a subject, but rather as the production of monstrous subjectivities at the 
collision of discourses.  She appears, as do all subjects, as and at the site of two or more 
conflictual demands that become reconciled, though possibly unrecognizably, in a moment of 
appearance, beautiful becoming or monstrously deformed.    
  As can be seen from this, the openings of possibility are founded on the disjunct and 
subsequent collision between quasi-ontological discourses of becoming.  Not just discourses, 
these domains are registered for Butler as two times: the universal times of law – where here, 
again, law is shorthand for those various forms of normativity -, and the mundane times of the 
law‘s application.  As we have already seen, for Butler, the law as such, and this is one of the 
broadest generalization Butler allows, can only exist as a certain abstraction, precisely to the 
extent that it must be applicable to all who fall within its range.  This is true of Butler‘s work not 
only for the instance of Creon‘s law in Antigone, but of law in general, of norms, of social 
structures.  These are registered not only as spatially abstracted – the law must be applicable in 
any place, they are also temporally abstracted – the law must be applicable at any time.  And yet 
as we have seen Butler argue, laws only function to the extent that they are applied in particular 
instances, at particular moments, in certain mundane times.  The time of the law is not the time 
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of life; and although the law will come to structure time, this structuring is never complete nor 
total.  There will also be a remainder of life that cannot be accounted for.  It is in this space of the 
remainder that possibility resides.  
        Antigone, of course, is not a figure of possibility without difficulty:  her life ends in 
death, a fairly difficult death at that.  She is fated, it would seem, to a certain punishment, 
banished to a prison that is her tomb, wherein she takes her own life.
101
  Possibility, as that which 
resides at the limit of representation, comes with a certain risk: the risk of death.  Although 
Antigone comes to occupy new subject positions, these positions are ultimately, and less, 
unlivable.  Of course Antigone‘s life ends, and to say anything beyond this may be overdramatic; 
even if we consider the moment of this death, it is still a death that is transferable, at least in a 
general way.  Yet Butler wants to insist that we look more closely at Antigone‘s death and see 
that it is, in some ways, quite exceptional.  Where, for example, do we mark her death: at her 
suicide?  At her burial, which of course takes place before her death?  At the moment she buries 
her brother, which will lead to her death?  In her being cursed by Oedipus?  Or in her being born, 
and placed under the curse of Oedipus?  It is, as Butler argues, that Antigone‘s ―fate is not to 
have a life to live, to be condemned to death prior to any possibility of life.  This raises the 
question of how it is that kinship secures the conditions of intelligibility by which life becomes 
livable, by which life also becomes condemned and foreclosed.  Antigone‘s death is always 
doubled throughout the play:  she claims that she has not lived, that she has not loved, and that 
she has not borne children, and so that she has been under the curse that Oedipus laid upon his 
children, ‗serving death‘ for the length of her life.  Thus death signifies the unlived life, and so as 
she approaches the living tomb that Creon has arranged for her, she meets a fate that has been 
hers all along‖ (AC, 23).  This doubling of death designates a prior death, prior to a final death, a 
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death that is experienced in life, and so is a living death.  It is the death experienced by an 
unrepresentable life, by a life that is unintelligible.  To the extent that to be is to be representable, 
any life that moves at the edges of representation will be something less than being.  Every 
possibility risks a living death, a suffering of non-being in life that is fore-ordained by the 
conditions which provide that very possibility.                                            
 This is, as Whitehead recognizes, the necessity of all actuality that is not captured within 
the stasis of being.
102
  ―[The] doctrine of organism,‖ he argues, ―is the attempt to describe the 
world as a process of generation of individual actual entities, each with its own absolute self-
attainment.  This concrete finality of the individual is nothing else than a decision referent 
beyond itself.  The ‗perpetual perishing‘ of individual absoluteness is thus foredoomed‖ (PR, 
60). A certain death is not simply a risk, but is the metaphysical necessity of any reiterative 
becoming; whether that be the iteration of performativity, or the iteration of concrescence. 
As we have seen, within his own metaphysical abstraction, Whitehead conceptualizes this 
death within and through the aid of the innocuous term ―satisfaction‖:  ―The process of 
concrescence,‖ Whitehead argues, ―terminates with the attainment of a fully determinate 
‗satisfaction‘; and the creativity thereby passes over into the ‗given‘ primary phase for the 
concrescence of other actual entities.  This transcendence is thereby established when there is 
attainment of determinate ‗satisfaction‘ completing the antecedent entity.  Completion is the 
perishing of immediacy: ‗It never really is‘‖ (PR, 85).  ‗Satisfaction‘ is that which marks the 
completion of an actual occasion, its final attainment.  Yet if ‗satisfaction‘ is a finality, a 
completion, it is a closure that is never experienced by the experiencing subject, for this, as 
Whitehead argues, ―would [then] be a component in the process, and would thereby alter the 
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satisfaction‖ (PR, 85).  With this final ontological unfinalizability, ‗satisfaction‘ becomes a 
marker, but a rather fluid, unstable, marker.
103
   
 Given that, and as that which is to be given, satisfaction, as completion, is measured, by 
Whitehead, as intensity.  In chapter three of the second part of Process and Reality, Whitehead 
posits four grounds of ‗order,‘ the second of which is that the ‗end,‘ as a final attainment of an 
actual occasion, is ―concerned with the gradations of intensity in the satisfactions of actual 
entities‖ (PR, 83).  To state it too quickly, ‗satisfaction‘ is the attainment of a coordinated 
unity,
104
 whereby the given, with its elements of order and disorder, is felt as a new ordered 
feeling of contrasting feelings:  ―The heightening of intensity arises from order such that the 
multiplicity of components … can enter explicit feeling as contrasts, and are not dismissed into 
negative prehensions as incompatibilities‖ (PR, 83).  Satisfaction is the final phase and 
completion of concrescence, that process whereby the given world is productive of a succession 
of feelings, which are inclusively ordered as contrasts, or exclusively ordered as 
incompatibilities.  This order, the order of satisfaction as the order of feeling, is measured by its 
production of intensity.  ‗Satisfaction‘ marks the completion of this process, which is the 
production of a final feeler, the subject completed, in Whitehead‘s language as a subject-
superject.  With this, the subject loses its immediacy of feeling, is completed, suffers a certain 
perishing, and is objectified, becoming a part of the given world for a new arising.  With this, 
‗satisfaction‘ is, although the conjunction of completion and death, for the scientifically minded 
metaphysician, something less than a mournful living death.      
One of the immediate consequences of Whitehead‘s insistence on the ontological 
principle, and his resistance to the reification of norms, is that his concern lies in ‗givenness,‘ 
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and not representation.  So chapter three begins with the announcement that ―For the organic 
doctrine the problem of order assumes primary importance.  No actual entity can rise beyond 
what the actual world as a datum from its standpoint –its actual world – allows it to be.  Each 
such datum arises from a primary phase of the concrescence of objectifications which are in 
some respects settled: the basis of its experience is ‗given‘‖ (PR, 83).  If the problem of order is 
of primary importance for Whitehead, it is so only as the order, or ordering, of what is given.  As 
such, it is the order of the actual world as it is given to experience, experience out of which a 
new actuality will arise.
105
  It is the order of the world for an actual occasion.
106
   
Whitehead quickly argues that order, although of primary concern, is not totalizing, or 
totalized.  ―The correlative of order is disorder‖ he argues, and ―[a]part from it, ‗order‘ must be a 
synonym for ‗givenness‘…‖ (PR, 83).   This correlation, as difference, determines the meaning 
of order, but also, precisely as a correlation determines both order and disorder as given.
107
  
Disorder is less a remainder to be accounted for than an ontologically given dimension of that 
which is given.  Or rather, disorder is not that which will arise as the unaccounted for in the 
coming to be of an actual occasion, but is rather constitutive of the actual occasion in its coming 
to be.
108
  The instability that a possibly chaotic disorder engenders will always be a constitutive 
element of an actual occasion.    
Although order is, in one sense, a ―generic term‖ (PR, 83), a condition of all becoming, it 
is also always already particularized in relation to a given actual occasion, and so is non-
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totalizing in a second sense.  As Whitehead argues, ―There is not just one ‗ideal‘ order which all 
actual entities should attain and fail to attain.  In each case there is an ideal peculiar to each 
actual entity….  Thus the notion of ‗order‘ is bound up with the notion of an actual entity as 
involving the attainment which is a specific satisfaction.  This satisfaction is the attainment of 
something individual to the entity in question‖ (PR, 84).  If it is possible, as Whitehead later 
indicates, to read order as a rendering of social law, the law is always already determined in 
relation to the particularity of actualities.  Radicalizing the ontological principle, the law 
becomes the condition for the becoming of an actual occasion only to the extent that the law has 
already become particularized for that occasion.
109
  As we have already seen, the nature of law, 
then, is to not only particularize, but to already be particularized.   
To the extent that this particularization is ―bound‖ to ―a specific satisfaction,‖ it is also 
bound to that which arises as a novelty.  This is to render as a reciprocal determination what 
elsewhere Whitehead designates as the ―ultimate matter of fact‖:  ―The many become one and 
are increased by one‖ (PR, 21).  Or, in a different context but now again, ―No actual entity can 
rise beyond what the actual world as a datum from its standpoint – its actual world – allows it to 
be‖ (PR, 83).  Order and novelty are reciprocal determinants, giving rise to each other.110   
Here, we begin to see one ground of possibility within Whitehead‘s system.  Although 
the actual world is given, and given in a certain order, this order is already determined by the 
novelty of the arising occasion.  In one sense, then, the determinant given world is really quite 
indeterminant.  ―The complexity of nature is inexhaustible,‖ Whitehead argues (PR, 106).  That 
which is given is inexhaustible, unable to be exhausted, unable to be drained of its movement 
into novelty, unable to be lethargically contained.  If it is here not precisely disorder out of which 
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possibility arises, it is the fact that the given is always given anew, that a new given is always 
given, and that this newness resides precisely in the re-structuring of order, the re-ordering of 
what is given.  Order is incapable of finally, for once and for one, determining a new occasion; 
order is always already being determined for this new, in a never ending process of creative 
advance.   
In the second section of ―The Order of Nature,‖ Whitehead begins to introduce a number 
of further conceptualizations of order.  The first is that of a ‗society.‘  Although Whitehead goes 
on to offer a number of specifications of societies, here, I want simplify a bit, treating societies in 
a general sense that includes within it these further specifications, so that a society, as this will be 
discussed in what follows, refers to a variety of societies, from the society that constitutes the 
human, to the society as we more general understand this as the social order.  
Now ―[t]he point of a society,‖ Whitehead argues, ―is that it is self-sustaining; in other 
words, that it is its own reason…  The members of the society are alike . . . by reason of their 
common character, they impose on other members of the society the conditions which lead to 
that likeness‖ (PR, 89).  A society is marked by a certain likeness of its members, an individual 
likeness, a likeness that is sustained, or at least sustainable.
111
  This likeness is sustained through 
a doubled imposition: the inheritance of ―a certain element of ‗form‘‖; and the ―reproduction‖ of 
satisfactions as the effect of this inheritance (PR, 89).  As has already been mentioned, this 
imposition is abstracted as the law of a society, as ―the product of the defining characteristic of 
that society…  [I]n a society, the members can only exist by reason of the laws which dominate 
the society, and the laws only come into being by reason of the analogous characters of the 
members of the society‖ (PR, 90-91).  In a society, the absolute novelty of an occasion is 
mitigated by the imposition of the law of that society.  The law, then, while still functioning as 
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the condition for the arising of the occasion, also now acts as a certain limitation to that 
arising.
112
  Although not an absolute foreclosure on creativity – what would be for Whitehead a 
metaphysical impossibility – the law does function so as to mitigate novelty in the service of the 
sustainability of the society.   
Before moving on to an exploration of this interplay between novelty and sustainability, 
it is necessary to note that for Whitehead, to speak of a society, in the singular, is quite 
misleading.  Here, Whitehead announces a principle, such that ―every society requires a social 
background, of which it is itself a part.  In reference to any given society the world of actual 
entities is to be conceived as forming a background in layers of social order, the defining 
characteristics becoming wider and more general as we widen the background‖ (PR, 90).  
Societies are delimited as societies overlain and embedded within societies, within still larger 
societies, within still larger societies.  On this configuration of societies, there is less a clash of 
societies, or an intersection of orders, than a mutually conditioned and conditioning layering.  
Each embedded society conforms, in receding generality, to the societies within which it finds 
itself.  This conformation is mediated by the abstractness, or distance, separating societies, so 
that the order of distant society may only appear, to another society, as a certain disorder.  One 
may wonder if, if this logic is followed to its extreme, there ever is disorder in the world?  In this 
case, it would be necessary to reemphasize the extent to which disorder is itself a perspectival 
ordering, a ordering that only is felt, by a particular society, or by the members of a particular 
society, as a disorder.  So it is that the determination of disorder is, quite strictly, a determination, 
and not a necessity, a determination abstracted from the previous determination of relevance.  
The foreclosure of order as disorder is a function of social order itself, operating in advance to 
determine what will be felt as a clash, as disorder, as impossibility, as irrelevant. 
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As we have already seen, this determination of order and disorder is, for Whitehead, a 
function of stability, the means for the stabilization of a society.  A society is stabilized to the 
extent that the determination of order and disorder, such as to be amenable to the reproduction 
and continued existence of that society, is itself reproducible, and so imposable on the members 
of that society.
113
  The extent to which a society is able to so maintain its own order within a 
certain environment Whitehead designates as its degree of ―specialization‖ (PR, 100).  Given 
this, a certain balance must be achieved for every society:  on the one hand, a society must attain 
a certain level of specialization so as to maintain a certain level of intensity in satisfaction (the 
measure, as we saw above, of the success of a society), while at the same time, being 
unspecialized enough to adjust to the ever and ongoing changes of the societies within which that 
particular finds itself.  ―The problem of Nature,‖ Whitehead argues, ―is the production of 
societies which are ‗structured‘ with a high ‗complexity,‘ and which are at the same time 
‗unspecialized.‘  In this way, intensity is mated with survival‖ (PR, 101).  Which is to say, in 
another way, that there cannot be one ideal order for any given society.  The imposition of one 
ideal order will necessarily, for Whitehead, eventuate in that society‘s instability.  The instability 
of a society, then, follows not from the failure to impose or follow a particular law, but rather 
from the over intensive imposition of a singular law, or order.
114
  Societies that do not allow for a 
certain flexibility of normativity will necessarily produce instability.  The circuitry of instability, 
then, is founded not on a failure to impose the law, but rather on the overzealous imposition of a 
singular ideal law.   
Societies must, then, maintain a certain balance in being open to a fluctuating given, 
while retaining a sufficient degree of exclusion to maintain its own order.  Whitehead posits that 
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societies achieve such a balance in two ways:  either by, 1) ―blocking out unwelcome detail‖ by 
abstractively objectifying the given into a certain ideal generality (PR, 101), or by 2) by 
―appetition,‖ or, in other words, the development of novelty (PR, 102).  Societies that follow the 
first path Whitehead deems as a low grade (PR, 102) of society, while those that follow the 
second path are deemed to be living (PR, 102).  ―The primary meaning of life,‖ for Whitehead, 
―is the origination of conceptual novelty – novelty of appetition‖ (PR, 102).  These living 
societies become Whitehead‘s concern in the remainder of the chapter.   
This novelty, this living, is always open to a certain pathologization by the society in 
question.  For novelty, as the creation of a new feeling, as an acceptance of the experience of that 
which is new, may, as Butler argues, be the introduction of instability into society.  Instability 
seems to threaten societies from all around.  And it is the introduction of this instability as the 
introduction of novelty that Whitehead recognizes as the pathologization of life, of the 
determination of a certain novelty as unacceptable by that society.  And yet, to the extent that 
this pathologization is successful, it may lead to the further decay and instability of the society.  
For pathologization, as the foreclosure on the possibility of novel experience, is always justified 
and is the means by which order is imposed.  Novelty then, brings with it the risk of exclusion, 
the risk of eliciting the imposition of law, as the means to deny the possibility of that novelty by 
its pathologization.  So it is that novelty is not only the possibility of new experience, of new 
subject positions, but also the possibility of the circuitry of the imposition of the law.  The 
balance of novelty and stability can quickly devolve into the mutual antagonism of the law and 
freedom.  ―Thus life turns back into society: it binds originality within bounds‖ (PR, 107).  And 
yet ―Life is a bid freedom,‖ Whitehead exclaims, a bid that is often forcefully suppressed.   
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 All of this must, finally, be brought back to the Whiteheadian context, one which is 
figured by societies composed of mutually influencing members, embedded and in interaction 
with other societies.  It is in this interaction between societies that the bid for freedom takes 
place.  For it is the freedom to interact by incorporation, by feeling, by experiencing in a new 
way this interaction, rather than by rejection, by elimination.  Yet the flip side of this freedom, 
this conceptual novelty, this new interaction is, and we finally now arrive at it, robbery.  ―All 
societies,‖ Whitehead argues, ― require interplay with their environment; and in the case of living 
societies this interplay takes the form of robbery‖ (PR, 105).  One can imagine two situations.  In 
the first, there are two societies, each stably determined by their own orders.  This stabilization is 
secured the fixity of the experience of the other society: although the two societies are 
contiguous, they are also exclusionary; they are completely other to each other.  Their stability 
resides precisely in the maintenance of this exclusion, a maintenance that is imposed and 
enacted, and means only that the individual members of the societies are others to each other.  
The members of one society do not experience the members of the other society.  Yet, in a bid 
for freedom, one member of one of the societies wishes to experience this other differently, 
wishes to experience this other positively.  A certain novelty is introduced whereby the other is 
introduced, is brought into, is experienced as a new feeling.  This novelty, as we have seen, can 
lead to the disruption of the society, can lead to its own stability.  It is an inappropriate 
experience, and improper experience, a taking that is not allowed, and, from the perspective of 
the society cannot be allowed.  This new experience must be experienced, by the society, as 
unlawful, as against the law of the society, as a robbery.   
In this way, for Whitehead, the circuitry of morality begins (PR, 105), morality as the 
determination of proper interaction, of proper novelty, of novelty within bounds.  A ―fanaticism‖ 
233 
 
(PR, 84).  A circuitry that is something other than the Nietzschean production of the bad-
conscience, another circuitry of morality.  A morality against novelty.  It is here, in positing this 
circuitry of moralism, that Whitehead comes closest to Butler‘s concern with the foreclosures 
which will already determine in advance certain lives as unlivable.  For Whitehead, this is the re-
assertion of a morality in the service of securing an ideal order, an ideal order derivative from the 
past, from a world that no longer is.   
 Immediately following the announcement of this moral circuit, Whitehead proposes a 
concept of God as amoral, if not immoral: ―The primordial appetitions which jointly constitute 
God‘s purpose are seeking intensity, and not preservation‖ (PR, 105).  Beyond the metaphysical 
necessity that Whitehead may find for this conception of God, here he also seems to be aware of 
the historical movement of societies such that the attachment of morality to God is in the name 
of a certain enforcement of the law, a certain doubling of moral fanaticism as religious-moral 
fanaticism.  God then becomes the final justification for morality, the final ground of the 
justification of certain experiences as being beyond the law, against the law, and so punishable 
by the law.  The moral God is the God of justification, judgment, and foreclosure. 
It is, quite possibly, this historical determination of a moral God, a determination that has 
justified, in Whitehead‘s words, a fanatical moralism, that has caused Butler to shy away from 
any positive engagement with religion until quite recently.  And even here, when she has 
considered God, Butler writes God out of the text as quickly as she writes God into her text.  
And so, in the final chapter of Precarious Life, Butler takes up a certain positive religious 
discourse, as a very peculiar reading of Levinas and the voice of God issuing the command, 
―Though shalt not kill.‖  This command, as Levinas argues, is at once both a temptation and an 
injunction:  the temptation to kill the other, and the injunction against this violence.  This, as 
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Butler notes, produces an anxiety, a ―fear for one‘s own survival, and there is anxiety about 
hurting the Other, and these two impulses are at war with each other….  But they are at war with 
each other in order not to be at war‖ (PL, 136-137).  Rather than confront the raging religious 
violence by evacuating God from the morally fanatic scene, Butler suggest figuring God at the 
very center of this scene, as a certain law giving God.  As the giver of law, as law, God will, as 
all law, produce a certain set of foreclosures, foreclosures on possibility, foreclosures on possible 
subjects, establishing the limits of proper subjectivity.  And yet, the very law that produces these 
foreclosures will be the law of non-violence, the law prohibiting these very foreclosures, such 
that the circuitry of foreclosure, the circuitry of violence will be stalled in its own enactment.  
And so Butler may, finally, be offering this final risk: the risk of God in an age of violence.   
5.  Divine possibilities 
From a number of differing traditions, political theory has again taken up a certain 
interest in the religious, such that it is becoming difficult to distinguish political theory from 
political theology.
115
  This interest is, in part, necessitated by the realization that, in the West at 
least, politics and the political have already been determined by the theological.  Within this 
realization a number of diverse traditions are uneasily coming together to require both attention 
to the religious in order to understand politics and the political and a turn to the religious in order 
to move beyond the theological determination of politics and the political.  Within this 
theoretical necessity Judith Butler‘s political thought has recently taken up an interest in the 
religious.  Specifically in ―Precarious Life,‖ and ―Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life in 
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Benjamin‘s ‗Critique of Violence,‘‖116 Butler has taken up a religious discourse that is 
inaugurated by an experience of the divine command ―Thou shalt not kill.‖  In these recent 
works the taking up of religious discourse becomes an occasion for theorizing the ontological 
rupture of an already theologically determined law.  Here Butler argues that the divine command 
functions in ways other than as law, such that an encounter with the divine command functions 
to undo the binds of law: the divine command ruptures, as a divine violence, the linear 
temporality of a theologically determined law whereby subjects are bound to their own 
subjugation within the law itself.  Divine violence, enacted through an encounter within the 
divine command, becomes a violence against the violence of law and thereby frees the subject to 
a possibility for life beyond the law.  In this, Butler‘s recent turn to religious discourse is a way 
to think the limits of subjugation within a theological law, which is also a way to think the limits 
of law itself and the possibility that can arise at these limits when the law is ruptured.   
In both ―Precarious Life‖ and ―Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life,‘‖ the religious 
discourse that is taken up arises out of a religious experience: an encounter with the divine 
command ―Thou shalt not kill.‖  In ―Precarious Life‖ it is not a direct encounter with the divine 
interdiction that is in question, but rather, drawing on Emmanuel Levinas, Butler explores this 
divine interdiction as it is ‗spoken‘ through the unspeaking face of the Other.  Through Levinas, 
Butler is able to return to the key problematic of much of her earlier work: the assumptive force 
of law in the determination of subjects.
117
  Continuing to advance an understanding of this 
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assumptive logic, in ―Precarious Life‖ the divine command takes place in and through the 
approach of the Other, so that the citational practice by which this command is assumed is 
always already a relational citation.  Although there is, in the ―Preface‖ to Precarious Life, an 
attempted distancing from the theorization of this relational interdependence (PL, xiii), the 
political ontology that is developed through this reading of the Levinasian reading of the divine 
command is already a relational ontology.   
With a particular scriptural seriousness, Butler draws from the Biblical narrative that 
relates God‘s giving of the law to Moses that ―the face [of the Other] makes various utterances at 
once: it bespeaks an agony, an injurability, at the same time that it bespeaks a divine prohibition 
against killing‖ (PL,135).  In inaugurating a relationally citational practice—in citing the divine 
interdiction as the already spoken ground of one‘s being in the presence of an Other—the 
encounter with the face of the Other through which the divine interdiction is announced becomes 
the generative occasion of a struggle, a tensed struggle that resides ―at the heart of ethics‖ (PL, 
135).  This tensed struggle is created through the approach of the Other, a drawing near that 
creates both a fright—the experience of having one‘s own precarious life put into question by the 
Other—and an anxiety—the possible necessity of harming the Other in self-defense (PL, 137).  
As Butler argues, within this Levinasian reading of the divine command, if the approach of the 
other creates both a fright and an anxiety this is because the encounter with the Other within the 
strictures of the divine command presents both the limits of one‘s being as well as the limits of 
one‘s relation to the Other.  The approach of the face exposes the self as a being that can be 
killed, while also encountering this Other as one who can be killed, but whose killing is already 
prohibited by the divine command.  The being of the self and the Other remain always in this 
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irreducible and threatening tension of encountering a protected threat, being always exposed to 
that which is approaching.  This relation with the Other can never be resolved into a simple 
reciprocity of pure being with the Other. The assumption into the relational command does not 
and cannot function to produce a secure or stable subjectivity, producing instead a tensed 
encounter with the Other as well as a tensed experience of the precariousness of life itself. 
In ―Benjamin‘s ‗Critique of Violence‘‖ it is no longer a relationally citational practice 
that is at issue, for the divine command itself can be met in itself and for the subject itself.  As 
Butler argues, Benjamin ―invokes the commandment as mandating only that an individual 
struggle with the ethical edict communicated by the imperative‖ (―CC,‖ 205), such that it is the 
divine command itself with which ―each individual must wrestle without the model of any other‖ 
(―CC,‖ 212).  Even though, as Butler notes, the divine command is understood by Benjamin in 
relation to the general strike, the divine command itself is always presented as being addressed to 
an individual, so that it is within the inner-life of the subject that the divine command is 
effective.  
Within this individual encounter, the divine command itself can only be met with struggle 
for the divine command is precisely not a law, being without the means for enforcing a singular 
acquiescence to itself (―CC,‖ 204).  When met within a subjugation to a law that has already 
enforced its own authority to bind, the divine command that leaves open the possibility of its 
own application opens a space for possibility within this other-than-law itself.  It is the opening 
of possibility, of struggle, of wrestling with the command that becomes the possibility for a 
political subjectivity that undoes the binds of law already subjugating the subject.  Although 
leaving behind the possibility of a relational subjectivity, ―Benjamin‘s ‗Critique of Violence‘‖ 
advances beyond the tensed struggle occasioned within the face of the command in ―Precarious 
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Life,‖ such that now the struggle occasioned by the divine command is that which shakes free a 
subjectivity captured in a law that allows for no struggle, a law that disavows any struggle as 
already necessarily being a struggle in violation of the law.  To the extent that Butler, following 
Benjamin, understands the binding law as enacting a violence, the divine command acts against 
the violent binding of the law.  In this violence against violence, the commandment, as Butler 
argues, ―establishes a point of view on law that leads to the destruction of law as coercively 
binding‖ (―CC,‖ 209).   
If we will risk designating a religious turn in Butler‘s thought at this point, this can only 
be understood as a turn to religion and the theological discourses arising from the religious as 
necessitated by the already theological determination of the law.
118
  A religious turn, it seems, 
becomes the only possibility for unbinding an already religiously determined law.  In this, Butler 
does not abandon her previously articulated critique of theology.  In this difficult sense, the 
religious is turned against itself within a determination of the divine command as opposed to the 
law.  The law that has been grounded in theology is seen to be undone in and by a divine 
command that is not law.  The failure of the theological law, which has always been central in 
Butler‘s thought for grounding the possibility of another (un)lawful existence, is now seen to 
arise from a confrontation with a divine command that is not law and which thereby opens a 
positive possibility.  Within this critical theological discourse, arising out of the religious 
experience of another non-law, it is the non-binding divine command that frees the subject into 
another temporality and another causation.  In attempting to think a political subjectivity that can 
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undo the binds of a theological law Butler is drawn to a religious subjectivity that is able to enact 
a rupture within the subjugating functionality of law itself (PL, 138). 
 The encounter with the divine command becomes the fundamental failure of the law to be 
binding.  If in her previous critique of theology, theology designated the determination of the law 
as perfectly binding, the religious now designates a command that will always fail as law—that 
functions as a command in providing the instance for a failure of law.  This failure, in opening a 
certain perspective on the law, does so by opening into an experience of the conditions of law 
itself.  Although in the opening of ―Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life‖ Butler strictly 
announces Benjamin‘s distinctions between mythic violence and divine violence, within the 
rhythm of the messianic which is opened to by divine violence, this distinction is blurred.  The 
destruction which follows from divine violence provides an opening to an originary rhythm, a 
destructiveness, which is the ―constantly recurring condition‖ of both positive law and legal 
violence (―CC,‖ 214).   
 On the one hand, it seems, the divine violence opens to the precariousness of life already 
articulated in ―Precarious Life,‖ though now that precariousness is understood in terms of a 
rhythm of perpetual downfall.  On the other hand, in ―Benjamin‘s ‗Critique of Violence,‘‖ this 
rhythmic destructiveness itself designates the sacredness of life, installing at the heart of life both 
a sacredness and a transience (―CC,‖ 217).  Transience itself then becomes the continual 
downfall and suffering of all life, which is also the condition of both mere life and sacred life.  In 
this sense, positive law, the violence of law, is the violence of transforming this continual 
downfall into a binding guilt by which the transient suffering subject is deemed responsible and 
guilty for a suffering that is its own sacred condition for being (―CC,‖ 216).  Acting against this 
binding, the divine command enacts a violence that provides an expiatory opening into the 
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suffering and transience of life.  Through this violence against violence, mere life is understood 
as being transformed into sacred life (―CC,‖ 216-217).  In reading ―Precarious Life‖ and 
―Benjamin‘s ‗Critique of Violence‘‖ together, the experience of the divine command, in 
inaugurating a tensed realization of the precariousness of life, an experience of the transience of 
life ―functions as the ground for the apprehension of life‘s value‖ (―CC,‖ 219).   
 The value of life is designated, here, as the sacredness of life, so that it is within the 
tensed encounter with the divine command that the subject is freed into an experience of the 
sacredness of life.
119
 Yet this experience of the sacredness of life will always, for Butler, remain 
as the outside of any positive law or order.  In ―Precarious Life,‖ the experience which arises 
from an encounter with the divine command is not yet designated as an experience of the 
sacredness of life, yet the experience of the divine command already attains a position as the 
troubling outside of any political order.  It is in this sense that Butler problematizes Levinas‘ 
claim that the divine command is what should be heard in the meaning of Europe (PL, 135).  For 
Butler, to insist on hearing this command as the meaning of Europe is to insist that there is no 
recognizable Europe in this meaning precisely because  the divine command can give rise to no 
positive civilization.  If a Europe is to arise from this command, it is precisely and only within 
the psychic circuitry of the tension that arises as the experience of the divine command.  
Whatever possible civilization may arise from this tension is itself grounded in the negative 
overcoming of the psychic displacement of accounting for the guilt arising from a forbidden 
desire.   
In ―Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life‖ Butler is more insistent that the divine command 
itself cannot give rise to any positive law.  First, the divine command is itself understood in 
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terms of being a command, and not a law.  Any translation of this command into law will itself 
undo the command as a command, rendering as impossible the struggle that the command 
inaugurates.  More fundamentally, the divine command cannot itself ground any positive law to 
the extent that the divine command is only announced once the law has already been effective 
(―CC,‖ 210).  The commandment then only functions as disruptive, as breaking the binds of law, 
but this is itself a breaking that has no possibility of opening to a life of what is broken.  This life 
that is opened becomes, then, ―an omission, a failure to show, to comply, to endorse . . . [a] 
refusal to act‖ (―CC,‖ 219).  What, we are left to ask, is this negative existence?  
Within his speculative metaphysics Whitehead‘s encounters with God are far from 
singular or complete so that a final interpretation of his determination of God and the relation 
between God and order will not be possible here,
120
 just as Butler‘s own nascent struggles with a 
religious discourse forbid any claims to finality.  As Lewis Ford has argued, a double trajectory 
can be traced in the development of Whitehead‘s speculative metaphysic.121  On the one hand, 
there is the movement that will eventuate in an ontology of actual occasions as concrescent 
activity of becoming in the midst of multiplicity.  With the achievements reached in the 
ontological development of actual occasions, Whitehead is able to develop a conception of God 
that eventuates in the determination of God as dipolar becoming.  This doubled development is 
not only a struggle to determine the ontology of actual occasions and God, or the relation 
between actual occasions and God, but is directly, for Whitehead, a question of order and 
possibility.  It is, as Whitehead continually insists, that God is a necessary element of his 
metaphysic to account for both order and possibility as arising within this order.    
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As we have already seen, Whitehead proposes the necessity of a secularization of God.  
The necessity of secularization requires that the determination of God is itself preceded by a two-
fold critique of religious determinations of God.  First, Whitehead proposes a metaphysical 
critique of determinations of God.  Any metaphysical determination of God, Whitehead argues, 
must satisfy the ecological requirements of that metaphysic.  God cannot, in other words, ―be 
treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse‖ (PR, 343).  
More importantly, though, Whitehead also proposes a theological critique of determinations of 
God.  In Process and Reality Whitehead argues that theological determinations of God produce 
―the doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came 
into being, and whose imposed will it obeys. . . . When the Western world accepted Christianity, 
Caesar conquered; and the received text of Western theology was edited by its lawyers‖ (PR, 
342).  Whitehead‘s theological critique is itself, then, also a political critique.  Within the 
―Western world,‖ a designation that requires a further elaboration to be accurate, God has 
become a legislator, functioning through law in the absolute determination of that which is to be.  
This determination itself is read as following from God‘s will, although it is, Whitehead argues, 
the will of an imperial domination that is being enacted.  In this way, the will of God comes to 
justify the will of Caesar whose own desire has supplanted that of God.                 
This political-theological critique of the determination of God begins Whitehead‘s own 
constructive determination of God, and it is only after the effect of this critique has been 
registered that Whitehead proposes a threefold determination of God as ―the outcome of 
creativity, the foundation of order, and as the goad towards novelty‖ (PR, 88).   In this threefold 
determination, God is not creativity itself, but rather the first accident of creativity, the accident 
of creativity that allows creativity to become actuality (PR, 7).  As that which presents creativity 
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to become actual, God is both the foundation of order and the percipient occasion for creativity 
to arise as novelty and not simply as repetition.  Yet as both foundation and goad toward novelty 
God is determined by a singular purpose: the seeking of intensity within actual occasions (PR, 
88).  With this determination of God‘s purpose as evocative of intensity the evocation of 
societies becomes a ―purely subsidiary‖ desire (PR, 105).  Although God is the foundation of 
order, this is precisely in order to produce intensity, just as societies, Whitehead argues, are 
necessary as that out of which intensity arises (PR, 83).
122
  With this, Whitehead‘s entire 
metaphysic becomes an articulation of the conditions for the ontological production of occasions 
of intensity.
123
  
Intensity is, for Whitehead, the structural production through which the relation between 
order, the subject, and the divine are related.  It might appear, at this point, that a certain 
agreement arises between Whitehead and Butler.  It may be argued that the intense inner struggle 
that Butler argues arises from an encounter with the divine command can be understood in 
relation to the divine desire for intensity in the becoming of occasions.  It would then be possible 
to move directly, within Whitehead, from a determination of God as desiring of intensity to the 
divine rupture of order and law as being the means for intensity to be actualized, deploying in 
this move the conceptual and theoretical apparatus Butler has developed.  Yet Whitehead 
proposes a third figure for encountering the divine that radically shifts the relation between law 
and order.  In distinction from the position articulated in ―Precarious Life,‖ God is, for 
Whitehead, the ground of the becoming of each actual occasion in its own becoming as 
providing its own subjective aim.
124
  God is not, for Whitehead, mediated from outside through a 
normative relationality, but is within the relationality of all becoming itself.  By figuring God as 
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within an already metaphysical relationality, Whitehead is able to theorize relationality itself 
without determining God as the cause or transcendent ground of being nor as the total outside of 
relationality (PR, 65).   
In distinction from the position articulated in both ―Precarious Life‖ and ―Benjamin‘s 
‗Critique of Violence‘,‖ Whitehead determines God not as a giver of law, nor even giver of 
command, but as the Principle of Concretion (SMW, 174, PR, 244), as foundation of order not by 
law or divine fiat, but as valuator of possibility (PR, 31).
125
  This is, then, to fully register the 
effect of Whitehead‘s theological critique of the determination of God.  For Whitehead, to 
understand God principally in terms of the giver of law is to already determine God as Caesar.  
This is also to already determine the world as obeying the divine fiat of will.  When all order is 
given over to the will of law, God and the world appear as already determined to an economy of 
political and law bound will.  For Whitehead, the secularization of God entails the necessity for a 
secularization of metaphysics itself.  And this metaphysical secularization proposes not simply 
the failure of the law, but the abandonment of the law as the ground of being and possibility.  
Within Whitehead, it is not the failure of the law that opens up possibility but a rejection of the 
lawful as the determination of both God and the world that undoes the law of Caesar itself.     
In determining God as the Principle of Concrescence and the ground of possibility, God 
not only does not dictate the world through law, but neither does God order the world by 
judgment.  God is rather the primordial decision through which, as Whitehead argues, ―the 
barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities obtains primordially the efficient 
conjunction of ideal realization‖ (PR, 40).126  As Steven Shaviro argues, situating Whitehead in 
relation to both Kant and Deleuze, God functions as both the limitative and inclusive disjunctive 
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synthesis: performing the primordial decision from which all other decisions can occur, while 
also providing, in this primordial decision, a wider scope of possibility in distributing a new 
composition of possibility itself.
127
  It is as primordial decision that God becomes the primordial 
occasion of novelty, grounding all becoming through decision and proposing what might be to 
that which arises from what has been.  It is in this divine decision that novelty becomes not only 
possible, but conceivable (PR, 40). 
It is also in this sense that God is, for Whitehead, primordial irrationality.  For this divine 
decision from which all other decisions flow is itself the ground of decisive rationality.  God is 
therefore, Whitehead argues, ―the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate 
irrationality‖ (SMW, 178).  It would seem that God is, for Whitehead, determined within what is 
for Butler, in her reading of Benjamin, the mythic.  Here then, God would be performing the 
primordial instance of formative violence, a formative violence that does not answer to any 
previous law or rationality, but is itself the ground for law and rationality (―CC,‖ 201-202).  God 
would be, if not Caesar, then the enactor of a primordial violence of law, whereby violence 
would become the final ground of all becoming and being.  The production of being out of the 
flux of becoming would be nothing more than an inseparable from this primordial violence.   
Whitehead does not shy away from the realization that God, as the Principle of 
Concrescence, performs a primordial decision that is a primordial limitation.  There is, 
Whitehead acknowledges, a certain ―ruthlessness of God‖ as the Principle of Concrescence; a 
ruthlessness that is ―inexorable in God‖ (PR, 244).  This ruthlessness is the ruthlessness of any 
decision, where decision refers not first to consciousness, but to ‗cutting off‘ (PR, 43).  Even so, 
it is difficult to render this ruthlessness as simply a violence against life, as an arresting of life 
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(―CC,‖ 208).  On the one hand, Whitehead argues that this is a necessary ruthlessness, a ruthless 
decision that must be performed in order for any becoming, or novelty itself, to be possible.
128
  
Without this primordial decision, the continual process could not become a process of becoming.  
Decision is, Whitehead argues, the very meaning of actuality (PR, 43).  The primordial 
ruthlessness, then, is not itself against life, but is a necessary valuation for the possibility of any 
becoming; it is a ―valuation as an aim towards ‗order‘; and ‗order‘ means ‗society permissive of 
actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts‘‖ (PR, 244).  With 
this, Whitehead seems to be acknowledging what Butler has always insisted on: all becoming 
can only arise out of what is given, and that which is given is only given through limitation, a 
decisive cutting off.   
If it is necessary, though, in following Whitehead, to continue to speak of this primordial 
decision as a primordial limitation, this is neither the enactment of a totalizing order nor a 
fundamental foreclosure.  Rather, the valuative order that is enacted in this primordial decision is 
only a partial determination of that which is given, the given out of which actuality arises.  
Disorder is, Whitehead argues, the correlative of order, and only together do they constitute what 
is given (PR, 83).  The ordering that is enacted in the primordial decision is the ordering of that 
which is given, but not in its totality.  It is rather a primordial decision that creates the condition 
for a further decision, the decision of an actual occasion in its own becoming.
129
  As Whitehead 
argues, ―An actual entity arises from decisions for it, and by its very existence provides decisions 
for other actual entities which supersede it‖ (PR, 43).  Thus actuality is constituted as a 
successive series of decisions, decisions within what is given as ordered thereby providing an 
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ordered given to what is to come.  Yet this series of decisions are not, in themselves, complete 
determinations of the decisions to come.  Rather, decisions are made for actual occasions only so 
that they, in their own singularity, may make their own decisions, and so attain their own 
actuality.  Decision, the decision to enact and how to enact prior decision, is then both the ground 
and responsibility for each actual occasion, determining itself amidst a continuing flux of prior 
decisions (PR, 88). 
In positing the successive arising of actuality as a series of decisions, as a series of 
limitations, Whitehead finally enacts the fundamental secularization not only of God but of 
creativity itself (PR, 343).  For it is in this sense, Whitehead argues, ―that God can be termed the 
creator of each temporal actual entity.  But this phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion 
that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be ascribed to God‘s volition.  The true 
metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal instance of this creativity, and is therefore the 
aboriginal condition which qualifies its action‖ (PR, 225).  With this rejection of the creatio ex 
nihilo
130
 the final effect of the secularization of God is felt (PR, 21).  On the one hand, creativity 
is designated as the ―universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact‖ (PR, 21) and 
is no longer determined solely as the will of God.  On the other hand, the decisive limitation of 
order is not itself a totalizing enactment of that which is given, but is rather the ground of 
creativity amidst a given that is both order and disorder.   
A strict distance arises, for Whitehead, between a primordial decision that, in its insistent 
repetitions, aims toward a decisive limitative ordering for the sake of intensity and a primordial 
violence that, in its constant reiteration, enacts a constant totalized capture of being.  For 
Whitehead this latter full determination of order, the determination of ―one ideal order necessary 
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for all actual occasions,‖ only arises from a ―disastrous over-moralization of thought under the 
influence of fanaticism, or pedantry‖ (PR, 84).  In a derivative sense of order, where order is a 
designation of societal order,
131
 this over-moralizing fanaticism is itself the social insistence that 
the given can be determined solely by and as order.  This insistence is contrasted by Whitehead, 
with the metaphysical determination of social order as a series of elicitations,
132
 coupled to the 
contrast, announced in Adventures of Ideas, between a civilization grounded in force and a 
civilization of persuasion.  It is the civilization of force that compels a final conformity to a 
totalized order as an over-moralization of the order of society itself.   
It is precisely against this over-moralization that God functions, within Whitehead, as the 
ground of possibility, the future possibility of the becoming of all actuality.  Within the inclusive 
disjunctive synthesis, God‘s envisagement of possibility transforms what appears as given 
incompatible disorder into intensive contrast, such that the given inheritance of order is 
―accompanied by a conceptual reaction partly conformed to it, and partly introductory of a 
relevant novel contrast, but always introducing emphasis, valuation, and purpose‖ (PR, 108).  
This introduction of relevant novelty is itself the ground of a decision that will become the 
background of the given from which further decisions will be made.  The introduction of relevant 
novel contrasts opens a possibility for an order of intensity within each occasion that works 
against any totalized order as a complete determination of what is given.  The introduction of this 
novelty then becomes the given for future occasions in their own becoming.  If this novelty, in 
inaugurating a serial order of that which is given, seems to open to a determination of that which 
is given, a determination that itself installs a determined order, Whitehead will still insist that 
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God, as the ground of this novelty, is ―seeking intensity, and not preservation‖ (PR, 105).  
Whatever novel possibility is inaugurated here is inaugurated not to establish another order, but 
rather, the order that is established is itself for intensity, for an intensity of becoming.  It is, as 
always, for Whitehead, order for intensity, and not primarily an order of intensity.   
To follow Whitehead‘s demand for a secularization of God is not simply, then, to demand 
a recognition of nor the elaboration of the possibility of the failure of law as the determination of 
order.  It is rather to demand a reconfiguration of the series of relations constituted by the 
determination of God as divine lawgiver, giving a law that can determine all order in its totality.  
This is to refigure the relation between God and law, which is also a determination of the relation 
between God and order.  Yet once these relations are refigured, it also becomes necessary to 
refigure the relation between God and creativity, determining the nature of creativity itself.  With 
this complete secularization of God, Whitehead is led to posit the audacious possibility of a 
civilization of Peace, where order is always an ordering for and not an ordering of.   
6.  A body politic to come 
 With this, then, we arrive at a final determination of a post-secular political ontology.  
This is a politics of the future (ES, 90), which is itself also a politics of the return of the religious, 
where the religious is always returning, returning as a divine violence rupturing history to its 
own possibility of becoming otherwise.
133
  Working through and with Butler and Whitehead, we 
arrive at a political ontology of the future, opened by the continual return of the religious.   
The religious is not, of course, the only opening of history that we have encountered.  
History, as the ―sedimentation‖ of our becoming (BTM, 245, fn. 8), that process within which we 
are always already engaged (AI, 46), is never completely closed or foreclosed upon.  The 
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negativity of decision which is at the heart of every becoming allows history to always remain 
not only the given of what has been, but also the given of what might have been (BTM, 233-236; 
PR, 226-227).  The past is always, in this sense, a usable past, usable as the ground of possible 
futures.
134
  History can never be fully captured by its own becoming, remaining always a 
contingent practice of decision given precisely as and through these contingent decisions 
perishing in order to give rise to a novel future.
135
  
If history can never be fully captured by its own being, it can also never be fully captured 
by practices of representation.  Language is a continual failure, is predicated precisely on this 
failure as a poetic lure for becoming.  As we have seen, for Whitehead the limits of language 
require that philosophic practice become precisely as a practice of becoming, always remaining 
open to its own future of development.  This future of philosophy comes through its own practice 
of conceptual creation, luring itself forward into experiences that have yet to come.  For Butler, 
this philosophical practice is itself the determination of a political practice as the continual 
contestation of representation and recognizability.  To recognize the limit of language is at once 
to recognize politics as a continual contestation of language as possibility.
136
   
Actuality is not, of course, simply a matter of its public history; it is also the occasion of its 
private becoming.  But this privacy is always a privacy that is shot through with otherness, a 
relational becoming as the coming together of that which is given.  If, as Whitehead insists, 
occasions become in the privacy of their own immediacy, this becoming is always a becoming 
together of others; relationality, in other words, is not simply to designate the becoming together 
of a community, but always the becoming together of a constitutive otherness.  The other is 
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always already present in the self as the repeated condition of its becoming.
137
  Although Butler 
has announced a certain hesitation with conceptualizing relationality, in her recent work she has 
taken up a much more explicitly relational thought in the name of a precarious and vulnerable 
subjectivity.
138
  With this, Butler has come to arrive at a Whiteheadian determination of the 
subject as an ek-static subjectivity, always being opened by and opened to a becoming of 
possibility transcending it owns being.
139
  
Possibility does not then arise simply from a divine violence.  Power is always a movement 
that is open to its own divergencies of becoming.  What, then, are we finally to make of this 
religious return, of this return of the religious as an opening of possibility?  It is, quite simply, 
without any simplicity, the in-sistence of metaphysical possibility, of what we have already 
designated as the possibility of an ecological politics, a politics of the world.  In the work of 
Butler, this turn to religion itself enacts a certain return, a return to the metaphysics of her own 
beginning, the metaphysical movement of desire.  To see this, it is possible to begin by noting 
two religious turns in Butler‘s work: a turn to an exploration of the secular, as the contemporary 
structure of our time, which is not our only time; and a turn to the theological in and through her 
reading of the divine violence.   
In a series of recent articles Butler has taken up the question of the secular, and in 
particular, the question of the constitution of the secular as an always contested, and so political, 
task.  The secular, and the religious against which it is posed, Butler argues, is neither an 
institutional order nor an achievement; it is rather a normative practice, or rather, a framework, a 
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framework which is taken up in our being and acting in the world;
140
 specifically, a framework 
for determining the social field as private and public (―JZ?‖ 70), governed by a particular 
temporality of freedom (FW, 101),
141
 populated by particular, and particularized, subjects (FW, 
108), subjects that we can, in drawing a connection that Butler has not herself made, designate as 
subjects of theological simplicity.
142
  The secular is, then, the always unstable, always mobile, 
always differentiated and differentiating production of a place and of a time (FW, 103), within 
which one takes up the task of becoming a subject.  Without here elaborating the content of these 
productions, that which appear as the substantive determination ―Muslim,‖ ―secular,‖ ―Western,‖ 
―homophobic,‖ ―gay,‖ ―free,‖ etc., an elaboration that I imagine we will be entered into tonight, 
we can here designate, at least as a sketch, the formal structure of this practice which is named 
the secular. 
But to begin, this is already to misname the practice.  For the secular cannot be thought in 
its simplicity because it is not practiced in a simple isolation from the religious (―JZ? 71). The 
secular is, rather, the practices of this separation, just as the religious is, in this sense, the 
practices of the separation.  The secular and the religious are both the negativity of their 
differentiation, functioning precisely as this negation as that which they are not.  There is, then, a 
mutual implication between the secular and the religious, within which they are equally bound to 
each other (FW, 122).  With this binding, and in our historical moment, which is to say within 
our history, Butler argues for a certain priority of the religious.  Our secular is, as many have 
argued, an achievement of Christianity, and, in particular, Protestant Christianity, so that religion 
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―underwrites the framework within which we are operating,‖ (―JZ? 71), underwritten, we might 
add, as the normative demand of and for a simple theological subject.   
The priority of the religious in our secular is itself achieved as the establishment of and 
the differentiation of the private and the public in and as the social space of our belonging.  The 
public sphere is, in this sense, the negative achievement of Protestant Christianity as its 
establishment of a private religious sphere (―JZ?‖ 71).  If the secular is, as is often proposed, an 
achievement of the privatization of religion as the safeguard of the public, this is itself a public 
that is inhabited by the religious, by a Protestant Christianity, as the secular (―JZ?‖ 71).  If 
religion is the outside of the secular as the private outside the public, this outside is only 
achieved by a particular religion remaining in the public sphere, remaining unmarked, known 
only as its effects.  The secular, then, becomes the means for the survival of the religious as other 
than its own determinate being as outside (―JZ? 72). 
In addition to being a spatial demarcation of public space, the secular is a determinantion 
of time, one temporality amidst the many times of our time (FW, 101), a time that is itself the 
determination of the place of the secular (FW, 103).  To speak of time, in this sense, is not 
simply to speak of the temporality of being, a temporality that Butler has already determined as 
reiteration, the continual citational practice by which one becomes.  Time is, rather, a certain 
structuring and ordering of this temporality, an ordering through which subjects of time appear 
within time.  The time of the secular, as determined to be secular time, is a teleological time of 
progress (FW, 104).  This is, of course, a rather well rehearsed determination of our time, the 
time not only of the secular, but the modern, although it is precisely the ease of this conflation 
that comes to trouble Butler as she attempts to disentangle the various times of our lives.  For if 
we too easily use this teleological time to conflate the secular and the modern, and both, if we are 
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to play out this well known narrative, as arising as the culmination of a Judeo-Christian 
rendering of time as linear, have we already assumed as the limit of our critique this teleological 
time that produces in its wake a singular cultural sphere?  If the secular becomes the modern in 
and through this time, this is always an achievement of time and in time, and so our critical 
engagements must always attempt a disentanglement of our times precisely as the entanglement 
of our being.   It is only after this religious secular that the theological can appear in Butler‘s 
work arriving as it‘s return, an arrival that we can tentatively designate as the post-secular 
theological appearance of the divine.  
As we have already seen, the appearance of the divine as a divine violence enacts a 
struggle, an inner struggle that is an inner intensity, an intensity that itself enacts a messianic 
expiation of the subject already caught in and as a guilt before the law.  Divine violence is after, 
if it is after anything at all, an immediacy of intensity, an intensity of inner struggle occasioned 
by the command to not kill, an intensity that opens the subject to its own messianc transience, its 
own perpetual downfall in and as the negativity of this negative command to preserve life.  This 
is a command by which the subject is bound to an Other in the negativity of freeing life, so that 
the subject theological undone is a subject of immediate ecstatic intensity.  So that finally if 
divine violence is after anything it is after the immediacy of desire. 
But what, in the end, are we to make of this other, this other theological command, this 
appearance of theology?  Certainly it is other to the secular, arising only after the downfall of the 
secular, although also remaining necessarily in relation to this other, taking into itself the history 
of its own appearance.  If this theological appearance is the appearance of a law, or a kind of law, 
it is not quite a human law, just as if it appears in the Face of the Other, it appears in a Face that 
is not quite a human face.  This appearance of the theological, as an appearance of a divine 
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violence that comes from elsewhere, from an other than human elsewhere, might then be an 
appearance of the ecological, as the (re)appearance of metaphysical desire, a desire that opens to 
and is opened by the world.  
As we have already seen, religion is, for Whitehead, a feeling of world-loyalty, a feeling of 
being within the world as being undone by the world of one‘s becoming.  The religious returns, 
then, as the ever returning event through which the subject is ecologically undone in its own 
becoming otherwise.  It is unsurprising, then, that at this moment, when Butler‘s own work is 
beginning to make a religious turn, taking up its own religious possibility, it is also taking up and 
being taken up into a series of ecological concerns.
143
  The divine opening of possibility is then 
an opening which is the undoing the subject not simply in its sociality but also, and more 
fundamentally, in its ecological becoming, opening to a becoming otherwise of not just the 
subject but of the world itself.  It is, in other words, a becoming otherwise of a politics that is 
already an ecological politics of becoming.  The post-secular event is then the event of 
possibility, a possibility for the world, a possibility for a world of and still with a future to come.        
           
      
                                                 
143
 See, on the one hand, her recent lecture ―Bodies in Alliance and the Politics of the Street 
(http://www.eipcp.net/transversal/1011/butler/en), as well as her contribution to the Becomings, Misplacements, 
Departures conference.    
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